Security hardened remote terminal units for SCADA networks. by Hieb, Jeff
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
5-2008 
Security hardened remote terminal units for SCADA networks. 
Jeff Hieb 
University of Louisville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Hieb, Jeff, "Security hardened remote terminal units for SCADA networks." (2008). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. Paper 615. 
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/615 
This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator 
of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who 
has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
SECURITY HARDENED REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS FOR SCADA NETWORKS 
By 
Jeffrey Lloyd Hieb 
B.S., Furman University, 1992 
B.A., Furman University, 1992 
M.S., University of Louisville, 2004 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Computer Science and Computer Engineering 
J. B. Speed School of Engineering 















Jeffrey Lloyd Hieb 
B.S., Furman University, 1992 
B.A., Furman University, 1992 
M.S., University of Louisville, 2004 
 
A Dissertation Approved on 
 
 








        
Dr. James H. Graham, Dissertation Director 
 
 
        
Dr. Adel Elmaghraby 
 
 
        
Dr. Patricia A. S. Ralston 
 
 
        
Dr. Dar-jen Chang 
 
 
        
Dr. Rammohan K. Ragade 
DEDICATION 
To my wife 
Jennifer 
for all of her support, encouragement and patience. 
111 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. James Graham, my 
dissertation director. Collaborating and working with him has been both pleasurable and 
educational. His technical guidance, perspective and encouragement were essential to the 
completion of this dissertation. I wish to thank the members of my committee, Dr. 
Patricia Ralston, Dr. Adel Elmaghraby, Dr. Dar-jen Chang, and Dr. Rammohan K. 
Ragade for their time, expertise, and support. A special thanks to Dr. Adel Elmaghraby 
for mentoring me in the future faculty program. I learned a lot from our conversations. I 
also owe special thanks to my friends and colleagues Sandy Patel, Rob Kelley, Doug 
Wampler, and Nathan Johnson for distracting me when I need distracting and assuring 
me when I need assuring. Many thanks to Dr. Walden Laukhuf, Mr. Steve Williamson, 
and the Chemical Engineering Department. Generous use of their facilities, particularly 
the Process Control Laboratory and the Unit Operations Laboratory, as well as their time 
and expertise were greatly appreciated. Thanks also to Ron Lile and his staff for 
providing technical support. 
IV 
ABSTRACT 
SECURITY HARDENED REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS FOR SCADA NETWORKS 
Jeffrey L. Hieb 
February 26, 2008 
Remote terminal units (RTUs) are perimeter supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) devices that measure and control actual physical devices. Cyber 
security was largely ignored in SCADA for many years, and the cyber security issues that 
now face SCADA and DCS, specifically RTU security, are investigated in this research. 
This dissertation presents a new role based access control model designed specifically for 
RTUs and process control. The model is developed around the process control specific 
data element called a point, and point operations. The model includes: assignment 
constraints that limit the RTU operations that a specific role can be assigned and 
activation constraints that allow a security administrator to specify conditions when 
specific RTU roles or RTU permissions cannot be used. 
RTU enforcement of the new access control model depends on, and is supported 
by, the protection provided by an RTU's operating system. This dissertation investigates 
two approaches for using minimal kernels to reduce potential vulnerabilities in RTU 
protection enforcement and create a security hardened R TU capable of supporting the 
new RTU access control model. The first approach is to reduce a commercial OS kernel 
v 
to only those components needed by the RTU, removing any known or unknown 
vulnerabilities contained in the eliminated code and significantly reducing the size of the 
kernel. The second approach proposes using a microkernel that supports partitioning as 
the basis for an RTU specific operating system which isolates network related RTU 
software, the R TU attack surface, from critical R TU operational software such as control 
algorithms and analog and digital input and output. 
In experimental analysis of a prototype hardened RTU connected to real SCADA 
hardware, a reduction of over 50% was obtained in reducing a 2.4 Linux kernel to run on 
actual RTU hardware. Functional testing demonstrated that different users were able to 
carryout assigned tasks with the limited set of permissions provided by the security 
hardened RTU and a series of simulated insider attacks were prevented by the RTU role 
based access control system. Analysis of communication times indicated response times 
would be acceptable for many SCADA and DCS application areas. Investigation of a 
partitioning microkernel for an RTU identified the L4 microkernel as an excellent 
candidate. Experimental evaluation of L4 on real hardware found the IPC overhead for 
simulated critical RTU operations protected by L4 partitioning to be sufficiently small to 
warrant continued investigation of the approach. 
VI 
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Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems became popular in the 
1960's for a variety of reasons. SCADA systems allow measurement and control of 
physical systems to be carried from a remote location. Initially they were used by 
industries and utilities to monitor and control physical devices like valves and switches. 
Prior to the use of SCADA systems, opening and closing of valves or the setting of 
switches was done manually; this was both costly because it was labor intensive and the 
exposure of valves and switches (especially in a distributed system like the electrical 
power grid or water supply system) to human control was considered a security and 
safety issue. Using SCADA systems, unauthorized access to valves and switches could 
be more tightly controlled while keeping a human in the loop; that is, human supervision 
and interaction were, and still are, part of SCADA systems. However, technological 
advances and the maturation of SCADA systems has pushed more of the supervisory 
function onto the computer systems that make up modern SCADA systems. 
In the early development of SCADA systems attention was given to physical 
security, but virtually no attention was given to electronic or cyber security. The systems 
were obscure and the skills and technology needed to interact with the systems were 
simply not readily available; security of this type is often referred to as "security through 
obscurity". This pattern has continued and today "most dedicated SCADA and PCS 
applications have not included built-in security" [1]. Unfortunately, open protocols, 
advanced telecommunication networks, cheap computer electronics, and unlimited access 
to even the most obscure information through the World Wide Web have made 
SCADA's security through obscurity obsolete. The move of SCADA systems to open 
standards and new technology has allowed SCADA system managers to realize cost 
savings by using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software. In addition, 
as computer networks and information systems have become more commonplace 
throughout the corporate enterprise, managers have seen the economic benefits of having 
access to SCADA data and have built network connections into the previously isolated 
SCADA networks. The connection of porous and less secure corporate networks to once 
isolated SCADA networks, now using COTS systems, has unintentionally exposed 
SCADA systems to a host of vulnerabilities and threats for which it was ill prepared. 
SCADA protocols provide no authentication or authorization capabilities. When 
other networks are connected to the SCADA network, intentionally or unintentionally, an 
attacker who manages to gain access to the SCADA network can spoof control signals on 
the SCADA network. Because SCADA protocols do not provide authentication or 
authorization a SCADA system is unable to distinguish between a real and a spoofed 
control signal, allowing the attacker to control SCADA devices. If the device were an 
electrical breaker and the SCADA operator was an electric utility, then turning that 
switch on might overload the power systems, or tuning it off might tum off electricity to 
customers. This threat is compounded by the use of COTS software, particularly COTS 
operating systems, as it becomes possible for insiders to use almost any PC to run 
SCADA software, and thus elevates the insider threat. 
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Concern for the cyber security of industrial control systems has been amplified by 
the fact that many, if not all, of our nation's critical infrastructures are heavily reliant on 
these control systems for reliable and stable day to day operation. The Patriot Act defines 
critical infrastructures to be "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have 
a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, of any combination of those matters" [2]. The President's Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection found that there was a "growing cyber dimensions associated 
with infrastructure ... and ... the defenses that served us so well in the past offer little 
protection from the cyber threat" [3]. 
While the United States has been fortunate that a major cyber attack has not been 
successfully carried out against any critical infrastructure SCADA systems, incidents 
have occurred. In 2003 the slammer worm penetrated part of the network at a Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio and disabled part of the safety monitoring system for 
nearly five hours [4]. Fortunately the plant was shut down for repairs at the time. In 
another incident, a hacker using a radio transmitter was able to open valves and release 
raw sewage from an Australian sewage treatment plant [5]. The reluctance of companies 
to release incident information along with the possibility that some or many incidences 
go unnoticed makes it difficult to accurately assess the risk. One attempt to track 
incidents, the Industrial Security Incident Database maintained by the British Columbia 
Institute of Technology (BCIT), has shown a sharp increase in security incidents 
beginning in 200 I [6]. 
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Addressing cyber security for SCADA is an ongoing task with many challenges. 
One challenge is that these systems tend to have a very long deployment life, up to and 
even beyond twenty years; consider the difference in computing technology between 
today and twenty years ago. Addressing the security needs for next year is challenging, 
addressing the security needs two decades into the future is daunting at best. Economics 
also plays a role because the cost of updating or replacing SCADA systems is significant, 
meaning that security solutions for legacy systems are needed. However, control systems 
are gaining in popularity; the global revenue from the sale of control systems is expected 
to grow to $13.9 billion by 2009 [1]. As this growth continues and as network 
convergence becomes an increasingly un-avoidable reality, it is of utmost importance that 
the next generation of SCADA systems be security hardened against all types of cyber-
based attacks. 
The SCADA architecture is generally broken down into a master station or MTU 
used by human operators to monitor and control remote terminal units, or RTUs. A 
communications network provides communication channels between MTUs and RTUs. 
Security hardening techniques are needed for the various components as well as for the 
SCADA system as a whole. RTUs interact with physical devices like valves and 
switches. A primary SCADA security objective is to prevent unauthorized or improper 
operation of valves, switches, or other physical devices, since these devices could have 
economic consequences for a SCADA operator as well as potentially disrupting normal 
operation of U.S. critical infrastructures. The fact that RTUs can, and often are, 
physically remote makes securing them that much more important. 
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This dissertation describes research and development of a security hardened RTU. 
While protecting and securing existing systems is important, the aim of this dissertation is 
to explore the development of next generation RTUs. As existing RTUs are replaced in 
existing SCADA deployments and as new SCADA systems are deployed, it is important 
that these RTUs be security hardened against cyber based attacks. This dissertation 
presents an RTU role based access control model for hardening RTUs. The model is 
developed to prevent unauthorized alteration of analog and digital 10 points. In addition 
a middleware layer deployment architecture is advocated to allow fine grained and 
homogenous application of an RTU access control policy. Operating system (OS) 
support for a middleware layer deployment is a critical factor in the assurance of the 
security hardened RTU. Two approaches for reduced kernel RTUs are presented. A 
reduced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) kernel is one approach, and is used in the 
development of a prototype for testing. A second approach is to use a microkernel which 
supports partitioning and partition RTU software components to improve security. 
1.1 Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter two provides background information in SCADA and SCADA cyber-
security as well as role based access control models and microkernels. Chapter three 
presents a high level description of the hardened RTU approaches which are investigated 
in this dissertation. Chapter four described the RTU role based access control model in 
detail. Chapter five discussed middleware layer deployment, and the role of an RTU 
operating system in security. Chapter five presents two reduced kernel RTU approaches, 
a reduced COTS kernel and a microkernel. Chapter six describes the development of a 
prototype hardened RTU based on the SIXNET mlPM and a reduced Linux kernel. 
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Performance and security testing results are presented in chapter six as well. Chapter 
seven describes additional investigation of microkemels and the results of some 
preliminary development and testing using an XScale PXA 255 processor and the OKL4 
microkemel. Chapter eight presents the conclusion of this dissertation and elaborates on 




This chapter presents background information of several topics relevant to this 
dissertation. Section 2.1 gives a historical overview of SCADA systems, their central 
components, and uses. The security threats and vulnerabilities that face SCADA systems 
are discussed in section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents a survey of SCADA security research 
and existing research challenges. Section 2.4 described the role based access control 
model (RBAC), and a presents a survey of the work on RBAC and constraints. Section 
2.5 discusses the trusted computing base (TCB) of a system, security kernels, 
microkernels and separation kernels. 
2.1 SCADA systems 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) came into existence in the 
mid 1960's coinciding with the development of the minicomputer. SCADA provides a 
means for remotely monitoring and controlling many kinds of industrial systems by 
providing users of the system with the ability to remotely control one or more specific 
devices and to monitor the performance of those devices from a central and physically 
remote location. The IEEE std C37.1-1994 [7] defines SCADA to be: 
"A system operating with coded signals over communication channels so as to 
provide control of RTU equipment. The supervisory system may be combined with a data 
acquisition system by adding the use of coded signals over communication channels to 
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acquire iriformation about the status of the RTU equipment for di~play or for recording 
functions." [7]. 
An excellent example of such a SCADA system is the distribution system used by 
electric utilities, which is one of the oldest and most familiar SCADA systems. In 
electricity distribution SCADA is used to collect information from remote parts of a 
power distribution grid; for example the volts, amps or phase angle of a particular line in 
a substation, and provide it to a central control installation. In addition, SCADA allows 
an operator at the centralized control station to trip breakers at remote substations in 
response to conditions reported by the SCADA system. Other well known industries that 
use SCADA are the gas and oil utilities and nuclear power production. 
2.1.1 SCADA Components. 
There are four main components that make up a SCADA systems: the supervisory 
system or master terminal unit (MTU), remote terminal units (RTU), a communications 
network, and field instruments or devices [8-10]. The exact nature of the different 
components depends greatly on the specific SCADA system and its topology. A typical 
supervisory system is shown in figure 2.1 and each subsystem is explained in detail in the 
following paragraphs. A small SCADA system might consist of only one MTU and one 
RTU, and is referred to as single-master, single-remote [11]. A more common 
configuration is the single-master, multiple-remote system with a single MTU connected 
to many RTUs. In large SCADA systems it possible to have multiple MTUs and 
hundreds of RTUs [II]. 
8 
Master station (MTU) 
The master station or master terminal unit (MTU) has traditionally been located in 
a control room where human operators interact with the system through a user interface 
(UI). The MTU is responsible for polling remote devices for data, processing the data, 
providing various representations of the data (including alarms) and sending operator 
initiated control signals back to the field devices. In some situations the UI is carried out 
by a separate system called a HMI (human machine interface) system. The HMI system 
provides an interface between an operator and the MTU, freeing up the MTU from 
providing a UI. In this case the MTU continues to carryout polling and control activities, 
but the high level representation is left to the HMI machine. A sample operator screen 




















Figure 2.1. Typical supervisory systems [11]. 
Remote Terminal Units 
Remote terminal units (RTUs), also referred to as remote telemetry units, are 
standalone systems that can acquire data from devices or equipment at the remote site, 
control devices or equipment at the remote site, and transfer acquired data back to a 
9 
master station. RTUs are typically built to withstand the much harsher operating 
environments that can be associated with remote locations like a plant floor, or an electric 
utility substation. RTUs provide four basic types of connections for interfacing with field 
devices: analog inputs, analog outputs, digital inputs, and digital outputs. Leads from 
field devices are directly connected to these interfaces on the RTU. An RTU also 
includes some communications capability through a combination of serial ports, built in 
modems, and more recently Ethernet ports. Other RTU components include a CPU, 
memory, power supply with battery backup, watchdog timer, surge protection, and real-
time clock. A sample RTU specification is given in appendix A and figure 2.3 shows a 
generic RTU hardware configuration. 
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The communication network of a SCADA system connects RTUs with MTUs. 
Remote locations may have a communications network, like a LAN, which can be used 
for local inter-device communication, but this is usually not considered to be part of the 
SCADA communications network. Communication links take many forms including 
leased lines, Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs), Internet Protocol (IP) based 
landlines, radio, microwave and even satellite. SCADA communications security has 
traditionally referred to error detection and error correction capabilities, and not to 
features such as authentication and encryption [7;9]. 
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Figure 2.3. Basic RTU hardware components [13]. 
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Field Equipment 
At the periphery of SCADA systems are field equipment or field devices. These 
are the actual hardware components, which effectively serve as the eyes, ears, and hands 
of the SCADA system. Field equipment essentially consists of sensors and actuators. 
Sensors directly measure a physical condition at some remote site and actuators open, 
close, activate or inactivate a remote physical device. Some examples of field equipment 
are: voltage sensor, phase sensor, circuit breaker, relay, temperature sensor, pressure 
sensor, and flow control valve. 
2.1.2 SCADA architectures 
As computer and network technology have evolved and matured, so have SCADA 
systems. The evolution of SCADA systems is generally broken down into three separate 
successive generations [14;15]: monolithic, distributed, and networked. The changing 
architecture of SCADA systems has been a contributing factor to the cyber security 
issues faced by modem SCADA systems. 
First Generation: Monolithic 
At the time that SCADA systems were first developed, the mainframe computer 
was the dominant computer technology. Networks were virtually non-existent making 
mainframes standalone machines. The SCADA systems of this era reflect this paradigm. 
They were special purpose standalone systems that were not intended to be connected to 
other systems and tended to be very hierarchical and centralized in nature. Figure 2.4 
shows a standard first generation SCADA architecture. The master station in these 
SCADA systems was typically a single mainframe computer. A second redundant master 
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station was usually present and shared the communications bus with the active master 
station. In the event of a system failure the second system could take over. 
The lack of network technology led vendors of SCADA systems to develop 
solutions that allowed RTUs to communicate with the MTU mainframe often over long 
distances. The communication technology they developed was driven solely by this goal 
and in the absence of any of today's WAN protocols. In general the communication 
protocols developed by different vendors were lean, supporting only the minimal 
functionality needed to achieve scanning and control of points within a remote device 
[14]. The transmission medium used to connect RTUs and MTUs lacked a high degree 
of fidelity, leading to communication security focused exclusively on error detection and 
error correction codes. In addition each vendor tended to view their protocols as 
proprietary, preventing other vendors from developing equipment that could 
communicate using these protocols [15]. 
SCADA Master 
~DD 









Figure 2.4. First Generation SCADA architecture [15]. 
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Second Generation: Distributed 
Advances in system miniaturization and LAN technology characterize second 
generation SCADA systems. The single mainframe master station was replaced by 
multiple stations serving different functions all connected by a LAN. The distribution of 
system functionality across multiple machines increased the overall processing capability 
of the system, but LAN technology was only capable of handling relatively short 
distances, typically hundreds of feet, this meant that the systems still had to be housed 
within a single room. Off-the-shelf LAN protocols were available, but some vendors still 
choose to use propriety protocols. Communication links with RTUs were largely 
unchanged relative to first generation systems, and in general vendors maintained control 
over what hardware, software, and devices were available for a specific SCADA system. 
Third Generation: Networked 
Third generation systems are similar in many ways to second generation systems, 
but with one important difference, which is the move to an open system architecture 
instead of a vendor controlled proprietary environments [15]. Open standards have 
removed the limitations that proprietary protocols placed on SCADA systems and 
therefore make it much easier to use COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) components to 
build SCADA systems. One consequence of this move has been the use of WAN 
protocols like TCP/IP for communication between SCADA components like master 
stations, RTUs, field communication equipment, and HMIs [15]. Figure 2.5 shows a 
typical third-generation SCADA architecture. Some advantages of internet based 
SCADA systems are discussed in [16]; the primary advantage cited is lower costs. 
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Figure 2.5. Third-generation SCADA architecture [15]. 
2.1.3 SCADA protocols 
At the heart of SCADA networks are SCADA protocols. These provide the 
template for communication between SCADA components, typically between the MTU 
and the RTU. Early SCADA systems, the first and second generation SCADA 
architectures discussed previously, used proprietary protocols, but in more recent years 
there has been a move to open standards in SCADA protocols. RTUs are connected to 
MTUs by a variety of different communication channels and both the cost and 
availability of the communication channels has affected protocol design [17]. 
The limited bandwidth of early communication channels resulted m a very 
compact message format, supporting only the most basic information needed to achieve 
RTU to MTU communication. Figure 2.6 shows the structure of the basic SCADA 
message format. The four bit RTU address allows multiple RTUs to share a single 
communication channel, rather than requiring a separate communication channel for each 
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RTU. The eight bit function code specifies what operation is to be performed by the 
RTU. The bits following the function code are an addressing scheme that indicates the 
set point, control point, or data on which the operation is to be carried out. This address 
has no special meaning to the RTU, and it is up to the MTU and SCADA software to 
correctly associate an RTU address with the real world value it represents. According to 
the American Gas Association's AGA-12 standard there are about 150-200 SCADA 
protocols [18]. Some of the more popular SCADA protocols, as shown in table 2.1, are: 
MODBUS, IEC 60870-5-101, and DNP3, but none of these currently contain security 
features [19]. 
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Figure 2.6. Typical SCADA protocol message format, adapted from [17]. 
2.2 SCADA cyber security threats and vulnerabilities 
The primary cyber based threat to SCADA systems is that an unauthorized person 
or agent will access the SCADA system and interfere with its operation. The IEEE guide 
for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security defines an electronic 
intrusion as: 
"Entry into the substation [RTUj via telephone lines or other electronic-based 
media for the manipulation or disturbance of electronic devices. These devices include 
digital relays, fault recorders, equipment diagnostic packages, automation equipment, 
computers, PIC, and communication interfaces." [20]. 
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Typical attack scenarios like those described in [21 ;22] center around an attacker 
making changes to control settings, physical device parameters, or sending control 
commands directly to field devices. These attacks would result in a malfunctioning of 
the SCADA system which might cause a disruption in service, or possibly environmental 
damage or loss of human life. These threats might be carried out by a number of 
potential threat agents, including hostile nation states, industrial spies, disgruntled 
employees, and malicious hackers. Table 2.2 lists possible threats to SCADA systems. 
Table 2.1. Common SCADA Protocols [23]. 
Protocol Organization Common Features 
Industries 
DNP3 Developed by GE Electric Object Oriented. Three layer OSI 
Harris, Managed Utilities, Gas model. Open non-proprietary 
by the DNP distribution, standard. 
organization and Water 
distribution 
Modbus Developed by Gas and Oil Initially developed for modicon's 
(Modbus/TCP) Modicon and electric PLCs. Is an open standard and is 
substations, royalty free. Simple to 
transportation implement. Both serial and TCP 
version are available. Simplicity 
and wide use make this an 
excellent protocol when 
int~ratirtg multiQle application. 
Ethernet/lP Open DeviceNet Industrial 
(Industrial Vendors Automation 
Protocol) Association 
(ODVA) 
Device Net Open DeviceNet Industrial Uses CAN as its backbone, 
Vendors Automation originally developed by allen-
Association bradley. Supports master-slave as 
(ODVA) well as ]Jeer to -.£eer 
IEC 60870-5 IEC TC57 





One of the most serious vulnerabilities faced by SCADA system is the commonly 
held misconception that control networks are isolated and therefore not accessible to 
attackers [24;25]. Early control systems used a combination of knobs, lights and dials 
mounted on specialized custom-built control panels. Communication with process 
machinery and field equipment was achieved using analog control signals carried by 
dedicated cables that connected the process control panels to field equipment [26]. 
Securing these systems was simply a matter of locking the door to the control room. The 
first major technological change affecting the cyber security of control systems was the 
adoption of digital communication through serial networks and the ubiquitous RS-232, 
RS-422 and RS-485 standards. At this point, networks, often proprietary or leased serial 
lines, were still relatively isolated. However, the use of digital communication created a 
consolidation of both communications channels and communication standards [26]. As 
computers and network technology began to become available and used through out the 
enterprise, there has been increased demand by industry for connection between the plant 
floor and the corporate network. At the same time there has been increased public 
availability of network access and computer technology. As a result, there is now almost 
always the possibility of an external connection being able to reach the control network, 
whether through an intranet, a business partner's networks, or the Internet. In addition to 
these standard network paths, many SCADA systems make use of modems to provide 
connectivity which can also allow an external connection into the SCADA network. For 
example, the use of war-dialers to connect to remote SCADA equipment is described in 
[21 ;22]. The assumption that SCADA networks are isolated and therefore protected from 
potential attack is simply not true today [25;27;28]. 
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Table 2.2. Threats to SCADA systems. 
Threat Description 
Hackers Hackers break into networks and systems for the thrill and challenge that it 
presents. SCADA systems are not exempt, and are now receiving the attention of 
hackers (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20128089/). 
Hostile Nation States Because they control critical infrastructures on which we are dependent SCADA 
systems are an excellent target for cyber warfare. 
Foreign Intelligence Intelligence agencies (foreign and domestic) are using cyber tools as part of there 
intelligence gathering capabilities. Attacking SCADA systems could provide 
intelligence was weIl as feed information into offensive branches. 
Botnets Botnets are a collection of compromised computers controIled by single person, 
usually referred to as a bot-herder. Botnets are used to carryout coordinated 
attacks, send spam, or carryout phishing schemes. Botnets make use of 
automated attack software. Botnets present two threat vectors, one they can be 
used to carryout an attack on SCADA systems, or two, SCADA systems may 
become part of a botnet and have their resources depleted by the botnet activities. 
Insiders Disgruntled insiders have been main source of computer crime since they have 
knowledge of and access to internal systems. Insiders include employees, 
business partners and vendors. Insiders may not necessarily be malicious, but 
accidental mistakes can have the same consequences as malicious attacks. 
Worms Worms are automated programs that propagate themselves though networks by 
exploiting a common vulnerably. Worms can exhaust network and computer 
resources, as well as harm files on the victims. 
Viruses A Virus is a program that can replicate itself and pass on malicious code to other 
non-malicious programs. Viruses can corrupt files and disrupt or interfere with 
the normal operation of a computer system. 
Terrorists Terrorist seek to destroy or incapacitate critical infrastructure in order to damage 
public moral. Cyber attacks on SCADA systems are one way to achieve this and 
may be possible from a point of relative obscurity. Cyber attacks on SCADA 
systems may also be used to leverage a physical attack, for example by hiding 
alerts of a malicious physical attack. 
Industrial Spies Seek to acquire trade secrets, or inside knowledge that can give one organization 
advantage over another. SCADA systems in manufacturing industries will have 
knowledge of trade secrets, or just private status data. Corruption of a 
competitor's SCADA system at the appropriate time could have financial 
benefits for the competitor. 
As mentioned in the previous section, early SCADA installations were 
characterized by closed systems and proprietary protocol standards. Most SCADA 
systems are privately owned and operated, and operators are driven by economic forces. 
For these reasons the economic advantages offered by open standards and open 
architectures has strongly motivate the adoption and integration in SCADA. In addition 
to assumption the SCADA networks were isolated, was a widely held belief that it was 
difficult to acquire information about SCADA system [6;27]. Open standards and open 
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application layer interfaces that make use of available commodity software, such as a 
web interface. These additional application layer interfaces in to device introduce 
additional vulnerabilities and attack vectors into SCADA systems. 
A final SCADA vulnerability comes from the increased data exchanges between 
businesses achieved through network connectivity. For example, deregulation in the 
power industry has created vulnerabilities for electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution SCADA systems. As a result of deregulation, data exchanges between 
single vertically integrated organizations have been replaced by many horizontal 
relationships among independent entities [15]. Some of the vulnerabilities that result 
from deregulation are described in [32]. The complex interaction among entities not only 
increases the network connectivity of SCADA systems but can require multiple master 
and multiple remote architectures with many different entities needed varying degrees of 
access. 
Evidence of the vulnerabilities faced by SCADA systems is well documented in a 
recent assessment of the network security of power substations [33]. In this assessment 
Oman and colleagues found a number of security vulnerabilities, identified in 1997, still 
existed in 2002. These included such basic security vulnerabilities as default passwords 
and unsecured modem access. They also found new potential vulnerabilities in the form 
of internet connectivity and wireless networks. Table 2.3 summarizes the vulnerabilities 
they identified. 
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Table 2.3. Power substation vulnerabilities [33] 
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There is also evidence that actual attacks against SCADA systems are occurring 
and that the number of attacks is increasing. A study by the British Columbia Institute of 
Technology [6] found a substantial increase in the percentage of attacks coming from 
external sources. BCIT maintains an industrial cyber security incident database for the 
purpose of tracking cyber security incidents in process control systems. They found a 
substantial increase in the number of attacks beginning in 2001. An analysis of incident 
type found that between 1982 and 2000 about 31 % of the incidents came from external 
sources but that from 2001 to 2003 nearly 70% of the incidents came from external 
sources. Further analysis of the external security incidents to identify entry points 
concluded that there are many routes into complex SCADA systems, 
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2.3 Securing SCADA systems 
Having established and understood the weak security of modem SCADA systems 
the question then becomes how to secure them. An obvious first step is to attempt to 
apply established network security technologies to SCADA networks. Section 2.3.1 
discusses a number of articles that explore applying standard IT security solutions to 
SCADA systems. However SCADA systems and traditional IT systems are not the same, 
and care must be taken when applying existing security technologies to SCADA since 
these technologies, which acceptable in traditional IT environment, may have 
unacceptable adverse impacts on SCADA. Section 2.3.2 discusses the difference 
between traditional IT environment and SCADA or control networks. In cases where 
traditional IT solutions are not feasible, new security technologies need to be developed 
to address the specific needs of SCADA. Section 2.3.3 presents the research challenges 
facing SCADA and the work that has been conducted. 
2.3.1 Securing SCADA with standard IT technologies. 
Applying the experience, knowledge, and technologies of IT security to SCADA 
and PCS systems has been an essential first step in securing SCADA systems. As we 
have seen, the security threat to SCADA systems comes in a large part from the fact that 
these were once isolated networks. When they can no longer be isolated, good network 
segmentation can help keep SCADA systems secure [22;34;35]. Segmentation can be 
provided by firewalls or through the use of a virtual LAN (VLAN) [36;37]. Network 
segmentation reduces the exposure of SCADA systems to external networks, improving 
security. 
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In [38] Munshi discusses the security considerations for SCADA systems at four 
levels of the SCADA architecture. Level one is field equipment like PLCs and RTUs. 
The threat identified at this level is access to data or spoofing of commands, and the 
recommended solution is to implement encryption. Level two is the telecom level 
comprised of the communication channels used to connect RTUs and field equipment to 
level three. The threat at this level is that these are generally unsecured communications 
that may be traveling over unsecured shared networks. The recommendation at this level 
is to consider using IPSEC. Level three is the SCADA level, essentially this is the 
control center. Recommendation for systems in this level include operating system 
hardening, patch management, network equipment access control, server access controls, 
physical security, virus protection strategy, and user authorization. The final level, level 
four, is the enterprise level, consisting of remote SCADA clients, ERP systems, corporate 
users of SCADA data, web services, and so forth. Recommendations at this level include 
network controls like firewalls, proxy servers, and network segmentation. 
A layered security approach is advocated by Miller [30]. Layered security 
deploys security elements in each of three layers of a computing environment, personnel, 
network, and operating system. Each layer includes some form of examination, 
detection, and prevention. According to this model, the SCADA computing systems are 
segmented and compartmentalized based on functional groups and access control plans. 
Access control matrices are developed that provide a detailed security policy, which is 
then implemented using security products for examination, detection, prevention, and 
encryption at the various layers. 
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As previously mentioned, the use of modems for remote access to SCADA 
systems provides an easy target. Abshier and Weiss [34] suggest keeping modems 
unplugged when they are not needed. In situations where this is not possible the use of 
dial back modems is recommended. Password protected modems and encrypting 
modems are another possible solution suggested by Oman, Schweitzer, and Roberts [21]. 
Vulnerability assessment tools like Nmap, Nessus, and Ethereal have become 
standard in the IT security community, Permann and Rohde [39] discuss the use of these 
tools for security assessment of control systems. The fact that the behavior of SCADA 
devices may be unpredictable when scanned makes them of limited value. For example, 
non-aggressive network scanning by Brown [26] caused the failure of PLCs from two 
different manufacturers. Recently, Tenable and Digital Bond have worked together to 
develop SCADA Nessus plug-ins for control system vulnerability scanning [40]. 
Oman, Schweitzer and Roberts [21] give an extensive list of mitigation 
technologies and tools from password generators and biometric devices to firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems and public key infrastructure. They also provide an extensive 
list of recommendations and best practices. Some recommendations not already 
mentioned include the use of two or even three factor authentication when appropriate, 
avoid using the same password for multiple systems, use warning banners to discourage 
electronic intrusions, limit the number of failed login attempts allowed for a single 
connection. Similar recommendations are also given in [32;41]. 
An extensive case study of a secure substation information system installation 
using standard IT technologies is described by Dolezilek, Carson, Leech, and Streett 
[42]. The system provides comprehensive multilayered security integration and 
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combines both the SCADA network and the business network. Another case study, of a 
PCS for a pulp mill in Canada, is described by Byres in [43] and focuses mainly on 
network segmentation. 
In addition to the use of specific security mechanisms and technologies for 
securing SCADA systems, improved management strategies and processes are also 
needed. Abshier [44] summarizes ten important design and process principles for 
securing control systems. The principles are: governance, security awareness and 
training, policies and procedures, change management, security architecture, adding 
devices and remote access, vulnerability, risk assessment and penetration tools, incident 
response, configuration and patch management, and monitoring. The goal of following 
these principles is to ensure that due diligence has been followed in securing an 
organizations control systems. Some additional strategies for building a security plan are 
given in [45]. 
Comprehensive guidelines for creating secure SCADA and control networks are 
also being developed by several industry organizations. These documents provide 
guidelines for establishing secure SCADA systems through definitions and best practices; 
in some cases specific technologies are discussed, but in others only the desired result is 
given. Many of these documents are still under development and review, but public 
drafts are available. 
Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control 
Systems Security (SP 800-82) [461 
SP 800-82 is one of the products of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology'S (NIST) initiative on critical infrastructure protection called the Process 
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Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF) [47]. The forum is a working group of 
over 500 members that come from government, academia, and the private sector. The 
main goal of the PCSRF is to increase the security of industrial process control systems 
through the definition of a common set of standards. The PCSRF has also published the 
first draft of its System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS) [47] 
and field device protection profile [48]. 
ISA-SP99 
ISA, a nonprofit organization concerned with standards in industrial automation, 
IS in the process of developing ISA-SP99, a standard for manufacturing and control 
system security. The goal of ISA-SP99 is to establish standards, practices, technical 
reports and related information for implementing electronically secure manufacturing and 
control systems. 
NERC CIP 002 - CIP 09 
The North American Electric Reliability Councilor NERC, is self-regulatory 
organization that sets standards for reliable operation of the bulk electric system. 
NERC's members come from all segments of the power industry: investor-owned 
utilities, federal power agencies, rural electric cooperatives, state municipal utilities, and 
independent power producers. NERC is in the process of drafting cyber security 
standards to reduce the risk of a cyber compromise of bulk electric systems. The first 
draft was known as NERC l300 and was issued in September 2004. In response to 
comments on the first draft a second draft was written. The seconds draft, renamed 
NERC CIP is organized in eight sections, CIP - 002 through CIP - 009. CIP - 005 
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focuses specifically on electronic security, defining electronic perimeters, and 
requirements for logging, password management, access control, and strong 
authentication. 
2.3.2 Differences between SCADA and Traditional IT environment 
Though SCADA systems are increasingly adopting technologies from traditional 
IT environments, SCADA and traditional IT systems are very different in several ways. 
One of the most important differences is how security is prioritized. In traditional IT 
systems, security engineers usually consider confidentiality the most important followed 
by integrity and then availability. However, as discussed by Miller in [30], for control 
systems availability is most important, followed by integrity and then confidentiality. For 
example, when you switch on a light, it needs to come on; when you pick up the phone 
there should be a dial tone. This is availability; it is what we expect from the systems and 
services that make use of SCADA. Moreover, down time for the services that SCADA 
systems operate can run into the millions of dollars per hour [30], making availability of 
paramount importance. 
SCADA systems and other control system also tend to have very different 
performance needs from traditional IT systems. Delaying the delivery of information 
even for a relatively brief moment is not acceptable in SCADA systems, though they 
often do not require a high degree of throughput. However, IT systems typically do 
require a high throughput but are much more tolerant of delays or jitter. In addition many 
SCADA systems may have much greater resource constraints than would be found in 
traditional IT systems. This lack of computing resources along with performance 
constraints can make it difficult or impossible to apply standard security technologies. 
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One of the real challenges presented by SCADA system is the relatively long life 
of SCADA components compared to their IT counter parts. It is not uncommon for 
SCADA components to be in use for fifteen to twenty years, while the average IT system 
as life span of three to five years. 
Table 2.4. Difference between SCADA and Traditional IT 
Category Information Technology SCADA Systems 
Systems 
Performance High throughput, can Medium to low throughput 
tolerate delay and jitter but cannot tolerate delay or 
jitter 
Focus of security Protect focus on central Need to protect the edges or 
architecture core of the system. So perimeter devices such as 
called Hard in the middle RTUs and field devices. 
and soft on the outside Also need to protect core 
internal systems as well 
Priority of security 1. Confidentiality 1. Availability 
primitives 2. Integrity 2. Integrity 
3. Availability 3. Confidentiality 
Component lifetime 3 - 5 years 15 - 20 years 
Physical accessibility Easily accessible Isolated and remote, may be 
very difficult to access 
2.3.3 SCADA research challenges and current research. 
Over the past several years industry groups and academics have begun to work 
towards addressing the SCADA security issue. This can be seen in the increasing 
number of publications related to SCADA security [1; 18;30;49]. Igure [18;27] identifies 
three research challenges in the field of SCADA security. The first challenge is to 
improve access controls to SCADA networks to make it harder for attackers to gain 
access to the SCADA network. The second challenge is to improve security inside 
SCADA networks, including developing efficient monitoring tools that make actually 
carrying out an attack difficult. Finally he points out the need to improve the security 
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management of the SCADA network. Solutions to these challenges must take into 
consideration the unique demands of SCADA systems discussed in section 2.3.2. 
One of the primary security tools is encryption, and there are several articles 
which present SCADA security solutions that deal with encryption. Leading the way in 
SCADA and encryption, particularly for legacy systems is the AGA 12 working group 
established in 2001 by the American Gas Association (AGA). The working group was to 
recommend solutions to that would help protect gas utility SCADA equipment from 
cyber attack. The group determined that unprotected serial based communication 
channels posed the greatest threat. In response to this threat AGA 12 has developed a 
serial SCADA protection protocol (SSPP) which is implemented by a separate device 
called SCADA Cryptographic Modules (SCM); these are installed on either end of a 
communication channel [50-52]. Figure 2.7 shows the proposed architecture of using 
two SCMs to provide encrypted communications between an MTU (SCADA Host) and 
an RTU. 
Wright, Kinast and McCarty [52] present a low-latency encryption scheme for 
retrofitting serial SCADA communications. This proposed solution attempts to fulfill the 
requirements of a SCM specified by AGA -12. Recall that an SCM sits on either side of 
a SCADA communication link, invisibly encrypting and decrypting all communications 
between an MTU and an RTU. Wright, Kinast, and McCarty describe two unique 
requirements for encrypting SCADA communication links. The first is that SCADA 
communication messages usually follow very predictable patterns, making plaintext 
attacks possible and likely. The second is that the real-time nature of SCADA systems 
means they can endure very little communication latency that will result from the 
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encryption and decryption of messages. The protocol prevents injection of unauthentic 
ciphertext, modification of ciphel1ext during transmission, reordering of messages, and 
replaying of old messages, while introducing a fixed latency of 2 * b/8 where b is the 
number of bits in a block. A different approach to meeting the AGA 12 SCM proposal is 
described in [19]. 
Figure 2.7. Encryption of SCADA serial communications with an SCM [52]. 
A secure SCAOA protocol that addresses message integrity and sender 
authentication is presented by Patel in [29]. Several approaches are highlighted, such as 
SSLlTLS wrapping, the use of digital certificates, and the use of challenge response with 
a pre-shared secret. The ONP3 protocol is extended to include the necessary 
authentication objects so that RTUs or MTUs can use the proposed protocol to verify 
sender authenticity and detect modifications to messages. A threat analysis and formal 
proof techniques support security claims about the communication protocol. The focus 
of the protocol is on integrity of message and sender authenticity and is not concerned 
with confidentiality. 
Some key management issues for a SCAOA networks are investigated by Beaver 
and colleagues in [53]. They point out that many critical SCAOA communications have 
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minimum time delays on the order of two to four milliseconds and therefore the 
processing time of public key protocols especially when run on the less powerful 
processors often found in SCADA devices prohibits the use of public key protocols for 
performing authentication unless highly specialized cryptographic accelerators are used. 
As an alternative to expensive hardware encryption they propose to let IEDs or field 
devices use symmetric encryption via a key exchange algorithm. They provide security 
for four communications paths: Master to Certificate Authority, Master to Substation, 
Substation to lED, and Substation to Substation. Communications are restricted to only 
these communication paths. They then describe a new format for packets within the 
SCADA network, and key generation, key storage, and key use associated with each 
communication path. Only substation to substation communications use public key 
algorithms, and then only for key exchange. They also describe a process for recovering 
from a substation penetration. 
The use of smartcards to provide encryption and authentication to field area 
network nodes is described by Palensky and Sauter in [54]. A field area network (FAN) 
is a collection of nodes at some site, similar to a remote location. A FAN gateway 
provides remote access to the FAN much like an RTU provides remote access to field 
devices. The proposed security architecture is to place a smartcard with one or more 
pairs of public-private keys with each node. Data encryption is carried out by the smart 
card, and a corresponding smart card on the receiving end. In addition two access control 
schemes are described. 
A DoS mitigation strategy for SYN flood attacks on SCADA systems is described 
by Bowen, Buennemeyer and Thomas in [55]. The approach they propose is based on 
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client puzzles. Client puzzles defend against DoS attacks by forcing clients, including 
attackers, to expend computational resources to calculate the solution to a puzzle, usually 
a cryptographic puzzle or hash function. Only after a valid solution is returned is a 
connection for the client created. Bowen et al. present a modified TCP protocol, called 
pTCP, that implements the client puzzle strategy. MTUs are the clients in this system 
and RTUs act as servers. When RTUs respond with a SYN+ACK to the MTU 
connection requests, a nonce and difficulty level is included in the response. The MTU 
uses the nonce to calculate a puzzle solution, with the difficultly level indicating the 
computational complexity of puzzle. As a DoS attack build (i.e. the number of 
established connections increases) the server increases the difficulty level, making the 
connecting stations and attackers commit greater resources to solve the puzzle. The goal 
is for attackers to cease committing resources to the attack before the puzzle difficulty 
level adversely impacts the delay of SCADA messages. Simulation using ns2 was done 
to evaluate the potential impact on the latency of SCADA messages. The focus of their 
simulation was on routine SCADA transactions, which they claim must have a delay time 
less than 540 milliseconds. The simulation found that for normalized difficulty levels 
below -9.5 latency increase was acceptable. 
The use of standard intrusion detection systems was recommended by several 
articles in section 2.4.1, but Naedele and Biderbost proposed in [56] a human assisted 
intrusion detection system designed especially for process control systems. The proposed 
idea is to provide system security information in a form that does not require information 
security knowledge so that a process control system operator can monitor network 
security in the same way she might monitor a process. A prototype process control 
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system HMI for intrusion detection is presented where IDS alerts and alarms are 
presented in a combination of graphical and textual data to the operator in terms of the 
consequences or dangers they represent to the system. Another IDS framework proposed 
by Naess, Frincke, McKinnon, and Bakken [57] is designed for embedded systems in 
general, but the authors point out its potential for SCADA systems. Their proposal is a 
configurable middleware-based intrusion detection framework for MicroQoSCORBA. 
Some methods for assessing the vulnerability of SCADA system are proposed in 
[58;59]. Byres, Franz, and Miller [58] describe the use of attack trees in assessing the 
MODBUS protocol. While the attack trees that were developed significantly improved 
the ability of the researchers in tinding exploits, they were also useful in selecting an 
appropriate mitigation strategy. Conte de Leon et al. [59] describes a graph based model 
for calculating device vulnerabilities of SCADA systems. Each node in the graph is a 
device and device x is visible to y if there is a path from x to y and x and yare able to 
communicate through the physical network described by the path. A vulnerability value 
is assigned to each potential visibility path and a device vulnerability level can then be 
calculated by summing these values. The most vulnerable device has the highest 
vulnerability level. Additional research is needed in determining the initial assignment of 
vulnerability levels. 
A generic SCADA security policy framework to assist in the creation of SCADA 
security policies is described by Young, Stamp, Dillinger and Rumsy [60]. The 
framework is organized in three hierarchical layers and supports detailed specific sub-
policies that support generic high level policies. The framework was developed out of 
the author's experience in SCADA assessments and secure communication system 
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development and implementation. The policy they develop is broken down into eight 
main categories at level one, ranging from data security and personnel security to 
network security and physical access. The goal of the policy framework is to assist asset 
owners in the creation of SCADA security policies. Implementation details for two 
example cases are given to demonstrate the model. 
Modbus/TCP, like most SCADA protocols has no security features and is unable 
to authenticate or authorize individual requests. A device using Modbus/TCP typically 
lacks packet filtering capabilities and therefore will carry out any legitimate command 
that reaches it. A common network security solution would be to filter the Modbus/TCP 
port as it passes through a firewall or router, enforcing an access control policy for device 
connection. However, this only allows access control at a source level, while some 
organizations' security policy may dictate that some hosts have read access to data, while 
other hosts have both read and write access to the device. An application layer filtering 
firewall is presented by Franz and Pothamsetty [61] that allows filtering of packets based 
on Modbus header values. This makes it possible to grant some hosts the ability to read 
from the Modbus slave device while not writing to it, and to other hosts the ability to both 
read and write. This work has been released under open source licensing and is available 
athttp://modbusfw.sourceforge.net/. 
An alternative architecture for the information and communication network of 
power systems is proposed by Xie, Manimaran, Vittal, Phadke, and Centeno [62]. The 
proposed architecture includes all the traditional elements of SCADA systems. The 
primary object of the architecture is to provide greater reliability through redundancy, 
though communication security is considered as well. Redundant communication 
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channels are combined with VPN and firewall technology to provide reliable but secure 
communications among entities. 
Another next generation SCADA communications architecture is proposed by 
Hauser, Bakken, and Bose [63]. The proposed architecture, referred to as GridStat, is a 
middleware framework with API stubs that correlate with traditional SCADA functions 
polling, events status, and control settings. GridStat was designed to support flexible 
communications, making new types of controls and better situational awareness possible. 
GridStat also provides schemes for trust management, with the ability to approve new 
subscription, make routing decisions, and manage access control. 
2.4 The Role based access control model 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is an alternative access control model to the 
classical forms of access control that grew out of the access control matrix model [64] 
and the Bell LaPadula Model [65]. RBAC was proposed as a means of simplifying 
access control and including functional capabilities [66]. RBAC is policy neutral but it 
supports three well-known security principles: separation of duty, least privilege, and 
data abstraction. Interest in RBAC has continued to increase and lead to a variety of 
different models and extensions. In response to the lack of any widely accepted standard 
Ferraiolo has proposed a NIST standard for role based access control [67]. This standard 
serves as reference model for common dialogue on role based access control. The basic 
RBAC model for this dissertation will be the NIST model. 
The standard defines three RBAC models, core RBAC and two extensions to core 
RBAC, hierarchical RBAC and constrained RBAC. Figure 2.8 shows the core RBAC 







Figure 2.8. Core RBAC model [67]. 
RBAC consists of five sets: users (USERS), roles (ROLES), objects (OBJ), 
operations (OPS), and permissions (PRMS). The basic concept of RBAC is that users are 
assigned to roles and permissions are assigned to roles, allowing roles to serve as a 
mapping between permissions and users. This simplifies the assignment of permissions 
to users, more accurately reflects how organizations think about permissions, and greatly 
simplifies role revocation. A user is most often a human being, but the notion of user can 
be extended to other entities like devices, networks or autonomous agents. Roles attempt 
to approximate different job functions within the organizational construct in which the 
system is participating. A permission is the right to carryout an operation on one or more 
objects. An operation is some type of function to be carried out by the system for a user. 
Objects are entities that contain or receive information; their exact type depends on the 
system. Some examples of objects are files, directories, and database tables, rows, and 
columns. The purpose of applying RBAC to a system is to protect the system resources 
represented by objects. 
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Figure 2.9. Core RBAC definitions [67]. 
The flexibility and high degree of granularity of RBAC comes from role relations. 
The user assignment relation (UA) assigns different roles to each users. The permission 
assignment relation (PA) assigns various permissions to each role. The result of these 
two assignment relations simplifies the process of assigning privileges to individual users 
and facilitates application of least privilege. The model is also easily extended to 
incorporate new operations and objects when, and if they, are added to the system. The 
core RBAC definitions from the NIST model are shown in figure 2.9. 
2.4.1 RBA C constraints 
The generality and flexibility of RBAC make possible an almost endless array of 
constraints, and since RBAC is policy neutral, constraints play an important role in 
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allowing the RBAC model to enforce security policies. Simon and Zuko [68] presented 
the first discussions of constraints for RBAC in 1997 when they identified three kinds of 
constraints possible in RBAC systems: 
• Constraints on role membership - overlap in member ship is constrained, usually 
to be null 
• Constraints on role activation - legitimate users of a role may be prevented from 
assuming the role 
• Constraints on role use - users who have assumed a role may be restricted in how 
that role is used. 
Simon and Zuko limited their treatment of role based access control constraints to 
Separation of duty constraints (SoD), and much of the subsequent literature has also 
focused on separation of duty constraints in RBAC. Separation of duty is one of the eight 
design principles described by Saltz and Schroeder [69]. Separation of duty is a security 
policy concept based on division of responsibility and is a central component of Clark 
and Wilson's commercial security policy [70]. For example, consider the following three 
actions within a company: issuing a purchase order for an item, signing for the receipt of 
the item, and issuing a check to pay for the received item. Separation of duty would 
prevent the same person from carrying out all three actions, and thus potentially 
defrauding the company. 
Simon and Zuko, in examining the literature in separation of duty identified two 
broad categories of separation of duty: strong exclusion or static separation of duty 
(SSoD), and weak exclusion or dynamic separation of duty (SSoD). In role based access 
control, two roles are strongly exclusive if no one person is ever allowed to perform both 
roles. Simon and Zuko pointed out that strong exclusion is simplistic and easily 
enforceable using only controls on role membership; however, it is often too ridged when 
applied to real world situations. Weak exclusion introduces the concept of time into 
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separation of duty, which is why it is usually referred to as dynamic separation of duty. 
Simon and Zuko define the flowing different type dynamic separation of duty with 
respect to role based access control: 
• Simple Dynamic Separation of duty - restricted roles may be assigned to the same 
user, but a user may not use or assume both roles at the same time. 
• Object-based separation ofdutv - restricted roles may be assigned to the same user 
and a user may assume or use multiple roles at the same time, but a user may not act 
on an object or target that the user has previously acted upon. 
• Operational separation of duty - Restricted roles may be assigned to the same user 
as long as all the union of all permissions in the roles does not contain all the 
permissions in a given set of permission (which usually represent completing some 
business task). 
• History-based separation of duty - extend object and operational separation of duty 
to allow for restricted roles to be assigned to the same user, and that user can carryout 
all permission in the union of the permissions for those roles but cannot carryout all 
the permissions in a given set (again modeling a business task) on the same target or 
object. Historical separation of duty constraints can be either order-dependent or 
order independent. 
Another analysis of the types of possible constraints for role based access control 
systems was presented by Ahn [71]. Ahn and Sandhu [72] developed the RCL2000, an 
authorization constraint language for role based access control systems. In understanding 
the expressiveness of RCL2000, described in the next section, Ahn identified three 
classes of constraints that could be expressed in RCL2000. 
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• Prohibition constraints - Prevent an RBAC component from doing or being 
something 
Example: SOD (user cannot be a purchasing and payable manager) 
• Obligation constraints - Force RBAC components to do or be something 
Example: Certain roles should be active in the same session or a user should have 
some combination of role assignments. 
• Cardinality constraints - Limit the number of users, roles, sessions. 
Example: limit number of users assigned to a role or limit number of sessions a user 
is assigned. 
As role based access control model increased in popularity, they began to be used 
In wider areas, opening up avenues for new types of constraints. Strembeck and 
Neuman [73] present a very comprehensive role based access control taxonomy. They 
define three dimensions, which they point out are not completely orthogonal, along which 
constraints can be categorized. The focus of their work is on only one type of constraint, 
specifically context constraints, which they point out are dynamic exogenous 
authorization constraints. Stembeck and Neuman's three dimensions are: 
• Static constraints vs. dynamic constraints 
Static constraints are constraints that can be evaluated directly at design time of an 
RBAC model. Dynamic constraints can only be checked at runtime according to 
actual values of specific attributes or with respect to characteristics of current 
sessIOns. 
• Endogenous constraints vs. exogenous constraints 
Endogenous constraints are constraints that are related to intrinsic properties of an 
RBAC model and inherently affect the structure and construction of a concrete 
instance of an RBAC model. Exogenous constraints apply to attributes that are not 
apart of the core RBAC model. 
• Authorization constraints vs. assignment constraints 
Constraints that place additional controls on access control decisions, such that a 
subject may possess the appropriate permission but can be prevented access by one or 
more authorization constraints. Assignment constraints are constraints that control 
the assignment of permissions and roles. 
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2.4.2 Specifying constraints on RBAC models 
The previous section presented a variety of categorical definitions for role based 
access control constraints. As pointed out by Jaeger [74] constraints are becoming 
increasingly important in role based access control systems since they provide a means to 
ensure that role specification actually matches desired access control requirements. 
However, to take advantage of role based access control constraints, a role based access 
control model must be capable of expressing constraints, and accurately interpreting 
them. This section presents a number of role based access control models that include the 
ability to express constraints. The results are summarized in table 2.5, which shows the 
different types of constraints a given model can express. 
Giuri and Iglio [75] present one of the early role based access control models that 
included constraints. The model is an extension to the named set of protection domains 
(NSPD) model [76] in which a role is defined NSPD. A NSPD specifies a collection of 
possible sets of privileges: 
(2.1) {{priv],], ... , privl,i}, ... , {privn,], ... , privn,j}} = {Pd], ... ,Pdn} 
Only one protection domain can be active at a given time. Girui and Iglio 
extended NSPD to include constraints: 
(2.2) {<c], {priv],j, ... , priv],j}>, ... , <cn, {privn,], ... , privnj}>} = 
{<c],Pd]>, ... <cn,Pdn>} 
where c is an expression in first order logic, or possibly an SQL query. A constrained 
protection domain is activated only if the corresponding constraint is satisfied. While 
the model includes constraints, Guiri and Jglio's model is limited to expressing 
exogenous dynamic role activation constraints. 
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As mentioned previously, the variety of different role based access control models 
developed during early research on role based access control made comparing different 
models very difficult. The NIST standard role based access control model, developed in 
2000, was an attempt to address this issue. The NIST RBAC model includes two 
important categories of extensions: role hierarchies and constraints. In role hierarchies a 
hierarchical relation on roles (i.e. manager - supervisor - clerk) is defined and more 
senior roles inherit the permissions associated with junior roles. Of interest here is 
constrained RBAC model described in the NIST standard. In the NIST model, there are 
two types of constraints: static separation of duty (SSO) and dynamic separation of duty 
(OSO) each specified in the model as a collection of pairs of the from {rs,t} where rs is a 
set of roles and t is an integer >= 2. SSO is fonnally defined as: 
(2.3) '\I(rs,n) E SSD, '\It ~ rs:1 t I;:::: n ~ nrE1assigned_users(r) = 0 
And OSO is formally defined as: 
'\Irs E 2R()U'S,n E N,(rs,n) E DSD => n;:::: 2/\ 1 rs I~ n,and 
(2.4) '\Is E SESSIONS, '\Irs E 2 ROU,S , '\Irole _subset E 2 ROU,S , '\In E N,(rs,n) E DSD, 





























Table 2.5. Types of constraint supported in different RBAC models. 
Prohibition Cardinality Dynamic Static Historical endogenous exogenous Authorization Assignment 
Yes Yes yes NO 
Yes No 
Yes Yes Yes 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Y N Y 
Y N N Y N Y N Y N 
N N Y N N N Y Y N 
In the NIST model the SSD constraint limits the UA relation by defining sets of roles 
such that a user can only be assigned some proper subset of the roles. A DSD constraint 
is similar except that they restrict the active roles of a user's session rather than the 
assigned roles. Figure 2.10 shows the relationship of SSD and DSD to the standard 
RBAC model. The constraints allow RBAC to express separation of duty or contlict of 
interest relations [77]. The NIST RBAC reference model constraints are thus limited 
exclusively to role assignment and role activation, and are endogenous, but include both 
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Figure 2.10. Core RBAC with SSD and DSD constraints defined in [67]. 
The use of static and dynamic separation of duty (SSoD & DSoD) however, is 
somewhat misleading as pointed out by Li, Bizri, and Tripunitara [78]. They point out 
that separation of duty (SSoD) is an objective not a mechanism. The mechanism, which 
is what is actually described in the NIST model, are static mutually exclusive roles, or 
smer for short. Li et at. define Static Separation of Duty (SSoD) as a set of m 
permissions and an integer k < m indicating that a there should not exist a set of less than 
k users that together have all m permissions. This differs from a SMER which is a set of 
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m roles and integer t < m forbidding any user from being a member of t or more roles in 
{rl ... rm}. Li et al go on to point out that there then exists a verification problem: does a 
set of smer constraints achieve a given SSoD goal, and a generation problem: how do we 
generate a set of smer constraints that adequately enforce a SSoD policy? Li and 
colleagues demonstrated that directly enforcing SSoD polices is coNP complete but that 
enforcing smer constraints is efficient, and went on to develop an algorithm to generate a 
set of smer constraints given an SSoD policy. 
The constraint specification described by Ahn and Sandhu [72] called RCL2000 
is based on the ARBAC 97 [79] model. ARBAC 97 is simiilar to the NIST reference 
model except that it includes administrative permissions and administrative roles. A 
summary of ARBAC 97 is shown in figure 2.11. Rather than lleave administration of the 
RBAC to an external "trusted" security administrator, theARBAC97 model includes 
administrative elements in the model, allowing administration of the policy to be 
distributed among multiple roles and multiple users. RCL2000, developed by Ahn and 
Sandhu and based on previous work by Chen and Sandhu [80], provides a constraint 
specification language and extends ARBAC97 with the following elements: 
• CR: A collection of conflicting role sets {crl ... crn} cri = {r1..ri} ~ Roles 
• CP a collection of conflicting permissions sets {cp1..cpn} cpi ={p\..pi} ~ Perms 
• CU a collection of conflicting user sets {cu 1 .. cun} cui = {u 1 .. un} ~ Users 
• Two non-deterministic operators 
• OE(X) = Xi where Xi E X (called the onel~ach operator) 
• AO(X) = X - {OE(X)} (called the allother operator) 
The model assumes that initially a policy administrator or devdoper defines the sets CR, 
CP and CU. Once each of these sets is defined then RCL2000 ,expressions can be used to 
define policy based constraints. The syntax of an RCL 2000 expression is given in figure 
2.12. An RCL expression can best be understood through an example. The formula (2.5) 
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IS an RCL expression, and its interpretation would be: no user can be assigned to two 
conflicting roles. 
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Figure 2.11. Summary of the ARBAC 97 Model [79]. 
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RCL2000 is a specification language. Syntax and semantics: are defined along with a 
means of converting between RCL2000 and a restricted form of first order predicate 
logic. A soundness and completeness proof for the conversion is given. Finally the 
expressiveness of RCL2000 is shown to include lattice-based access controls as well as 
traditional and new separation of duty constraints, but no discussion of an enforcement 
mechanism is given. RCL2000 can express prohibition, obligation, and cardinality 
constrains, static constraints, some types of dynamic constraints, and IS strictly 
endogenous. 
A very different approach to role based access control with constraints was 
proposed by Wook et al. [81]. Wook's model, extended role based access control with 
procedural constraints, is intended to be used in trusted operating systems. Motivation 
for the model comes from preventing classic timing attacks that rei ink letclpasswd to give 
an attacker write permission to letclpasswd. Wook adds negative procedural constraints 
to the classic RBAC model to prohibit certain sequences of ordinary actions, such as 
rei inking letc/passwd. The procedural constraints operate on behaviors, and these 
behaviors are interposed between the traditional role permission assignment. Colored 
Petri nets are used to model behaviors, and detect when a behavior has become malicious. 
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Figure 2.12. ReL 2000 syntax. 
One of the more recent and elegant role based access control constraint models 
was developed by Jason Crampton [82], which extends the classic role based access 
control model described in section 2.5.1. Crampton points out that constraints informally 
define bad sets. He then invents a formal specification scheme to allow formal 
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specification of constraints in the form of a triplet triple (s, c, x) where s is the scope, c is 
the constraint set, and x is a temporal context either {static, dynamic, historical}. The 
scope and constraint sets are a subsets of U, R, and P. A constraint defines a family of 
sets. For example, 2.6 states that neither user u] nor user U2 can be assigned both r] and 
r2· 
(2.6) ({r],r2},{u],U2},S) 
This specification scheme can express both static, dynamic and historical constraints on 
role and permissions and is strictly endogenous. Crampton also suggests the use of black 
lists to enforce historical constraints, though this proves difficult for cardinalities greater 
than two. 
In addition to the taxonomy for constraints, Stem beck and Neuman [73;83] also 
developed a model to express and enforce context based exogenous authorization 
constraints. Their model begins with the classic model and adds the elements shown in 
figure 2.13. 
Strembeck and Neuman's model is specifically dynamic and exogenous. When 
the check permission action is performed on a requested action, the enforcement point 
first checks to see if the subject is assigned to a role that has the appropriate permission. 
If the subject is assigned to such a role, then, before validating the request, any context 
constraints on that permission are evaluated. If a context constraint condition evaluates 
to false, then the requested operation is denied. If every cont'ext constraint evaluates to 
true, then the operation is allowed. Possible conditions suggested by Strembeck and 
Neuman include the IP address of the subject must be a certain value, the time or date 
must fall in a certain range, or even specific conditions about a user, their age or gender 
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for example. The model only supports dynamic exogenous: authorization constraints, 
though it is easy to see that the NIST SSoD or DSoD constraints could be included to add 
support for other types of constraints. Strembeck and Neuman also present an execution 
model and approach for discovering context constraints in a specific environment. 
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Figure 2.13. Context constraints as defined by Strembeck and Nueman [73] 
Jaeger and Tiswell [74] developed a graphical based constraint specification 
scheme. The scheme is actually broader than role based access control, and was aimed at 
expressing all the different types of separation of duty. The model is very expressive and 
shared some similarities to RCL2000. The model is based on DTAC not RBAC, but they 
are similar enough (basically DTAC is RBAC with object type and some other 
extensions) to make types of constraints possible. The model is expressed as a graph, 
G(X, Y). X is a set of nodes, each node is a set, but of possibly different types. Y is set 
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of edges representing relationships between sets. Constraints are defined as binary 
relationships between sets. Figure 2.14 shows an example of a constraint specification 
using Jaeger and Tiswell's notation. In the figure pI and p2 are arbitrary permissions and 
the double headed arrow marked with ~T indicating that permission p I may not be 
assigned any authorization type to which permission p2 is assigned, and vice versa. 
~T 
Figure 2.14. A graphical constraint specification in [74]. 
2.5 Operating system security, reliability and reduced kernels 
The heart of an operating system is the kernel. The kernel is the part of the 
operating system that executes in the processor's privilege mode and provides the lowest 
level of abstraction between the physical components and the rest of the system. Thus 
the kernel plays a key role in the security of a system since it mediates all or almost all 
access to the computer systems physical resources. In today's multiprogrammed 
operating systems, the kernel is responsible for providing a means for principals (users or 
processes) to share systems resources by providing a common interface to those resources 
and controlling access to the shared resources. The security and reliability of an 
operating system are determined by how well, or how consistently, the operating system 
provides that protection. When the kernel fails to consistently enforce the appropriate 
protection, users experience system failures and/or security violations. The 
trustworthiness, or the degree that a system can be trusted, reflects the confidence that the 
operating system, usually the kernel, provides appropriate and adequate protection. The 
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frequency with which modem commercial operating systems, such as Linux and 
Windows, fail to adequately provide protection is all too familiar to users today. 
One of the essential ideas in the construction of secure or trusted systems has been 
the security kernel. The security kernel is based on the concept of a reference monitor 
and a reference validation mechanism as discussed by Bishop in [77]. A reference 
monitor is an access control concept of an abstract machine that mediates all access to 
objects by subjects. A reference validation mechanism is an implementation of a 
reference monitor that can be proven to be tamperproof, always invoked, and small 
enough to be subject to verification. A security kernel is then defined to be the 
combination of hardware and software that implements a reference monitor. Later the 
idea of a security kernel was extended to trusted computing base (TCB), which is the 
collection of all protection systems responsible for enforcing a security policy. 
Application I 
Middleware ] 
Operating System I 
Hardware I 
Figure 2.15. Computer architectural layers. 
A major contributing factor to the low level of reliability and security provided by 
today's commercial operating systems is the fact that they use a monolithic kernel design 
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that has led to large kernels with poor fault isolation [84]. In monolithic kernels all of the 
core operating system functionality is implemented in the kernel. This functionality 
includes: memory management, file systems, access control, network stacks, device 
drivers, and interrupt handling. Therefore the TCB, the entire kernel, is very large and 
thus difficult to analyze. A typical monolithic kernel design is shown in figure 2.16, with 
the TCB shaded in gray. 
In order to support the increase in variety of hardware available, the size of the 
kernel in commercial operating systems has become surprisingly large and is continuing 
to grow [85]. There are now about 4.1 million lines of code (LOC) that make up the 
Linux kernel, and Vista is said to have 20 million LOC [85]. Much of that code runs in 
privilege mode of the processor, allowing it unrestricted access to system resources, 
including memory and 10 ports. Therefore, software flaws in the kernel code can 
potentially do a great deal of damage since these processes are not subject to system 
protection mechanisms. Unfortunately software errors or defects cannot be avoided. Due 
to the size and complexity of the kernel, finding all the defects before deployment is 
simply not feasible, and finding them all, in any given amount of time is unlikely. This 
led to a penetrate and patch approach to operating systems security and reliability. As 
pointed out by Loscocco and colleagues [86] the assumption that adequate security can 
be achieved at the application layer is seriously flawed. Without a secure operating 
system, application layer security mechanism cannot succeed. 
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(Processor, Memory. Keyboard, Monitor. other peripheral devices) 
Figure 2.16. Monolithic kernel design. 
The size and complexity of commercial operating systems is only continuing to 
increase. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that within a monolithic kernel 
there is no fault isolation. If some piece of code in the kernel has a defect, then 
exploiting that defect can corrupt the entire kernel (reliability) or give malicious code the 
opportunity to bypass the normal access control measures (security vulnerability) that 
protect systems objects and other principles. 
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2.5.1 Minimal kernels 
A small TCB is more amendable to formal analysis, making possible a much 
more trustworthy TCB. To achieve this a minimal kernel is needed. One approach that is 
receiving considerable attention recently is the microkernel designs. A microkernel [87], 
is a minimal kernel that implements only those services that cannot be implemented in 
user space. There are three minimal requirements for microkernels described by Liedtke 
[87]: address spaces, inter-process communication, and unique identifiers. 
Microkernels have actually been around in some form for quite a while. The first 
system that could be considered a microkernel was Brinch Hansen's Nucleus [88]. 
Hensen's Nucleus supplied only primitives for process control and inter-process 
communication, with the operating system policy and strategies implemented outside the 
kernel. Hydra [89] extended the Nucleus work, and was instrumental in separating policy 
(in user land) from mechanism (in the kernel). Following on Nucleus was Mach [90] 
developed at Carnegie Mellon University. It was the Mach team that coined the phrase 
microkernel. Interestingly enough, the Mach kernel, while calling itself a microkernel, 
contained nearly 150 thousand lines of code and had 200 systems calls. There were many 
contemporaries of the Mach kernel such as NextStep [91] (which became Mac OS X), 
University of Utah's Mach4 [92], and IBM's Workplace OS [93]. In the 1980's 
microkernels received a great deal of attention and focus. However poor performance 
characteristics plagued developed systems. The reasons for this, and some alternatives, 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Central to the microkernel architecture, shown in figure 2.17, is the notion of user 
land operating services that replace many of the operating systems services that are 
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included in the monolithic kernel. Moving these services to user land provides better 
fault isolation and prevents errors in a specific service from allowing complete 
compromise of the system. To allow these services to communicate, the microkernel has 
to provide inter processes communication (IPq functionality to all the supported tasks or 
threads. Microkernels of that time exhibited IPC costs of about 100 microseconds [85] 
and in 1994 Chen and Bershad concluded that performance problems were "inherent in 
the as structure" [94]. Many then concluded that the microkernel approach could not 
meet the performance demands and interest in them waned. 
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Figure 2.17. The basic microkernel design. 
Around 1994 John Ledieke and others began analyzing microkernels and found 
that microkernel IPC could be made fast through strict adherence to the minimal kernel 
goal and optimization [95]. Leidke developed the L4 kernel to demonstrate the 
performance improvement, and demonstrated an order of magnitude improvement over 
the Mach microkernel. The bad performance reputation that microkernels had gained 
prevented Leidke's work from receiving attention at the time. But today microkernels are 
receiving renewed attention due in part to the popularity of virtualization and hypervisors 
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which have a lot in common with microkernels. One of the areas of renewed interest is 
the Rushby's idea of a separation kernel, which is explained in the next section. 
2.5.2 Separation kernel and the MILS architecture 
Recall that the TCB concept grew out of the reference monitor first developed in 
the 1970's. There has been substantial work to implement reference monitors but 
problems have been encountered in the application and implementation of these 
principles [86;96;97]. Rushby argues that the problems encountered in constructing and 
verifying security kernels is that they attempt to impose a single security policy over the 
entire system. Instead, Rushby proposes leveraging the inherent security benefits of 
physically distributed systems. In physically distributed systems, such as a network 
printer, network storage, and a PC connected to the network, security is achieved through 
a combination of physical separation of individual components, and mediation of trusted 
functions within some components [96;98]. To support a distributed system on single 
processor, Rushby proposed the idea of a separation kernel. 
The Multiple Independent Levels of Security or (MILS) architecture was 
developed to provide a high-assurance and high-performance computing architecture 
with the ability to enforce strict security and separation policies on data and processes 
residing on a single processor [99]. The architecture was designed to make possible 
formal verification of application reference monitors and therefore realize high assurance 
of security mechanisms. The MILS concept originated with Rushby's work and is based 
on his separation kernel. The current MILS architecture is pictured in figure 2.18. A 
separation kernel has four security requirements [97]: 
58 
• Data Isolation: Information is accessible only by that partition, and private data 
remains private, 
• Control of Information Flow: Information flow from one partition to another is 
from an authenticated source to authenticated recipients; the source of the 
information is authenticated to the recipient, and information goes only where 
intended, 
• Periods Processing: The microprocessor and any networking equipment cannot 
be used as a covert channel to leak information to listening third parties, 
• Fault isolation: Damage is limited by preventing a failure in one partition from 















Figure 2.18. The MILS architecture [100]. 
The security advantages of the MILS architecture is that it provides both process 
separation and functional separation. Process separation strictly enforces the flow of 
information between user processes, such that information flows only when explicitly 
permitted. Through functional separation, MILS moves security functions out of the 
kernel and into modular external components. These components can enforce specific 
security policies and then can be layered together to provide an overall system security 
policy. Because the MILS architecture provides data isolation and information flow 
control, an implementer can create an application-level reference monitor in a user 
partition that is NEAT (non-bypassable, evaluatable, always invoked, and tamperproof 
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[100]). An additional advantage of these independent modules is that they are small 
enough, and simple enough, to be evaluated using formal techniques; thus making it 
possible for the entire system to achieve a high level of assurance. An example 
implementation of a mediator (or reference monitor) using physical separation and the 
MILS architecture is presented by Hanebatte and colleagues [99]. 
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CHAPTER III 
SECURITY HARDENING RTUS 
Chapter two presented the security threats and vulnerabilities that currently face 
SCADA systems in general. The traditional IT security approach of soft on the outside 
(peripheral systems) and hard in the middle (servers) is not appropriate for SCADA 
systems. In SCADA installations the peripheral devices, such as RTU, must be security 
hardened as well. The focus of this dissertation is to identify and develop hardening 
techniques for RTUs and to develop a security hardened RTU. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, in the past, these devices faced primarily physical threats, but today 
they are increasingly network enabled and network accessible. Security hardening these 
devices is a major challenge facing the development of secure SCADA systems. Two 
security hardening approaches are explored in this dissertation, an RTU role based access 
control model and a reduced kernel OS. Previous work on both role based access control 
constraints and minimal kernels for operating systems was presented in chapter two. This 
chapter introduces the architecture for a security hardened RTU. The RTU role based 
access control model is presented in detail in chapter four and the minimal kernels for 
R TU are presented in chapter five. 
Before considering specific RTU threats it is important to define, from a security 
perspective, the security perimeter of an RTU. This approach parallels the definition of a 
physical security perimeter that is a standard approach in securing physical places. 
SCADA systems are large distributed systems, and in developing a layered approach to 
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security for them it is important to identify security boundaries for different components. 
For field devices, the security boundary, or electronic perimeter, is defined to be the point 
at which the device makes contact with the SCADA network. For example, if the RTU 
connects to the SCADA network using Ethernet, then the electronic perimeter is the 
Ethernet controller card. It is important to establish such a perimeter; if the perimeter 
were too encompassing, the R TU' s security perimeter would include components over 
which it has no control. 
3.1 RTU security vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities in RTUs can occur at many different layers. The highest and most 
abstract layer is the protocol layer. Protocols are abstract descriptions, and must be 
implemented, typically in software. Below the protocol layer is the software application 
layer which will implement interfaces to the SCADA network, particularly SCADA 
protocols, but this also applies to other protocols that might be used now or in the future. 
It is rare today that software applications are written to run at the hardware level. Instead 
software usually makes use of libraries, and other applications to achieve its goals. This 
creates yet another layer of shared software libraries and binaries, which is often referred 
to as middleware. Below the middleware layer is the operating system kernel, the lowest 
level of abstraction between the hardware and the software; finally, there is the actual 
hardware. Figure 3.1 shows these architectural layers. 
As mentioned in chapter two, initial SCADA protocols did not include security 
features, which resulted in vulnerabilities to message modification, spoofing, and sniffing 
attacks. The protocol vulnerabilities are really outside the RTU security perimeter, at 
least in their specification, but it is important to mention them, and keep them in mind in 
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considering lower layers. One reason for keeping these in mind is the principle of easiest 
penetration [101]. If an RTU supports an insecure SCADA protocol that can easily be 
attacked and used to control or damage the connected physical processes, it will be 
impossible for a lower level prevention mechanism to protect the RTU since it has no 
way of differentiating between authentic and un-authentic SCADA communications. 
Two excellent solutions to address the shortcomings in SCADA protocols have been 
presented in the literature review in chapter two [29;52]. Both the AGA's cryptographic 
solution, and Patel's authentication octets and challenge response approach adequately 
address the vulnerabilities in SCADA protocols. 
Protocol Layer 
Software application Layer 
Shared Libraries and 
Middleware Layer 
Operating System Kernel 
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Figure 3.1. RTU architectural layers. 
Unfortunately, though providing for authentication in the protocol is a significant 
improvement, there are still many additional RTU threats and vulnerabilities. One of the 
more significant threats is that of insider attacks. In the 2000 CSI computer crime 
survey, cited by [6], insider attacks represented 71 % of security breaches. Much of the 
perpetrated computer crime is the result of insiders; they represent a big threat since they 
have knowledge of systems and networks, and valid authentication credentials. For 
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example, the recent hacking of a waste management system in Australia was carried out 
by an insider [5]. An insider might be a disgruntled employee or ex-employee as was the 
case in Australia. With respect to RTU security, an insider could have knowledge of the 
network location of RTUs, such as their phone number or an IP address, and if the RTU 
is protected by some form of authentication then a user might have knowledge of the 
password or other form of identification. Not all insiders are necessarily malicious either. 
It is possible that a legitimate user might inadvertently cause damage by changing the 
value of a set point they were not supposed to change or accidentally issuing a control 
command. 
Another major vulnerability for RTUs is software vulnerabilities. A protocol may 
be secure, but its implementation may contain flaws. These flaws can be exploited by an 
attacker to circumvent or by-pass the security provided by the protocol. Software 
vulnerabilities can also be found in other COTS software components that might be 
included in an RTU. For example, the trends discussed in chapter two, particularly the 
increase use of Ethernet, are leading vendors to include pervasive commercial 
components such as such as FTP servers, Web servers, or a remote access server. These 
COTS systems may also contain vulnerabilities; for example, the well known Wu-ftp 
exploit [102], and can be exploited just as easily when they are deployed on RTUs as 
they can when deployed on typical desktop systems. When vendors adopt commercial 
operating systems, many of these services such as telnet, FTP and others come 
preinstalled and possibly activated. These commercial pieces of software may also have 
flaws, perhaps even well known ones, which could be exploited. 
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There may also be flaws in shared libraries or other pieces of common code used 
by RTU applications. These shared resources can also have exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Many RTU applications are written in C or C++ which have limited buffer overflow 
prevention capabilities, and make use of vulnerable C libraries. 
As discussed in chapter two, the operating system kernel is responsible for 
providing protection and allowing sharing within a computer system. Operating systems 
themselves can have flaws. Monolithic kernel commercial systems tend to have a lot of 
flaws, and hence a lot of software vulnerabilities. For example, it is well known that 
commercial operating systems like Windows and Linux contain flaws and require the 
application of patches on a regular basis. Recent estimates put the number of flaws in the 
Linux kernel at 15000 and for Windows XP nearly 30000 [103]. The penetrate and patch 
approach that is familiar to commercial operating systems is often not applicable to RTUs 
It is difficult to regularly apply patches to RTUs simply because they are remote and 
because they cannot endure the risk that a patch breaks the operation of some critical 
R TU components. 
Once an attacker has managed to gain access to the R TU, there are the obvious 
threats that the attacker will issue control commands to connected actuators and disrupt 
operation of the SCADA system. Other threats include deleting or modifying stored data 
to hide evidence of the attack and replacing or modifying application code to corrupt 
system integrity. In addition, a privilege escalation threat also exists, where an attacker, 
having gained some level of access, attempts to increase their rights by attacking the 
access control configuration. 
65 
3.2 A security hardened RTU 
To address these vulnerabilities, this dissertation proposes two security hardening 
techniques for RTUs and presents these in a security hardened RTU. The security 
hardened RTU employs three security enhancements: 
1. The use of a security enhanced SCADA protocol 
2. Fine grained access control 
3. A reduced kernel OS 
The secure SCADA protocol used is that developed by Patel [29] and is used to 
provide RTU authentication of users. The focus of this dissertation is the access controls 
and reduced kernel os. Section 3.2.1 briefly describes the security enhancement 
proposed by Patel [29]. Section 3.2.2 introduces the RTU access control model and 
section 3.2.3 introduces two reduced kernel approaches for a reduced RTU os kernel. 
3.2.1 Secure SCADA protocol 
The focus of this dissertation is not on security in the protocol layer or secure 
SCADA protocols. However the security hardened RTU must have a secure protocol, 
otherwise other security measures can too easily be circumvented. A new security model 
for SCADA communications was presented by Patel in [29]. This enhancement uses a 
challenge response approach to allow either party to perform spontaneous sender 
authentication and message integrity verification of the most recently received message. 
Authentication using challenge response allows periodic verification of the identity of the 
communicating party and the integrity of the most recent message. The challenge 
response mechanism requires that all parties possess a pre-shared secret. Either of the 
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devices (a master or an outstation) can initiate the challenge. The steps are as the 
following: 
1. After the link is established, the authenticator (a master or a field device) sends a 
random "challenge" message to the other party (a field device or a master). 
2. The other party sends a response message that includes an HMAC [104] of the 
challenge message. The challenge message includes a pre-shared secret that assures only 
a valid device can calculate the correct hash. 
3. The challenger checks the response against its own calculation of the expected hash 
value. If the values match, the normal operation proceeds; otherwise the connection gets 
terminated. 
4. At random intervals, the authenticator sends a new challenge to the other party, and 
repeats steps 1 to 3. 
To enhance security, devices issue challenges at the following times: 
• initially, to prevent any communications from proceeding without prior 
authentication, 
• periodically and randomly, to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks, 
• and before carrying out specific critical device operations. (The challenger issues the 
challenge immediately after receiving the critical operation, and before taking any 
action on it.) 
To protect against replay attacks, the challenge message contains a nonce value that 
changes randomly each time a challenge is issued. The challenger, in the challenge 
message, specifies the cryptographic algorithm to be used in calculating the HMAC when 
building the response. 
The responder performs the cryptographic algorithm specified in the challenge message 
to produce a response. The following information is included in the computation: 
• Address information from the SCADA protocol (in order to authenticate the 
responder as a valid application layer user) 
• The challenge data (to protect against replay attacks) 
• The requested operation (if the challenger is protecting a specific critical operation) 
• A shared secret known to both outstation and master 
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Figure 3.2. Challenge response authentication [l05]. 
3.2.2 RTU role based access control 
While it is impossible to eliminate insider threats and the potential failure of 
authentication schemes, like the one presented in section 3.2.1, it is possible to greatly 
limit the threat and constrain the potential damage of these attacks using access control as 
opposed to access restriction. As has been discussed previously, many SCADA systems 
employ neither, but those that do favor access restriction, as is fits with the physical 
protection model that is more familiar to industry practitioners. In access restriction, 
there is a many-to-one mapping of users to an identity, as opposed to access control 
where there is a one-to-one mapping of users to identity. In access restriction, any 
authenticated user is allowed to carry out any valid operation since the system cannot 
distinguish between users. Access control provides improved security by allowing users 
access to only certain permissions. 
Another vulnerability that can be mediated by access control is the trend toward 
open systems and interchangeable SCADA components. Using well defined open 
protocols, such as DNP3 and Modbus, led to the case where many RTU devices, share a 
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common stack implementation. For example, Triangle Microworks has a DNP3 stack 
which RTU vendors can purchase and integrate into their devices. While there are 
advantages to this, the disadvantage is that a vendor's RTU may support functionality of 
which they are not aware. For example, a purchased DNP3 or Modbus stack will likely 
include all of the functionality described in the protocol specification; a vendor, not 
intimately familiar with the protocol, might only pay attention to those functional 
elements needed by their device. Also a SCADA operator or implementer may want to 
absolutely limit what a particular protocol can do. For example, suppose they need to 
provide access to a business partner to parts of the RTU data. Providing that access 
through a standard protocol, such as DNP3 or Modbus, the SCADA operator cannot 
easily limit the capabilities provided to a business partner. The SCADA operator may 
even be unaware that certain capabilities are exposed. 
A primary contribution of this dissertation is an access control model for RTUs. 
In developing the RTU access control model, different access control models including 
the access control matrix model [64], the HRU model [106], lattice models [65;107;108] 
and role based access control models [67; I 09] were considered. While all of these 
models have strengths and weaknesses, RBAC was chosen for modeling because of its 
flexibility and expressiveness. RBAC is policy neutral and can support fine grained 
access control enforcement. Another advantage of RBAC is that it more accurately 
captures the collection and assignment of permissions to users. It is much more logical to 
think of an RTU operation, such as changing an analog dead band value, turning on or off 
a breaker, or adjusting an actuator, as belonging to a role, as opposed to belonging to a 
person or some unnamed coIlection of people. The RTU model developed in this 
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dissertation has the following roles: Operator, Engineer, Vendor, Administrator, Display, 
and Enterprise. The roles are described in detail in chapter four. 
Chapter two mentioned the Field Device Protection Profile for SCADA Systems 
In Medium Robust Environments published by NIST [48]. The main focus of this 
document is enumeration of Authentication, Authorization, and Audit capabilities for 
field devices, including RTUs. The NIST specification asserts that the RTU or field 
device must be able to enforce access control on protected data based on at least the 
following criteria: roles, location (of the subject), and time of day / day of week. 
Justification is given in some detail in the NIST document. The protection profile 
provides only guidance about what is expected and ignores implementation specifics 
completely; nor does it specify how access control constraints are to be specified. 
To support these criteria and to further strengthen the RTU, the access control 
model includes additional constraints. The NIST PP identified the following constraints: 
location, time of day, day of week, and role. To that the RTU role based access control 
model adds the notion of state and the notion permission type. Constraints play an 
important role in the security of the RTU by facilitating secure operation through the 
application of the least privilege, allowing users to have only those permissions needed to 
carryout their operations. Roles, rather than the more traditional access control schemes, 
makes grouping permissions more logical and constraint on roles allows least privilege to 
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Figure 3.3. RTU access control model. 
3.2.3 Reduced kernel OS 
The second vulnerability that was identified in section 3.1 was commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) software, particularly COTS operating systems. A potential option is to 
eliminate this level all together by having a single process or program perform all of the 
duties of the RTU and essentially return to a runtime executive model. There are several 
reasons this is less than desirable. One is that the RTU application will have to handle on 
its own those functionalities usually provided by the operating system. It is also 
inefficient since a specific RTU application may have to be completely re-written to 
change what amounts to superficial changes, such as supported protocol. Most 
importantly it makes the task of software development much more difficult since those 
operating system abstractions are not available to the software developer. Also, as 
changes are made to the RTU program, the entire program must be re-verified, and it is 
not possible to re-use parts of an existing verifies solution without re-verifying them. 
Recall from chapter two that the TCB is all of the hardware and software that is 
involved in enforcing a security policy. For commercial operating systems this is the 
entire operating system kernel, as well as the hardware (memory paging). The size of the 
code base, millions of line of code, and the incident of software flaws make it difficult to 
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trust the TCB. The key to a more trustworthy TCB is to reduce the size of the TCB. A 
smaller TCB is more trustworthy because 
1. There is less code, and therefore less chance of flaws. 
2. A smaller TCB is easier to understand. 
3. A small TCB is potentially amendable to formal verification. 
For RTUs, one way to achieve a smaller and potentially more trustworthy TCB, is 
to use a reduced kernel OS. Two approaches to creating a reduced kernel OS for RTUs 
are presented in chapter five. The first approach is to base the RTU on reduce COTS 
operating system. The second option is to use a micro kernel or separation kernel to 
isolate multiple COTS operating systems and distribute the RTU components across 
them. 
In the first option, the secure RTU model uses a reduced COTS kernel to provide 
only the minimal amount of functionality needed by the RTU for operation. By 
eliminating unneeded elements of the kernel, not only is its size reduced, but a large 
amount of code with potential flaws is also eliminated. A particular system like an RTU 
does not necessarily need all of the functionality of the typical desktop environment. By 
stripping the kernel of its unnecessary code, the threat that this code contains exploitable 
flaws is significantly lowered. The reduced kernel then serves as a more secure base on 
which SCADA and other RTU applications can be built. 
A second option for the secure RTU model is to use a separation kernel [96;98] 
and the MILS architecture to isolate components of the RTU from each other. Individual 
components of the RTU (see figure 2.3) can be placed in separate partitions as shown in 
figure 3.4. There are several advantages of compartmentalizing the RTU in this way. 
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The compartmentalization prevents a software flaw in one system from modifying data, 
structures, or code in other modules. Also, if COTS components are used, they can be 
placed in their own partition and pose no security threat to other modules. 
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Figure 3.4. Secure RTU model with a separation kernel. 
3.3 A security hardened RTU architecture 
The RTU role based access control model must be enforced at some level in the 
RTU. The application layer is often the choice for RBAC systems, since they tend to 
deal with abstract permissions that are difficult to integrate into the operating system. 
Based on the reduced kernel approaches in section 3.2.3, especially the microkernel 
approach, enforcement of the RTU access control model at a more primitive level is 
possible and desirable. 
Building on the microkernel concept of extracting and isolating system 
components and security functions in their own partitions, rather than including them in 
an application or in the operating system, a security-enhanced SCADA RTU architecture 
is derived. The model pictured in figure 3.5 has been developed to provide a high level 
description of the security enhanced RTU architecture. In this model only an input 
output (10) controller has access to analog and digital 10 ports. Access to status points 
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and command points is mitigated through the access control enforcement and security 
functions modules which provide a public interface for RTU services and share a private 
(trusted) communication interface for sharing security relevant information. All access to 
RTU points is through the access control enforcement layer, where an access control 
decision is influenced by both the access control policy and trusted security attributes 
obtained from protected and verified security functions. Security functions, particularly 
authentication are exported to remote users through the security enhanced ONP3 
protocols described in section 3.1. 
Besides authentication, an example of a secure function would be the access 
control decision function check_access, which takes as an argument a subject, an object 
and an operation, and returns true if the subject is allowed to carry out that operation, and 
false if not. The decision function check_access is called before attempting to access the 
protected RTU points. Check access informs the access control enforcer that 
check_access has been called, by which subject, and the result of the function. The 
SCAOA communication module can then access the point (provided check_access was 
successful). While it would be possible to have the enforcement module provide a single 
interface and make calls to the security mechanism internally the proposed method of 
separating the security functions should make them simpler, easier to verify, and 
interchangeable. In addition, it may be possible that a single call to the appropriate 
security functions could result in the enforcer granting multiple accesses to the caller. 
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Figure 3.5. Security enhanced RTU architecture. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter defined the security perimeter of the RTU and discussed the specific 
threat model for RTUs. In response to the threat model this chapter has introduced the 
concepts of the RTU access control model and reduced RTU kernels. These concepts 
along with a previously developed SCADA communication scheme are combined to 
create a security hardened RTU architecture. Roles and constraints will playa central 
role in defining the RTU access control model and micokernels and minimal COTS 
kernels have been identified as potential candidates for a reduced RTU kernel. In the 
next chapter, the RTU access control is explored in greater detail and the RTU access 
control model developed as part of this dissertation is defined. Chapter five explores in 
greater detail reduced kernels for RTUs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RTU ACCESS CONTROL MODEL 
The lack of authentication in SCADA protocols leaves the RTUs and other field 
devices in a position of trusting that all received requests are from a valid and authentic 
source and should be dutifully carried out. As seen in chapter two a primary focus of 
SCADA security effort has been on authentication. But, as discussed in chapter three, 
providing authentication is just part of a comprehensive security architecture for SCADA 
systems, including RTUs. Providing robust and layered security requires that the RTU 
further protect itself by providing fine grained access control that assures authenticated 
users are only allowed to carryout authorized actions. This chapter presents the RTU 
access control model which has been developed through this dissertation research. 
4.1 Core elements of the RTU access control model 
The RTU role based model is based on the conventional role based access control 
concepts of users, who are assigned to roles and permissions that are assigned to roles. 
Specifically the model includes five core sets: users (U), roles (R), points (P), operations 
(0), and permissions (PERM). These sets have the usual meaning with some exceptions, 
specifically the replacement of the usual set of object (OBJ) with points (P) to reflect the 
RTU domain. These sets are fully defined in section 4.1.1. In addition there are two 
significant relations in the standard role based access control model, the user assignment 
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Subjects are the active entities of the system and of the associated requested 
operation. Subjects are traditionally understood as users, with the understanding that 
some agent within the computer system is acting on behalf of the actual user. For RTUs 
a subject may certainly be a human user, but we must also consider that the subject might 
be another computer system. For example, a HMI display might make requests to an 
RTU independent of any human interaction, or an MTU may collect information from an 
RTU automatically. In both these situations an external computer system is the subject or 
the user. Therefore, the notion of RTU subject includes both human users as well as 
remote systems (that are apart of the SCADA network) both of which must be acting 
through some local process or agent on the RTU. 
Roles provide a logical means of grouping a set permissions, and convenient way 
to manage the assignment of permissions to users. Many RBAC models provide for an 
unlimited number of roles, which is appropriate for large organizations that can have 
many users playing many different roles. For RTUs the goal is different. The 
functionality of an RTU is very specific so a limited number of fixed roles will be 
acceptable. The RTU access control model provides the following roles: 
• Engineer - The role of engineer captures the activities of SCADA engineers, who 
design and maintain SCADA system. They do not carry out day to day operations, 
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but analyze data and parameters off line, and update safety and monitor controls. 
Engineers need to have the ability to read most status points, including those most 
frequently used by operators as well as more obscure status points which engineers 
use to carryout safety and protection analysis. 
• Operator - The operator role captures the activities of users who carryout day to day 
operation of the SCADA system. Operators need access to the status points that 
indicate the status of the current system, and any command points that they will use in 
response to observations about the entirety of the SCADA system. 
• Displav - The display role captures the activities of passive HMI machines. This role 
has only read access, and only to status data. 
• Vendor - The vendor role captures external entities associated either the RTU or 
devices connected to the RTU. Vendors may need to observe certain values in order 
to provide technical support to system operators. However they should not be 
allowed to observe all points and should be prevented from changing command points 
or set points. 
• Enterprise - the enterprise role address the current and suspected continuing trend 
that some systems or users from the enterprise network may desire access to R TU s. 
Users are internal entities to the organization that have an interest in some data values 
on the RTU. Or they might be business partners who are provided access to certain 
data as part of their arrangement with the owner of the SCADA system. This role 
will have limited permissions reflecting the fact that those network are less trusted. 
• Admin - The admin role captures the administrative duties of the RTU. This user (or 
users) is responsible for defining roles and assigning users to roles. This role should 
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not have any access to R TU process related data points. This provides for separation 
of duty so that a user cannot both assign themselves roles and have access to the R TU 
system values. 
Objects (Points) 
The purpose of access control is to protect systems resources. For computer 
access control systems these system resources are generically referred to as objects. For 
general purpose systems such as PCs files are the most common abstraction to which 
access control is enforced. In role based access control, objects are generic and take on 
specific meaning only in the context of a target domain. The RTU roles based access 
control model is such a target domain. For RTUs and other field devices the primary 
abstraction is the data point. Recall from chapter two that RTUs are field devices that are 
typically connected to sensors and actuators that measure and control physical systems. 
Points are a universal abstraction in control systems, and refer to named or unnamed 
variables whose value: (l) directly relates to sensor readings or actuator settings, (2) is 
directly derived from one or more sensor reading values, or (3) directly influences the 
reading or writing of sensor and actuator values. Points are the digital representation of 
the telemetry and control provided by an RTU. Therefore, in the model, the standard 
RBAC object (OB1) is replaced with points (P) where a point represents a single data 
value. 
Operations 
The operations with which we are most familiar are read, write and execute. 
These correspond to the basic operations for files on standard commercial operating 
systems, and for memory on most commercial hardware. Read and writing points is 
meaningful however, over the years SCADA protocols have developed their own 
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standard set of operations on points. These operations are read, select, and operate, and 
are described in more detail in [17]. These operations came about to compensate for 
possible errors in transmissions of early and less reliable serial communications. Read 
has its standard meaning; writing a value to a point is a two step operation usually 
referred to as select before operate. To write a value to an RTU point a user would first 
send a select operation, which identified the point to be written to and the value to be 
written. After receiving an acknowledgment, the user would then send the operate 
command which included the same point identifier and the value. Only if select and 
operate requests matched would the value be written to the actual point. The RTU access 
control model adopts the standard SCADA operations of read, select, and operate as its 
definition of operations. 
Permissions 
A permission is the approval to carry out some operation on one or more points. 
Permissions group the operations and points into sensible actions. For example select 
digital output one, or operate analog output two. Not all combinations of operations and 
objects are necessarily valid. 
4.1.2 Relations. 
Central to the role based access control model are the user assignment relation 
(UA) and the permission assignment relation (PA). The user assignment relation is a 
many to many relation that maps user to roles, such that a user can be assigned to more 
than one role and a role can be assigned to more than one user. The permission 
assignment relation is also a many to many relation between roles and permissions. In 
the core model these two relations establish the policy that is enforced by the model. For 
80 
every request r, where r = <subj, point, oper>, r is allowed if the user is assigned to at 
least one role ((user, role) is an element of UA) which has the permission (oper, point) 
(((oper, point), role) is an element of PA). This is formally defined as the function: 
check _ access( u,p,oper). 
4.1.3 Core model definition 
The previous definitions are summarized in figure 4.1, which gives the core RTU 








- The set of RTD users. 
- The set of roles defined for the RTU {Engineer, Operator, Display, 
Vendor, Administrator, Enterprise, Restricted) 
- The set of all points in the RTU 
- a set of operations on P, {read, write, select, operate) 
- The set of permissions of the form <oper,p>. PER <::;;; OPER X P. 
UA - A relation of users to roles UA <::;;; U X R. 
PA - A relation of roles to permissions UA <::;;; PERM X R 
Functions: 
roles(u:USERS) ~ ROLES a function that maps every user to a subset (possible null) of 
ROLES. 
assigned-J'erm (r:R) ~ 2 /\ PERM mapping of roles onto permissions. assigned-J'erm(r) 
returns the permission assigned to role r. 
Figure 4.1. Core RTU access control model definitions 
4.2 Additional access control factors 
In the core model that was just presented, the access control decision is based 
solely on the user assignment relation and the permission assignment relation. An 
advantage of this simplification versus the access control matrix model is the reduction in 
the number of relationships that need to be managed, from O(mn) toO(m + n). 
However the real advantage of role based access control is the potential to capture and 
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express constraints. As discussed in chapter two, constraints are one of RBAC's most 
important benefits. Constraints allow a model to capture and express accurately, complex 
and diverse policies; to better enforce separation of duty; and to achieve least privilege. 
In this section we consider possible criteria for constraints. 
The NIST Field Device Protection Profile for SCADA Systems in Medium 
Robust Environments [48] is a draft document developed by PCSRF to provide a means 
for SCADA and industrial control system community to express the security 
requirements for the next generation of field devices and RTUs. The document asserts 
that the next generation of field device must implement access control, and furthermore 
that 
"The access control decision shall be based on a variety offactors that are 
corifigured by an Administrator. The field device shall support at least the 
following access control factors: user role, system location, and time of day / day 
of week." [48]. 
The core elements of the model presented in section 4.1 provides only the role factor. To 
allow the additional factors listed in the NIST protection profile, location, time of day, 
and day of week can be achieved through the addition of constraints. In addition to the 
factors listed in the protection profile, this dissertation identifies two additional access 
control factors: point type, and system state. Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 describe and 
define how each factor is to be interpreted in relation to the process control domain. 
4.2.1 Location 
For RTUs the location criteria applies to users (or systems) making requests of the 
RTU. The motivation behind the use of the location criteria is to allow the model to 
support limiting specific actions (or permissions) from originating from certain locations 
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irrespective of the role assigned to the user. For example, a breaker may only be turned 
on from the control room (but it might be turned off from anywhere), or a valve position 
may only be operated from the plant floor. The following is a list of locations, and 
reflects the locations currently supported in the model. The model can easily be extended 
to include other locations. 
• Control Room 
• Plant Floor 
• Enterprise Campus 
• Unknown 
For the RTU to enforce restrictions based on location it must be able to associate 
a given user with a location. There are a number of different possibilities for associating 
a user with a given location. It is assumed in the model that structures needed to provide 
this association exist and are available. One possible choice is to bind an IP address to a 
particular subject at the instance of the request and then to use an established association 
of IP addresses to locations to determine the user's location. There are obvious short 
comings with this approach. An alternative would be to use GPS data and add location 
attribute information into a network communication protocol layer. 
Definition 4.1. A set of potential user locations 
LOCATION = {PLANT_FLOOR, CONTROL_ROOM, 
ENTERPRISE_CAMPUS, UNKNOWN} 
Definition 4.2. A user's location is given by the many to one relation 
location 0:;;;;; USERS X LOCA nON 
The meaning of location(u , I) is that user u is currently in location I. 
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4.2.2 Time of day and day of week 
Most RTUs operate 24 hours a day seven days week and 365 days a year. The 
primary reason for including time of day and day of week as potential criteria for access 
control decision is to limit access of users to correspond with their work schedules. For 
example, Alice works only on weekends and she is an engineer. The inclusion of time of 
day and day of week allows the security administrator to limit Alice's privileges to the 
weekend, when she is on duty; preventing her from accessing the system at an 
unexpected time. The security benefits of this are two fold, first this helps support least 
privilege and protects against a session hi-jack where an attacker continues to use Alice's 
credential after she has finished work. 
Definition 4.3. The time of day is determined by the function time_oi_day that returns a 
value indicating the current time of day defined by the set TIME_OF _ DA Y the set of 
minutes in twenty four hour day denoted as hh:mm. These are discrete times which can 
be enumerated. Rather than write each individual time, we also define a short hand ii:jj -
kk:1I to denote the all discrete times between the interval ii:jj and kk:1I inclusive. 
time_oLdayO ~ td E TIME_OF _DAY 
TIME_OF _DAY = {OO:OO, 00:01, 00:02, ... ,23:58, 23:59} 
Definition 4.4. Day of the week is determined by a function day _ oC week that returns a 
value indicating the current day of the week as an element from the set DA Y _OF_WEEK 
day_oLweekO ~ dWEDAY_OF_WEEK 
DA Y OF WEEK = {MONDAY, TUESDAY, WENSDA Y, THURSDAY, 
FRIDA Y, SATURDAY, SUNDAY} 
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4.2.3 Point type 
This dissertation identifies three possible types of points: status points, control 
points and configuration points. Status points represent the value read from a sensor, 
such as temperature, or possibly a derived value such as the deviation of a temperature 
reading from a static set value or the difference between two temperature sensors 
readings. Control points dictate, directly or indirectly, the behavior of connected 
actuators. A digital control point turns something on or off; an analog control point 
might dictate a valve position. Corifiguration points affect either status points or control 
points. For example a configuration point might dictate a dead band value for a sensor 
reading, or the frequency of a pulse width modulation control (which could be turned on 
or off by a digital control). Each point in the model is mapped to only one point type. In 
addition to the above point types there is a special permission type, nil, indicating that a 
point has yet to be assigned a type. 
Definition 4.5. A set of point types 
POINT_TYPE = {STATUS, CONFIGURE, CONTROL, NIL} 
Definition 4.6. Each point is associated with only one point type defined by the many to 
one relation 
point_type c;;;; POINT X POINT_TYPE 
The meaning of point _ type(p, pt) is that point p is of point_type pt. 
4.2.4 System state 
RTUs and other field devices often have a set of states such that at anyone time 
they are only in a specific state, and only certain operations should be carried out when in 
that state. For example, during start up operating some of the control points should be 
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prohibited. This may be safety related but clearly has security implications. In the 
model, the state of the system is global to the RTU, and changes to the state occur both as 
the result of internal processes (for example detection of the completion of the startup 
routine) and in limited cases as the result of human initiation, such as entering the 
maintenance state. The following states are used in the model: 
• Maintenance - Indicating that the R TU is undergoing some type of maintenance 
activity 
• Operate Secure - The RTU is operating, doing its normal activity, but is in an 
elevated security posture 
• Operating - The normal operating state 
• Panic - This state is entered when an error or failure is detected, errors and failures 
include security errors and failures (which ideally the RTU will be able to detect). 
• Recovering - The R TU has experienced and error and is attempting to recover from 
the error. 
• Shut down - This is the state entered when the RTU is told to shutdown or reboot. 
• Start up - This is the state entered when the RTU is powered on. 
Definition 4.7. The set of system states is defined by the following set 
SYSTEM _ STATE = {MAINTENANCE, OPERATING_SECURE, 
OPERATING, PANIC, RECOVERING, SHUT_DOWN, START_UP} 
Definition 4.8. At any given time the system is some state which is given by the function 
system _stateO -7 s E SYSTEM _ STATE 
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4.3 RTU constraints 
The factors identified in section 4.2 can be incorporated into the RTU access 
control model using constraints. Recall from chapter two that there are several different 
possible types of constraints that the model might choose to express. Separation of duty 
constraints have been among the most popular, but chapter two identified seven different 
types or categories of constraints. The RTU access control model can support access 
control decisions based on the factors identified in section 4.2 by using exogenous 
constraints. Exogenous constraints are constraints whose attributes are not a part of the 
core RBAC model, and were defined in chapter two. The constraints will affect the 
relations in the model, specifically the UA and PA relations. Since these attributes will 
change during the runtime execution of the RTU, they are dynamic constraints. We 
incorporate into the model three types of constraints, role activation constraints, 
permission activation constraints, and point type constraints. 
4.3.1 RTU role activation constraints 
RTU role activation constraints place runtime or dynamic constraints on the use 
of one or more roles by a user. These are exogenous prohibition constraints, and define 
conditions when a user, who would otherwise have access, is prevented from making use 
of a role to which he or she has been assigned. 
Definition 4.9. The RTU access control model limits the conditions under which a user 
may not use a given role to access some permission in the relation 
RAC ~ U X R X 2A {LOCATION X TIME_OF_DAY X DAY_OF _WEEK X 
SYSTEM_STATE} 
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The meaning ofRACCu, r, cs) is that a user u is prevented from using role r if location(u) 
E cs or time _ oC dayO E cs or day _ oC weekO E cs or system stateO E cs. 
4.3.2 RTU Permission activation constraints 
RTU permission activation constraints place runtime or dynamic constraints on 
the permissions that can be accessed through a given role. These are prohibition 
constraints in that they define conditions under which a permission cannot be accessed by 
a role. As an example, consider this natural language expression of an RTU permission 
activation constraint: "an engineer (role) may not change the dead band value of the 
pressure sensor stations _12 _section _ 2 from the enterprise network or an unknown 
location." We now give a formal definition for permission activation constraints. 
Definition 4.10. The RTU access control model limits the conditions under which a 
given role cannot access a permission normally assigned to it in the relation 
PAC ~ R X P X 2/\{LOCATION X TIME_OF _DAY X DAY_OF _WEEK X 
SYSTEM_STATE} 
The meaning of PACCr, p, cs) is that any user u is not allowed to access permission p 
through role r if location(u) E cs or time_oCdayOE cs or day_oCweekO E cs or 
system _ stateO E cs. 
4.3.3 RTU point type constraints 
The final constraint that is added to the model is the point type constraint. These 
constraints are more akin to mandatory constraints, though not identical. The previous 
two constraints defined in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 can possibly be null, in which case the 
model is equivalent to the core model, as the constraints are non-existent. The RTU point 
type constraints are more static than the role activation constraints and the permission 
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activation constraints. The point type constraints limit the kinds of operations that can be 
assigned to roles. Recall from section 4.2 each point is assigned a type from the set 
PO INT _TYPE. The point type constraint is a static obligation assignment constraint that 
requires each role be assigned a set of point types. Enforcement of this constraint 
prevents roles from being assigned any operation on points of a specific type. We now 
formally define the point type constraint as 
Definition 4.11. The RTU access control model limits the assignment of permissions to 
roles in the relation 
The meaning of PTC(rs,pt) is that the roles in rs are assigned to the point types in pt. A 
role r may be assigned to an operation on point p if and only if <r,pt> E PTe, where pt is 
the point type of point p. 
4.4 The RTU access control model 
The previous sections have described and identified additional criteria on which 
access control decision should be based, and defined three types of constraints to add to 
the RTU access control model that reflect these additional access control factors. The 
final RTU access control model can be defined. [t incorporates the constraints, and unites 
together the different access control factors. The model definitions are summarized in 
figure 4.2. The functional operations on the model are defined in table 4.1. For each 




USERS - The set of RTU users initially. 
ROLES - The set of roles defined for the RTU {Engineer, Operator, Display, 
Vendor, Administrator, Enterprise, Restricted} 
POINTS - The set of all points in the RTU 
POINT_lYPES - A set of point types: {status, control, configuration} 
OPER - a set of operations on P, {read, write, select, operate} 
PERM - The set of permissions of the form <oper,p>. PER ~ OPER X PERM. 
APER - A set of administrative permissions, permissions that operate on the 
model {assign_role, add_user, assign_permission, 
assign_type_PO, delete_user, add]AC, add_RAC, add]TC} 
LOCATION - A set of locations from which users generate RTU requests 
{PLANT_FLOOR, CONTROL_ROOM, ENTERPRISE_CAMPUS, 
UNKNOWN}. 
TIME_OF _DAY - The set of all hour minute combinations for time of day, given as 
hhmm, (0001-2400) 
DAY_OF_WEEK- The set of days of the week {Mo,Tu,We,Th,Fr,Sa,Su} 
SYSTEM_STATE - The set of device states {Reboot, StarCup, Shut_down, operating, 
Operate_secure, Maintenance, Recovering, Panic} 
Relations 
RAC ~ UXRX2A{LOCATION, TIME_OF_DAY, DAY_OLWEEK, SYSTEM_STATE} 
PAC ~ RX PERM X 2A{ LOCATION, TIME_OF_DAY, DAY_OF_WEEK, 
SYSTEM_STATE} 
PTC ~ 2AR X 2ApOINT_lYPES <r,pt> indicating which point types a role may 
operate on. 
UA ~ U X R. A relation of users to roles 
PA ~ R X P. A relation of roles to permissions 
PTA ~ P X PT a many to one mapping of P to PT. 
Functions: 
roZes(u:U) ~ R a function that maps every user to a subset (possible null) of R. 
assigned-penn (r:R) ~ 2PERM mapping of roles onto permissions. assigned_perm(r) 
returns the permission assigned to role r 
Zocation(u) ~ IE L a function mapping a user u to a location. 
point_type (p) ~ ptE POINT_lYPE is a function that maps a point p, to a point type. 
time_oLdayO ~ todE ToD a function that returns a ToD element representing the current 
time of day 
day_oLweekO ~ dOWE DoW a function that returns a DoW element representing the 
current day of the week 
system_stateO ~ ssE D_S a function that returns the current state of the device. 
role(rac:RAC) ~ r E ROLES a function that returns the role of given role activation 
constraint. 
user(rac:RAC) ~ u E USERS a function that returns the role of given role activation 
constraint. 
Figure 4.2. The RTU access control model. 
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Table 4.1. RTU access control operational functions 
Function Arguments Preconditions Postconditions 
check access U, op, p, result u E USERS /\ op E OPER /\ P E PERM result = 3 r E roles{u) I (p,r) E PA /\ (u,r) E UA 
/\ (\I (cr,cp,cs) E PAC, r *- cr v p *- cp v 
(location( u)(l CS /\ time_of dayO(l cs /\ 
day _ oC weekO(l cs /\ system _stateO(l cs /\) /\ ( 
\I (cu,cr,cs) E RAC, r *- cr v u *- cu v 
(Iocation{ u)(l CS /\ time_of dayO(l cs /\ 
day of weekO(l cs /\ system stateO(l cs /\ ) 
add user User user (l USERS user E U 
delete user User userE USERS user (l U ----,3 r:RI(user,r) E UA 
assign user user, role user E V /\ role E ROLES (user,role) EVA; 
deassign user user, role user E U /\ role E ROLES /\ (user,role) E VA (user,r) (l UA; 
assignJole role, op, obj role E ROLES /\ (op,obj)E PERM /\ (role, point_type(obj» {(op,obj),role) E PA 
E PTC 
'-0 deassign role role, op, obj role E ROLES /\ (op,obj)E PERM /\ «op,obj),role) E PA «op,obj),role) (l PA 
assign _type p, pt P E POINTS /\ pt E PT /\ point _type(p) = nil Point _ type(p) = pt 
add RAC roles, perms, roles ~ R /\ perms ~ PERM /\ csE RAC 
cs cs ~ 2{LOCATION U TIME_Of_DAYU DAY_Of_WEEK U SYSTEM_STATE} 
add]AC users, perms, users ~ U /\ perms ~ PERM /\ cs E PAC 
cs cs ~ 2{LOCATION U TIME_Of_DAY U DAY_Of_WEEK U SYSTEM_STATE} 
add PTC roles, types roles ~ ROLES /\ types ~ POINT_TYPES /\ (roles, types) (Roles, types) E PTC 
ex PTC 
remove RAC roles, perms, roles ~ ROLES /\ perms ~ PERM /\ cs (l RAC 
cs cs ~ 2{LOCATION U TIME_Of_DAYU DAY_Of_WEEK U SYSTEM_STATE)_ 
/\ cs E RAC 
remove PAC users, perms, users ~ USERS /\ perms ~ PERM /\ cs (l PAC 
cs cs ~ 2{LOCATION U TIME_Of_DAY U DAY_Of_WEEK U SYSTEM_STATE)-
/\ csE PAC 
remove PTC roles, types roles ~ ROLES /\ types ~ POINT_TYPES /\ (roles, types) (roles, types) ex PTC 
E PTC 
4.5 Check Permission Algorithm 
A central model component IS the function check _ accessO, Check access 
determines whether a given subject can carry out a given operation on a given object. 
Table 4.1 gives the post conditions for check access. Check_access is modeled as a 
function and an algorithm for implementing check access is shown in figure 4.3 
Function Check access (subject, operation, point) 
Begin 
allow_flag = false; 
PERM = to_perm (operation, point) II return the permission 
II associated with the operation 
end 
UR = roles (subject) 
PR = roles (permission) 
UCR = {} 
PCR = {} 
CS = {location(user) , TOO(), OoW(), State()} 
For each rac in RAC 
If user(rac) == subject 
For each cs in CS 
If cs <:;:;; constraints (rac) 
UCR = UCR U role (rac); 
For each pac in PAC 
If PERM == perm(pac) 
For each cs in CS 
If cs <:;:;; constraints (pac) 
PCR = PCR U role (pac) 
UR UR nUCR 
PR PR nPCR 
R = URnPR 
IF IRI > 0 
Allow_flag true 
Return allow_flag 
Figure 4.3. Check_access algorithm. 
The check_access function first identifies permissions associated with the 
requested operation, and then finds the roles assigned to the user, and the roles to which 
the specific permission has been assigned. Next the context functions 
locations (user), time of day(), Day of_week(), and 
system_state () are evaluated as stored as elements of the set CS. Then the 
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check_access function identified each role activation constraint from RAC that applies to 
the subject. If a role activation applies to a user, then a test is performed for each element 
of the constraint set CS. If an element is a subset of the current RAC's constraint set, 
then the RAC's role is added to the set UCR. The same process is repeated for the PAC 
using permissions and the set PCR. Finally any role in UR that is also in UCR is 
removed from UR and any role in PR that is also in PCR is removed from PRo If the 
intersection of UR and PR has at least one role then the subject is allowed to carry out the 
operation on that object. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a formal model for RTU access control. The model is 
based on the core RBAC defined by NIST but without sessions. In the model, the 
primary factor for access control is roles, but additional context factors are allowed to 
influence the access control decision. These factors are expressed as constraints, and are 
given in the sets RAC, PAC, and PTC. The access control decision is provided by the 
function check_access and an algorithm for the check_access function is given. 
93 
CHAPTER V 
RTU PROTECTION AND REDUCED KERNELS 
The RTU access control model described in chapter four provides a model for 
determining authorized RTU actions. Application of the model to an actual RTU requires 
an authorization system and protection architecture. A typical authorization architecture 
includes a policy enforcement point (PEP), and a policy decision point (PDP) as shown in 
figure 5.1. As discussed in chapter two, the operating system plays a central role in 
security since it provides the interface to system resources and controls all access to 
system resources. Unfortunately, commercial operating systems tend to provide 
discretionary access control that is very coarse. Commercial operating systems typically 
follow the Unix model, where all system resources are treated as files. Processes 
(subjects) and files are assigned to a user id and a set of permission bits attached to each 
file determines whether a subject can access the file (resource). Subjects, not the system, 
determine who has access to the resources they control. This protection architecture is 
insufficient to enforce the RTU access control model from chapter four for two reasons: 
first, it is too coarse, because the model requires the ability to restrict access to specific 
operations on individual analog and digital 10 points; second, the controls are 
discretionary allowing them to be arbitrarily changed. An alternate R TU protection 
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Figure 5.1. Typical authorization architecture. 
Since the operating system level of abstraction is not sufficiently fine-grained, a 
logical choice is to place the PEP in a middleware layer and force all access requests 
through the PEP. This middleware layer will provide access to the RTU operations such 
as reading and writing digital and analog 10 points, and other operations such as cold and 
warm restarts. It is possible to place the PEP within a specific application such as the 
ONP3 application layer process. The problem with locating the PEP and PDP within a 
single application is that in the case that the RTU supports multiple SCAOA protocols, 
the RTU access control model will have to be implemented in each application. This is 
wasteful and inefficient, and most importantly can lead to an inconsistent application of a 
given policy. A middleware PEP placement is far superior as it allows centralized 
administration and enforcement, and assures that all software components are subject to 
the access controls. 
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The problem that faces a middleware layer PEP brings us to the second RTU 
threat area identified in chapter three - COTS operating system vulnerabilities. The 
middleware layer relies on the protection mechanisms in the operating system to ensure 
that all subjects must access the protected objects through the PEP. An operating system 
vulnerability could allow the PEP to be bypassed, and thus for the security of the RTU to 
be circumvented. The ability to circumvent the access controls is not limited to SCADA 
applications, such as the DNP3 server. Other RTU applications, even those not intended 
to access analog and digital IO points at all, could be allowed to read or make changes if 
they are able to exploit a vulnerability in the kernel. Clearly this is an undesirable 
situation, and given the poor track record with respect to security that is characteristic of 
commercial operating systems, it must be considered a strong possibility. 
The two contributing factors to the poor security of commercial operating systems 
identified in chapter two included the size of the code base and their monolithic design. 
This chapter presents two approaches to creating a reduced kernel based OS for RTUs 
that strengthen the protection provided by an R TU middleware PEP. The first approach 
acknowledges that there is strong motivation to use commercial operating systems due to 
the significant cost savings that can be realized by both the cost savings of the OS itself 
and the savings in the time spent on application development. The approach leverages 
the fact that a good deal of the code base in commercial operating systems is not needed 
by the RTU, by proposing to reduce a COTS kernel to a minimal COTS kernel for RTUs. 
The second approach takes a more radical approach and proposes using a microkernel to 
isolate RTU components and place an isolated PEP between RTU resources and user 
level applications. The two minimal kernel approaches identified in this chapter reduce 
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or potentially eliminate the COTS OS threat faced by RTUs, and provide assurance that a 
middleware layer PEP for the R TU access control model is not subverted. 
5.1 Minimal COTS kernel based RTU 
Recall from chapter two that one of the motivating factors in the adoption of 
COTS components in SCADA environments was the need to contain costs. The majority 
of SCADA networks are privately owned and operated and in most cases are for profit 
companies, such as PG&E, American Water Works, W. R. Grace, and Proctor and 
Gamble. Vendors of SCADA components such as RTUs are strongly motivated to keep 
the cost of their products down and to keep the cost of ownership down as well. For this 
reason COTS operating systems, particularly Linux, are an attractive choice for SCADA 
devices, since their cost can be significantly less than the cost of developing a custom OS 
for the device (Linux further reduces cost by eliminating licensing cost associated with 
devices). However, as was discussed in chapter two, commercial operating systems' 
track record with respect to security is less than exemplary. 
To address this shortcoming while maintaining the economic benefits of using a 
COTS OS, the minimal RTU kernel is achieved through a radical reduction of a standard 
COTS kernel. The goal of the radical reduction is to provide only the minimal amount of 
functionality needed by the RTU for operation. By eliminating unneeded elements of the 
kernel not only is its size reduced, but a large amount of code with potential flaws is also 
eliminated. A particular system like an RTU does not necessarily need all of the 
functionality of the typical desktop environment. By stripping the kernel of its 
unnecessary code, the threat that this code contains exploitable flaws is eliminated. The 
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reduced kernel then serves as a more secure base on which SCADA and other RTU 
applications can be built. 
One of the primary sources of vulnerabilities in today's commercial kernels are 
device drivers. These pieces of code have a higher flaw rate, and in monolithic kernel 
design, complete access to the text and data sections of the kernel. To make commercial 
operating systems able to function on a large number of environments modem kernels 
include many drivers, filling the kernel with unneeded and possibly exploitable code. 
Unneeded device drivers are an excellent target for removal in creating a minimal COTS 
kernel RTU, as unneeded drivers can be permanently eliminated. It should be possible to 
greatly reduce the kernel using this approach as device drivers often represent about 70% 
of the operating system [84]. 
Besides drivers, there are also a number of support structures in a standard COTS 
kernel, the main ones being a file system, process model, interrupt handler, memory 
allocation, and scheduler. While these main components will need to remain in the 
kernel to function properly, it is possible to pare them down by removing unneeded lower 
level components. For example, support for many different file systems, such as NTFS 
are likely not needed by RTUs since they are characterized as stand alone systems. 
The objective of the minimal commercial kernel RTU is to allow RTU vendors to 
capitalize on the cost savings that are provided by commercially available operating 
systems, while at the same time minimizing the security vulnerabilities. Any COTS OS 
is likely to have both known and unknown vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities are the 
result of software flaws in the OS code. Reducing the kernel reduces the lines of codes in 
the kernel and thus possibly eliminates the code containing unknown flaws. A recent 
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study [110] showed that code contains on average between 6 and 16 bugs per 1000 lines 
of code (Ioc). Therefore eliminate enough lines of code and you significantly reduce the 
occurrence of bugs. A RTU security architecture can then be constructed using the 
reduced RTU kernel and a middleware PEP as shown in figure 5.2. 
f--
PDP PEP RTU Applications DNP3, Modbus, RAS 
f--
Policy Analog & 
Digital Reduced COTS Kernel 
10 Points 
Hardware 
Network Interface, Analog and Digital 10, Storage, Memory 
Figure 5.2. RTU security architecture using radically reduced RTU kernel. 
5.2 Microkernel based RTU 
The minimal COTS RTU kernel can eliminate many potential vulnerabilities. It 
is however still based on the monolithic kernel design, which means that all of the 
services provided to the RTU still exist in a single address space with little protection 
from each other. Particularly the analog and digital 10 modules are not protected from 
other kernel objects or threads. Malicious code can still potentially break into the kernel 
by exploiting a vulnerability and gaining root access. Once root access is achieved an 
attacker can bypass the PEP and potentially directly manipulate analog and digital 10. 
Truly robust RTU protection cannot rely only on the discretionary access controls 
enforced by commercial OSs. Instead a different approach is needed. The separation 
kernel and the MILS architecture, described in chapter two provide inspiration for a 
solution. Using this architecture, critical RTU resources, specifically analog and digital 
10 ports and modules can be truly isolated from other RTU components. Individual 
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components of the RTU (see figure 2.3) can be placed in separate partitions as shown in 
figure 5.3. 
The security advantages of strongly isolated RTU components are numerous. 
First, the compartmentalization prevents a software flaw in one system from modifying 
data, structures, or code in other modules. This type of isolation helps the RTU achieve 
availability; this is essentially the MILS fault isolation goal. Another advantage is that, if 
COTS components are used, they can be placed in their own partition and pose no 
security threat to other modules. For example, if an RTU vendor chooses to include a 
web interface, the server software can be placed in its own isolated partition, and the 
system architecture prevents the possibility of the web server being compromised and 





H Field I Network Device 
Interface (/):0- Field 1-.9-
Device OE Remote Local Device H SCADA t). Field I Q) Access Control 110 "'0 .-' Device Application Q)~ Server module control 
- Q) (/) .... 
::::s rn module !=;3: 
c¢:: H Field J :::>0 
(/) DeVice 
I I I I I 
Separation kernel 
Hardware 
Figure 5.3. MILS RTU with isolation of RTU components. 
Complete isolation of each component is not possible, there must be some 
cooperation among the isolated component for the RTU to function. For example, the 
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communication module, which sends and receives SCADA messages, will need to 
retrieve actual 10 data from the analog and digital 10 modules, and possibly pass values 
back to these modules. The complement to isolation is cooperation or sharing. The 
security achieved by isolating RTU components can easily be undone when the various 
components are allowed to interact. Consider the analog and digital 10 components. 
These are drivers that access the RTU's 10 ports. Isolation allows the ports and memory 
to be dedicated to an analog input module, or digital output module. The dedication of 
10 ports to 10 modules prevents other potentially misbehaving modules from accessing 
10 ports, or modifying the programs of 10 modules. However, for the RTU to carry out 
its function, some other isolated components will need to have access to the input and 
output values from the 10 modules. 
Recall that the separation kernel is a microkernel and that a microkernel provides 
three primary abstractions: address space, execution, and inter process communication 
(IPC). The isolation presented so far is represented by address spaces. The execution 
abstraction is achieved through tasks, which represent a unit of execution. Finally IPC 
allows tasks, which are isolated in one or more address spaces, the ability to cooperate 
and share information. Tasks communicate with each other through a set of IPC 
primitives provided by the kernel. Moreover the kernel, as the arbiter of task IPC, can 
determine if two tasks are allowed to send and receive messages. In MILS there is an 
additional layer called the partition communication system, which extends the IPC 
functionality with security primitives. 
While some systems may choose to prevent any partition from communicating 
with any other partition, it is through secure cooperation that robust, secure, and useful 
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systems can be built. The advantage of MILS and the structure of the I PC or PCS is that 
the system architect can designate which partitions or tasks are allowed to communicate 
with each other, and the separation kernel enforces this absolutely. This allows 
application layer reference monitors to be placed between different partitions, and assure 
that these reference monitors are not bypassed. Thus, rather than relying on the kernel to 
make all access control decisions, the MILS architecture allows access control to be 
layered. User land applications that provide security are inserted between isolated 
application components, and the separation kernel guarantees that these components 
cannot be bypassed. Applying this principle to the security hardened RTU allows for the 
creation of one or more PEP to protect different isolated R TU components. Furthermore 
the PDP can be isolated as well, making it impossible for other RTU components to 
modify the policy. Figure 5.4 shows how the RTU PEP is inserted between various 
isolated RTU components. This allows the RTU to unequivocally apply its security 






















There are some disadvantages to applying the MILS architecture and a separation 
kernel to RTUs. The MILS architecture is targeted for high-assurance systems, in 
particular those that need to support multi-level security (MLS). While MLS is needed 
for many military systems, for SCADA systems, specificaIly for RTUs, it is not 
representative of the desired security objectives. MLS is a based on the Bell LaPadula 
model, which is a confidentiality security model. As mentioned in chapter two, for 
SCADA systems, availability and integrity are of primary importance, not confidentiality. 
Two other significant disadvantages to the separation kernels and the MILS architecture 
are cost and availability. A true separation kernel, which was first proposed in 1982, has 
yet to be developed. Recent advances in microprocessors are making the performance 
cost associated with a separation kernel more acceptable. As discussed in detail in 
chapter two, research and development of the MILS architecture and a separation kernel 
are currently active. Lynxworks and Greehhills software are both working on separation 
kernels that can achieve EAL seven certification, which is a key milestone to realizing 
the MILS architecture. However, to this author's knowledge no EAL seven certified 
separation kernel is yet available. Moreover, if a separation kernel is to become 
available, it will surely have a high cost associated with it, at least initially. Since 
SCADA operators face economic pressure to contain costs, the expense of a full 
separation kernel is likely to be out of their reach for the foreseeable future. 
5.2.1 Alternative microkernelfor the security hardened RTU 
While clearly a certified EAL seven separation kernel provides the best 
microkernel for an RTU from a security perspective, microkenels in general can enable 
the development of more robust security, and provide partitioning and encapsulation that 
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are core to the MILS approach. A key difference being that they lack formal verification 
and the MILS architecture in which to be integrated. There are a number of microkernels 
available, several of which are open source and could be used in developing a 
microkernel based RTU. These are discussed in chapter seven where development of a 
microkernel based RTU prototype platform is presented. 
5.2.2 RTU protection architecture using a microkernel 
Given the obstacles to a MILS / separation kernel based R TU and availability of 
open source microkernels, a viable and promising alternative to a MILS based RTU is a 
microkernel based RTU. Although this alternative cannot provide the same high 
assurance as MILS, it can provide a superior RTU security architecture, and one that can 
potentially eliminate or mitigate the vulnerabilities in COTS operating systems and 
software in the RTU. It is this approach that is advocated here. The availability of open 
source microkernels IS ideal for the development of secure RTUs. The three 
microkernels mentioned in the previous section, Fiasco, Pistachio, OKL4, are all 
sufficiently mature to support investigation of a microkernel based security hardened 
RTU. 
The microkernel based RTU security architecture isolates RTU components by 
assigning each to its own address space. Each individual component then provides one, 
or more, interfaces for receiving IPe messages. The contents of the messages are 
dependent on the particular component. For example, the analog input component might 
accept a read message indicating the analog input point value that is desired. The 
component would then put the value in a response message. Another example might be 
the communication interface accepting an open connection message, or a send or a 
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receive message. The model includes a number of RTU components, such as local 
control, which might not necessarily be present in every RTU. It should be easy to 
accommodate this, as these can just become null address spaces, and give null responses 
to errant requests. 
The microkernel provides for isolation of these components, providing the first 
layer of security. Next, security components, especially a PEP and PDP that capture the 
application of the RTU access control model described in chapter four, are woven into 
the components. The main security component is the R TU security service component. 
This component maintains the security related information, policy, and state information 
relevant to RTU security. Isolated components can send messages to the RTU security 
service. Rather than a single PEP, the microkernel based RTU has multiple PEPs in the 
form of guards that intercept communication between different components, and enforce 
the RTU security policy on these requests and replies. The security architecture is shown 
in figure 5.5. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed protection architectures for the RTU that support the 
RTU access control model described in chapter four. The access control model is fine-
grained and cannot be natively supported in most commercial kernels. Therefore some 
middleware protection scheme is needed. This highlights the threat posed to RTUs by 
COTS operating systems, since flaws in the OS can allow middleware protection 
mechanisms to be circumvented. Two approaches to reducing this threat were described 
in this chapter - a minimal COTS RTU kernel, and a microkernel. The minimal COTS 
kernel is proposed as a way to reduce the threat of vulnerabilities, but still allow SCADA 
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vendors and SCADA operators to capitalize on economic benefits that make COTS 
desirable. The MILS architecture and separation kernel serve as the inspiration for the 
microkernel approach. But rather than actually advocate the use of the MILS architecture 
and separation kernel, which are not readily available and are expected to be cost 
prohibitive for SCADA operators, the use of an open source microkernel is advocated, as 
it provides the benefits of MILS and separation kernel, though lacking formal 
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Figure 5.5. Microkernel based RTU security architecture. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 
A new access control model for RTUs was presented in chapter four, and chapter 
five described two reduced kernel approaches for strengthening RTU security. This 
chapter describes the development and testing of a prototype hardened R TU. The 
prototype implements the developed RTU role based access control model as a 
middleware layer available to other RTU processes, and uses a reduced COTS kernel as 
described in chapter five. A security enhanced DNP3 protocol similar to that described 
by Patel in [29] was included to provide SCADA access to the prototype. RTUs and 
other industrial controllers usually have less available memory and processing power 
than traditional computing systems and have different performance requirements as well. 
The prototype was developed on actual RTU hardware from Sixnet and evaluated in a 
test bed environment including actual SCADA hardware. Both performance analysis and 
security testing were conducted in the prototype evaluation. 
6.1 Prototype development platform 
An mlPM form Sixnet was used as the prototype development platform. SixNet 
10 is a US based company that manufactures and distributes hardware for the industrial 
automation industries including: oil and gas production and distribution, water and 
wastewater treatment, and transportation. Their product list includes DCS controllers, 
10 modules, Dataloggers, and RTUs that support Ethernet, RS232 and RS485 
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communication standards. Their products are designed for harsh industrial environments 
and are Deutsches Institut fUr Normung (DIN) rail mountable. Sixnet also caters to 
OEMs, providing them with private labeling of controllers and RTUs. Sixnet's Linux 
based IPm controllers are open systems, allowing OEMs to create customized RTUs 
using open source tools, making them an excellent choice for prototype development. 
6.1.1 Hardware 
Sixnet RTUs and DCS controllers are actually embedded computers based on a 
PowerPC CPU with a 32 bit data bus operating at 50 Mhz. Besides the processor, RTUs 
and DCS controllers also have flash memory, dynamic RAM, and persistent (battery 
backed) RAM and come with a mix of 1011 00 Ethernet ports, RS232 and RS485 ports as 
well as on board digital and analog 10. Battery backed RAM is common in industrial 
devices and is used for logging purposes since the contents persist through power cycles. 
Access to dynamic RAM on Sixnet devices is made available through an emulated disk. 
6.1.2 Software 
Sixnet offers RTUs and DCS controllers with either Winows CE or Linux 
operating system (OS). The IPm series ofRTUs by Sixnet uses the Linux 2.4 kernel, and 
the Sixnet Linux installation includes a TCP/IP stack, common Internet daemons 
including telnet, echo, ftp, and daytime. Since the Linux OS is open source, the kernel 
source used by Sixnet is available. Basic OS utilities such as cat, more, ls, and ps are 
provided by busybox. The standard installation also includes gdbserver to allow 
remote debugging of applications. 
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6.1.3 Development Environment 
To encourage OEMs to use their product, Sixnet provides a development package 
called IADK (lPm Application Development Kit). The kit includes a gcc cross compiler 
toolchain for compiling code that can be executed on an IPm based RTU. The kit also 
includes a client side GUT based debugger (insight) that connects to a running instance of 
the gdbserver on an IPm. In addition the kit includes static and dynamic versions of 
commonly used libraries. Finally the kit includes Sixnet's proprietary library used to 
access local digital and analog 10 on the IPm. Using the library a program can read or 
write to local analog and digital 10 by calling one of two functions: IODBRead ( . 
) and IODBWrite( ... ). 
6.2 Hardened RTU prototype development 
The most basic open IPm based RTUs from Sixnet was chosen as the platform on 
which to develop the hardened RTU prototype. Since the mlPM is a commercially 
available RTU, computing resource available to the prototype RTU such as dynamic 
memory, flash memory, and processor speed, were considered comparable to current 
commercial units. Sixnet's support for OEMs and OEM customization of mlPM 
products makes development and testing possible and provides a potential path towards 
future commercial deployment. The chosen RTU, designated by Sixnet as mlPM VT-
241 D was the least expensive RTU which had a nice complement of on board 10. The 
mlPM RTU has 16MB of flash, 16MB of dynamic memory, one auto detection 10/100 
Ethernet port, and four serial ports. The on board TO consists of twelve binary inputs, 
four binary outputs, six analog inputs and two analog outputs. The binary inputs are 
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based on the mlPM's power supply which for the prototype was fifteen volts. The binary 
outputs can draw on the power supply as well, up to two amps. The technical 
specifications sheet for the mlPM are included in appendix D . 
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Figure 6.1. SixNet RTU used for prototype development source [111]. 
The prototype consists of three primary software components: first, a reduced 
COTS kernel, as described in chapter five, second, an implementation of the new RTU 
role based access control model described in chapter four which provides access to RTU 
10 points to all other RTU software, and third, an implementation of DNP3 enhanced 
with security measures, particularly authentication, to allow other SCADA devices to 
access the R TU. 
6.2.1 Prototype development: Reduced Linux Kernel 
The first component of the hardened R TU to be developed was the reduced 
kernel. Two approaches were identified in chapter five, a reduced COTS kernel and a 
microkernel. The reduced COTS kernel approach was chosen for this prototype. The use 
of a microkernel is explored in chapter seven. Some initial experimentation with reduced 
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kernels was carried out using the LynxOS [112]. LynxOS is a real-time operating system 
based on Linux and designed for embedded systems development. The environment 
supports the POSIX® standard and provides cross-compilation platform and kernel 
customization. A reduced kernel image was created using LynxOS's kernel 
customization features and the creation of KDI's or kernel downloadable images. The 
main feature of the kernel customization is the inclusion and exclusion of different 
drivers and supporting libraries. Other elements of kernel reduction were focused on 
setting variable values that affect performance such as the maximum number of 
processes, the size of the disk cache, or the maximum number of mounted file systems. 
To further reduce the size of the kernel, the libraries for IPv6 and the NFS were also 
excluded. 
LynksOS support for the PowerPC was limited, and was not available for the 
mIPM. The Linux 2.4 Kernel is supported for the mIPM hardware, with a patch available 
from Sixnet. The source code for the 2.4 kernel was downloaded from kernel.org. The 
Sixnet mlPM is built around a Power PC based single board computer (SBC). In order 
for the kernel to run on the mIPM a patch to the kernel source must be applied. The 
patch is freely available from Sixnet. 
After patching the kernel a reduced kernel image was created. This was achieved 
by eliminating a host of drivers and supporting software. Support for the following file 
systems was eliminated: REISER, HFS, BFS, EXT3, FAT, MSDOS, UMSDOS, VFAT, 
NTFS, EFS, NFS, and MINIX. Parts of the network libraries were eliminated including 
support for IPv6 and netfilter support in the kernel's TCP/IP stack. The final kernel 
configuration file is listed in appendix A. The final size of the reduced kernel was 1.3 
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megabytes. For comparison purposes a default installation of Redhat 7.3 which uses the 
2.4 kernel was evaluated. The default Redhat 7.3 Linux kernel was 2.9 megabytes. The 
hardened RTU's reduced Linux kernel is less than half the size of a comparable standard 
Linux kernel. Assuming that software vulnerabilities are evenly distributed, this reduced 
kernel RTU has reduced by about one half, the number of kernel vulnerabilities that 
result from kernel code flaws, and which could present RTU attack vectors. Table 6.1 
shows the sizes of the compressed and uncompressed kernel images and breaks down 
their size into text, data, and bss segments. Once the custom reduced kernel was 
compiled it was loaded onto the mIPM RTU. 
Table 6.1. Reduced kernel and standard kernel comparision. 
Kernel Size 
Uncompressed compressed text segment Data Bss 
Hardened 1.3 M bytes 553943 byes 1285640 bytes 59592 13827 




Standard 2.9 Mbytes 1.2 Mbytes 1969848 bytes 431652 383452 
Linux kernel 3072843 1262048 bytes 
(Red Hat 7.4) 
6.3.2 Prototype development: RTU Role Based Access Control 
After the new reduced kernel was loaded, the next hardened RTU component 
needed was an implementation of the RTU role based access control model described in 
chapter four. The RTU role based access control component was created for the mIPM 
RTU using Sixnet's IADK. The IADK library routines provide access to the prototype's 
hardware circuitry for analog and digital input and output. The access control scheme 
was implemented as a middleware security layer between the IADK library calls and a 
112 
new inter process communication (lPC) defined interface. Figure 6.2 shows the basic 
architecture of the implementation. The defined interface is available to any RTU user 
process or application through IPe calls described below. A permission was created for 
each primitive in the IDAK library. 
Custom IPC 
interface 
RTU Role Based I 
I Access Control Security IODBRead( ... ) 
Middleware SIXNET 
IODBWrite( ... ) IADK RTU User Applications LIBRARY DNP3, RAS, . -
- ~ V 
Figure 6.2. Prototype security middleware implementation. 
The access control scheme was implemented as a middleware security layer using 
named and unnamed pipes. The module provides access to the protected RTU 10 points 
by exposing an interface through which user programs can request processes 10 
operations. The interface is provided through the named pipe 
/tmp/var/tmp/rtuIOserver. The privileges of this pipe are set such that anyone 
can write to the named pipe but only its owner, the RTU middleware security layer can 
read from the pipe. The IADK calls 10DBRead and IODBWrite require root privileges, 
which is given to the middleware security layer. Regular user processes can call IADK 
library functions, but they have no effect and the returned values are undefined. All 
hardened RTU user processes are executed without privileges, preventing them from 
making 10 point changes except through the provided security middleware layer which 
implements the RTU role based access control. 
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The policy is stored in several permanent files in the flash memory of the 
prototype. The name of these files are: "USERS", "PERMS", "POINTS", "PAC", and 
"RAC". There are three fields in the USERS file: user id, user name, and user roles. 
Multiple roles are separated by a comma, and allow users to be assigned multiple roles. 
The POINTS file has three fields: logical id, logical index, and point type. The logical id 
and logical index uniquely name each point; for example, binary input one or analog 
output two. The point type is an element from point_type from the model described in 
chapter four, definition 4.5. The file PERMS has four fields, the operation, the logical id, 
the logical index, and the set of roles. This file creates the mapping between the IADK 
library routines, which represent all the possible permissions the prototype can execute, 
and the roles in the model. Multiple roles are separated by a comma. The constraints are 
stored in the two files: RAC and PAC, for role activation constraints and permission 
activation constraints respectively. There are four fields in RAC: a user id, a logical id 
and logical index (indicating the actual RTU point), a role, and a constraint set. Multiple 
elements in the constraint set are separated by a comma. 
In each file, fields are separated by white space. New constraints can be added 
and existing constraints can be removed from the prototype by manually editing the files 
"RAC" and "PAC". The permissions for these files are set to require root privileges. For 
the prototype no additional interface to the constraint set was developed. It would be 
possible to create a custom remote and authenticated application to allow updating of 
constraints. However, DNP3 provides the ability to read and update files, and could be 
used to make policy changing. A more sophisticated constraint update interface could be 
built with some effort and should have little impact on the performance of the RTU. 
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A process makes a processes 10 request by writing to the named pipe. The bytes 
are structured into a request message. Figure 6.3a shows the format of the request 
message and figure 6.3b shows the format of the response message. Before sending a 
request message a user program creates its own pipe, through which it will receive a 
response. The R TU access control enforcement module will open the pipe designated by 
pipename and write the response message back to the caller. The RTU access control 
enforcement module always sends a response message, even if the operation was not 
allowed, as not sending a response could potentially deadlock the user application. In the 
event that access is denied, this will be indicated in the return message's status flag. All 
this functionality could easily be wrapped into a library and hidden in a simple library 
call. But for initial implementation and testing it was left exposed. 
PIPENAME (40 bytes) OPERATION (1 byte) User 10 (2 bytes) LOCATION (2 bytes) 
a) request message 
I VALUE (2 bytes) Status Flag 
b) response message 
Figure 6.3. Security middleware request message format. 
The request message includes an operation, a point type and an index. These 
indicate the operation to be carried out (read or write), the point type (analog input, 
analog output, digital input, digital output), and the point index (beginning at index 0) 
respectively. These fields are sufficient for the middleware layer to translate the request 
into an appropriate IADK. Upon receipt of a request the RTU Security Middleware 
(RMS) first consults the RTU access control policy to determine whether the operation is 
allowed or not by calling the check_access function, based on the algorithm defined in 
section four of chapter four. 
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Recall from chapter four that the authorization decision is based on the following: 
a users role, the permissions assigned to the users role, a set of context information, and 
the sets RAC and PAC. The focus of this dissertation has been authorization, not 
authentication, therefore in the prototype each message includes a user id that identifies 
the user associated with the request. This user id is provided by the security enhanced 
DNP3 described in the next section. Context functions provide the context information. 
Time of day and day of the week are easily provided by accessing the system clock. Time 
is always given in UTC [113] since RTUs might be located anywhere in the world, and 
accessed from a different time zone. 
The location context function returns the location associated with a specific user, 
particularly the user associated with the current request. Since the user id information is 
supplied as field in the request, the location information is supplied as well. The request 
message format defines four locations based on definition 4.1. The network location or 
host id of the originating request is a logical approach to tying a user to a location. In the 
prototype, DNP3 link layer address is used by the DNP3 module to map a user to a 
location. DNP3 addresses are required to be unique, and though they are spoofable, the 
protocol layer security enhancements provided protection against such spoofing. The 
mapping used assigned DNP3 address is given in table 6.2 
Table 6.2. DNP3 address to location assignment. 
DNP3 Address LOCATION 
10 CONTROL CENTER 
11 PLANT FLOOR 
12 ENTERPRISE CAMPUS 
AI1 other dnp3 address UNKNOWN 
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The system state is the fourth and final context function. The internal 
representation of system state is based on definition 4.7. System state is determined by 
the internal state of the RTU, and is stored in a location accessible to the security 
middleware layer. The prototype begins in the start up state then transitions to the 
operating state. The system state could be changed by other processes (if they have 
permission). For testing purposes the system state can be manually manipulated by 
changing the current system state stored in the file / etc/ SYSTEM_STATE. 
6.3.3. Prototype development: SCADA access via DNP3 protocol 
The final component of the security hardened RTU is the use of a security 
enhanced SCADA protocol. The security enhanced protocol described by Patel in his 
doctoral dissertation [29] was used as the basis for this portion of the hardened RTU 
prototype. The security enhancements were applied to the DNP3 protocol. A more 
detailed description of the DNP3 protocol is described in appendix B, and Patel's 
enhancements are fully explained in [29]. This section provides a brief description of the 
modifications related to the prototype implementation. 
DNP3 is a SCADA protocol designed to allow devices to communicate and 
transfer data and control commands from one point to another. It supports both serial and 
TCP/IP communications with IP communications generally being achieved by tunneling 
the serial version inside TCP or UDP packets. In DNP3 the term outstation refers to 
devices or computers that are in the field and the term master refers to computers in the 
control center. The term slave is also used to refer to an outstation. DNP3 is a non-
proprietary protocol and a full specification is available from www.dnp.org for a nominal 
fee. 
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Every DNP3 device has a database of different data types, analog inputs, analog 
outputs, binary inputs and binary outputs. They are organized as an array of values. Data 
items are identified by their data type and index, called a point index. The MTU or 
master uses the data values to display the state or condition of the physical system to 
which one or more outstations or RTU s are connected. The objective of the master is to 
keep its database updated and accomplishes this by sending requests (polling) to 
outstations. Outstations then provide the master with the value of data item or items that 
were requested. (Outstations may also send unsolicited data to masters in the form of an 
unsolicited response). Master may also send data to outstations, causing outstations to 
update local values, which will intern effect connected field equipment. 
The DNP3 protocol is organized into layers that are similar to the standard OSI 
model. The top layer, or user layer, maps DNP3 data objects to local data. On master 
stations, the user layer initiates requests to outstations for data. On outstations, the user 
layer retrieves data from the outstation database in response to a master's request. The 
requested operations, the item or items on which the request is made, and any data need 
to complete the request are specified in the application layer message. The transport 
layer breaks up long application layer messages into smaller packets for the link layer and 
re-assembles them on the other side. The link layer makes the physical connection 
reliable. For the purpose of this discussion only the application layer is of concern since 
the developed security enhancements are applied at the application layer. 
DNP3 application layer messages have three main components: an application 
header, a function code, and one or more DNP3 objects each of which consists of an 
object header followed by one or more object values. Figure 6.4 shows the general 
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structure of the DNP3 application layer fragments; masters send request fragments and 
outstations send response fragments. The application control octet contains an 
application layer sequence number and some status flags. The function code indicates the 
operation being performed, and the object header identifies the data point or points (range 
of indexes) on which the operation is to be carried out. The lIN in the application 
response fragment is used to communicate the internal status of the RTU or outstation to 
the master. 
Request Fragment 
Application Request First Object Header Header DNP3 Last Object Header 
Application [ Function Group [ Variation [ Range Objects Control Code Group [variation [ Range 
Response Fragment 
Application Response Header First Object Header 
DNP3 
Last Object Header 
Application [liN [ Function Group [variation [ Range Objects Control Code Group [variation [ Range 





In the challenge-response authentication security enhancement to DNP3 [29], a 
pre-shared secret is used to verify the authenticity of a communicating party and the 
integrity of a received message. It is assumed that the MTU and RTU have already 
established a pre-shared secret and the method for exchange is not specified here. 
Communicating parties, either the master or the slave (MTU or R TU) can, at any time 
initiate a challenge by sending a challenge message (a new DNP3 function). Upon 
receipt of a challenge message the outstation or master must reply with an appropriately 
constructed response message. Operation of either the slave or the master is suspended 
until an appropriate response message is received. After a predetermined and 
configurable number of consecutive failed responses, a master or slave terminates the 
connection. The challenge message includes a nonce value that is integral to the response 
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message and prevents replay attacks. The challenge message also specifies the 
cryptographic hash algorithm for the responder to use when building the response. The 
response message includes an HMAC [104;114] value. An HMAC is a keyed hash used 
for authentication. The HMAC value is computed over the nonce value and other 
predetermined data from the application layer fragment using the pre-shared secret as the 
HMAC key. A response is considered authentic if the received HMAC value matches 
the calculated HMAC value, as shown in figure 6.5. Typically the RTU would send a 
challenge when a connection request is received to prevent any further communication 
from proceeding without prior authorization. 
MTU 
Pre-shared secret S 
RTU 
Pre-shared secret S 
t---Request Connection (MTUid 
IT HMAC = 1-.._---Challenge(N 
H(S XOR opad, !-
H(S XOR 
ipad,Chalienge I N» Response (HM AC\. 
~ 
t----Non Critical Operatioln-----i~ 




H(S XOR opad, L.. __ ----Challenge(Nr 
Response (HMAC,---'l. __ .-. 
--
Generate n once 
value N 
IFHM AC == 
H(S XOR op ad, H(S XOR 




value N H(S XOR 
ipad,Crtical 
Opertationl 
Challenge IN» IF HMAC == 
<>--_--.--.I-I(S XOR opad, H(S XOR ~ __ Standard protocol responst:' ipad,Critical Operation I 
r-- Challenge IN» carryout 
operation 
Figure 6.5. Challenge-response authentication for RTU - MTU 
communication. 
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During normal operation, an RTU (or MTU) receives requests for a variety of 
different operations, some of which may be considered more critical than others. 
Individual critical messages or operations can be explicitly authenticated using the 
challenge response scheme and including the application layer fragment containing the 
critical operation in the hash calculation. If an RTU (or MTU) receives a critical 
operation it issues a critical operation challenge that includes a nonce value and indicates 
to the sender the receiver is challenging the most recently received application layer 
message. The responder's HMAC calculation includes the nonce and the last application 
layer fragment sent to the challenger. Potential critical operations include: RTU output 
operations such as controls, set-point adjustments, and parameter settings and MTU 
receipt of atypical data or alarms. 
The scheme as described by Patel is based on a single key and lacks the notion of 
a user. For the hardened RTU prototype implementation the scheme was extended to 
include the notion of a user. This was done by adding a user field to challenge-response 
messages, identifying the user providing the response. This requires each RTU, in this 
case the prototype to know each users key. HMAC calculation is done using the 
appropriate user key identified in the response message. Key distribution was beyond the 
scope of this work and was part of the initial setup of the RTU. 
6.3 Hardened RTU prototype setup and configuration 
Various components require parameters to fully describe their behavior, and these 
must be filled in during a setup phase. The following sections provide the instance 
specific assignments that relate to the deployed hardened RTU prototype. Where 
possible this information is given in tabular format for easier access. 
121 
6.3.1 RTU Role based access control policy 
For RTU operation and testing to proceed an actual RTU access control policy 
had to be loaded in to the prototype RTU. The policy is simple but sufficient to exercise 
the model and carryout testing. The RTU access control policy is described by the 
following relations: UA, PA, PTC, PTA, RAC, PAC. In addition to these relations the 
set USERS needed to be populated. As mentioned in section 6.3.2, the specific RTU 
policy is stored in file form in the RTU's flash memory. Policy elements were added to 
the RTU using a standard editor to modify these files. The policy for the prototype is 
described in tables 6.3 through 6.6. 
6.3.2 DNP3 configurations 
There are several components of the DNP3 module that are configurable; the 
settings are given in table 6.7. 
6.4 Test bed 
To create a realistic testing environment the prototype RTU has been connected to 
a level control system in the process control lab of the chemical engineering department. 
The level control system is a simple process control setup and is ideal for the initial 
prototype tf~sting since the failures can at worst overflow water onto the floor. 
The level control system, shown in figure 6.6, consists of the following 
components: 
• three bowl glass column 
• a valve that controls the flow of water into the column based on air pressure input 
• a manual screw valve at the bottom of the column that allows water to flow out of 
the column at varying rates 
• a level control sensor that indicates the water level in the column 
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• an actuator that controls the air pressure applied to the water feed valve based on 
an applied voltage 
• a flow sensor that indicates the amount of water flowing through the valve and 
into the column at a given time 
The level sensor of the column is connected to analog input zero and the flow 
sensor output is connected to the analog input one. The valve position controller takes 
voltage between zero and nine volts, where zero volts closes the valve and nine volts 
opens the valve completely. The RTU analog outputs are 4-20 milliamps, so the digital 
outputs are used to generate the desired voltage. Binary outputs zero, one, and two, 
control the voltage level that is applied to the valve position actuator. If all three are off 
then zero volts are output and the valve is closed. If only one output is on then the 
generated voltage is approximately three volts, leading to a valve position of about 33%. 
If two outputs are on, then approximately six volts are generated leading to a valve being 
open about 66%. If all three digital outputs are on then the approximately nine volts are 
applied to the actuator and the valve is fully open. 
Table 6.3 RTU users and role assignments 
User Name UserID Roles 
BOB 1 ENGINEER, OPERA TOR 
ALICE 2 OPERATOR 
CHUCK 3 OPERA TOR, ENGINEER 
DORTHY 4 ADMINSTRA TOR 
EVAN 5 VENDOR 
CC DISPLAY 6 DISPLAY 
CLOSED LOOP CONTROLLER 7 OPERATOR 
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Table 6.4. Permissions, point types and permission assignments. 
Permissions (PERM) 
Operation Point Point Type Roles 
READ ANALOGINPUT 0 STATUS DISPLA Y,OPERATOR,ENGINEER 
READ ANALOGINPUT 1 STATUS OPERA TOR,ENGINEER 
READ ANALOG INPUT 2 STATUS ENTERPRISE 
READ ANALOGINPUT 3 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ ANALOGINPUT 4 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ ANALOGINPUT 5 STATUS VENDOR 
READ ANALOGOUTPUT 0 CONTROL DISPLA Y,OPERA TOR,ENGINEER 
READ ANALOGOUTPUT 1 CONFIG OPERATOR,ENGINEER 
WRITE ANALOGOUTPUT 0 CONTROL OPERATOR,ENGINEER 
WRITE ANALOGOUTPUT 1 CONFIG ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 0 STATUS OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y,ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 1 STATUS OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y,ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 2 STATUS OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y ,ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 3 STATUS OPERA TOR,ENGINEER 
READ BlNARYINPUT 4 STATUS OPERA TOR,ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 5 STATUS VENDOR 
READ BINARYINPUT 6 STATUS VENDOR 
READ BINARYINPUT 7 STATUS VENDOR 
READ BINARYINPUT 8 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 9 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 10 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ BINARYINPUT 11 STATUS ENGINEER 
READ BINARYOUTPUT 0 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y 
READ BINARYOUTPUT 1 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y 
READ BINARYOUTPUT 2 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y 
READ BINARYOUTPUT 3 CONFIG ENGINEER,OPERA TOR,DISPLA Y 
WRITE BINARYOUTPUT 0 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR 
WRITE BINARYOUTPUT 1 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR 
WRITE BINARYOUTPUT 2 CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR 
WRITE BINARYOUTPUT 3 CONFIG ENGINEER 
COLD RESET DEVICE CONTROL ENGINEER,OPERA TOR 
Table 6.5. Role activation constraints (RAC) 
UserID Role Constraints 
1 ENGINEER OPERTATE SECURE 
5 VENDOR 00:00-10:00,22:00-23:59 
3 ENGINEER UNKNOWN, ENTERPRISE 
7 OPERATOR UNKNOWN,ENTERPRISE,PLANT FLOOR 
Table 6.6. Permission activation constraints (PAC) 
Role Permission Constraints 
OPERATOR WRITE BINARYOUT 0 UNKNOWN 
OPERATOR WRITE BINARY OUT 1 UNKNOWN 
OPERATOR WRITE BINARYOUT 2 UNKNOWN 
ENGINEER WRITE ANALOGOOUT 1 OPERA TE SECURE 
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Table 6.7. DNP3 settings 
Setting Value Description 
Periodic Challenge timeout 2 minutes The time between random challenge messages 
Response time out 5 seconds The time an outstation or MTU will wait for a 
response before assuming it is lost. 
Critical functions WRITE, SELECT, Use of these functions causes the RTU to send a 
OPERATE, challenged even if the authentication period has 
COLD RESTART not expired. 
HMAC hash SHA-J The hash algorithm used in calculating the HMAC 
IP Address xxx.xxx.49.249 Internal LAN IP address of RTU 
ONP UOP Port 20000 UOP port ONP3 server listens on 
6.S Hardened RTU prototype testing 
Testing of the hardened RTU prototype was divided into two different categories; 
performance and security. Both performance testing and security testing were conducted 
using the test bed previously described. To interrogate the hardened RTU prototype, 
several MTU and HMI programs were used. These programs supported the security 
enhanced protocol used by the prototype, and provided a simple interface that allows a 
user to issue commands to the RTU, and see the results displayed on the screen. Section 
6.6 describes the performance testing and results, and section 6.7 described the security 
testing and results. 
6.6 Performance Testing 
As discussed in chapter two, SCADA systems have different performance 
requirements than do traditional IT systems. Though not all SCADA systems and 
process control systems have hard real time requirements, it is important that the SCADA 
system (in this case the RTU) have reasonably short response times. Since different 
systems have different requirements, there is no established targeted response time. 
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Furthermore, in evaluating the performance of impact of the AGA encryption scheme for 
serial communications [115] found that while operators perceived polling as continuous, 
there are generally small delays built into SCADA systems that can absorb some 
additional response overhead resulting from the addition of security. Some performance 
testing of the prototype was conducted to access the impact of security measures on the 










Figure 6.6. Diagram of the level control system in the process control lab. 
As DNP3 was the chosen SCADA interface to the RTU, performance measured 
the prototype RTU's response to DNP3 requests. While response times ofa single DNP3 
request are important, more complicated actions are also of interest. Therefore several 
different tasks or workloads were used during performance testing. Each task was 
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conducted using an appropriate user from the list of users in table 6.2. Response time is 
defined in equation (6.1). 
(6.1) R = tresponse - trequest. 
Where tresponse is the time at which the final ONP3 response was received (or in the event 
that there was a loss of communication, that the final response timer timed out) and trequest 
is the time at which the first ONP3 request was initiated by the control program. 
The response time R, includes any latencies introduced by security measures as 
well as latencies introduced by the amount of network traffic. To reduce the impact of 
specific network traffic conditions, each task was continuously repeated for one hour. 
The overh~:ad of control calculations in the closed loop control task were measured 
independently and found to be between zero and three microseconds. This overhead is 
left in the performance results, since it is several orders of magnitude smaller than the 
response times. The MTU program, which supports the master ONP3 protocol, was 
instrumented to record time elapsed in milliseconds while spent in one loop iteration. 
Each task was then implemented inside the loop, and timing gathered by the program 
indicate the amount of time it took to complete one round of a specific task. A brief 
description of each task is given in section 6.6.1. 
6.6.1 Performance testing task descriptions 
Simple Read 
Reading individual points from the RTU is a basic SCAOA task. This task 
consists of reading an individual outstation point, specifically analog input one which is 
the flow reading. Reads make up a significant portion of SCAOA activities, and so this 
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task serves a unit operation base line for reads. The task is conducted as the user BOB, 
who is assigned to the engineering role. 
Simple Write 
Making changes to interval points is another basic SCADA task. The simple write 
task writes a value to the prototype, specifically it writes a value to analog output one. 
Analog output one represents a virtual [0 point influencing how the system reports the 
column level. This task is also carried out by the user BOB. 
Static Data Poll 
This task sends the RTU a READ function code followed by a special DNP3 
object that indicates to the RTU to send the value of every outstation point. These values 
are sent in single DNP3 response. For each point the RTU role based access control layer 
must decide whether the user has permission to read the point. Confidentiality is not a 
primary RTU concern, but the RTU access control model supports defined access in such 
a way that there could exist outstation points, that are not readable by all users. In fact 
the policy developed for testing includes this situation. If access is denied, the RTU 
access control layer returns a status indicator to a calling module indicating this. The 
DNP3 module treats this as an offline condition. This task is conducted by the 
CC _Display user. This user has limited privileges and is intended to be used by display 
consoles, that provide status information, but not process control. 
Closed Loop Control 
This task represents a PID control loop block that might be found in a process 
control setting. The task consists of reading the level of the water in the column from 
analog input zero, making simple PID control calculation, and then writing the control 
calculation result to analog output O. Analog output zero is a 4-20 rnA output that could 
be used to control the valve position, though in the test setup this was not possible since 
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the valve position control uses voltage as the control signal and not current. This task is 
carried out by the user CLOSED_LOOP _CONTROLLER. This user is intended to 
represent a host in the control center dedicated to carrying out closed loop process 
control. The user is assigned to the operator role, and further restricted by a RAC that 
prevents that user id (which may have weaker authentication, being a machine account), 
from activating the role from any location other than the control center. 
Complex Operation 
This task represents a complex, multi-step, operation, such as might be carried out 
by an operator, engineer or vendor. It involves reading values, and then making some 
adjustment to the binary outputs using a control block and select before operate. This 
task serves to evaluate a human in the loop control, which is typical of many SCADA 
systems. The task consists of reading the water level in the column, by reading analog 
input zero, and then use select and operate on binary output zero then binary output one 
then binary output two to effectively set the actual valve position. The task is carried out 
by the user Alice, who is assigned to the operator role. 
6.6.2 Performance Results 
Each task was allowed to run in a continuous loop for one hour. Then log files of 
the timing data and DNP3 statistics were collected and analyzed. Tables 6.8 - 6.12 
present the results from each test, and table 6.13 summarizes the response time results of 
all tests. The mode of the recorded response times for each test was chosen to represent 
the average response time. Since each test experienced some response time outs, in 
which for some reason a response to a request was never received, some response times 
for each task were actually the response timeout times. Reporting mode as opposed to 
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mean prevents these times from inappropriately influencing the results. The simple read 
had the shortest response time of 49 milliseconds and the complex operation had the 
longest response time, over two seconds. This is what should be expected, given the 
number of critical operations included in each complex operation. The static data poll 
was the only other task besides simple read that included no critical functions. Its higher 
response time reflects the extra work done by the access control layer in determining 
access for each outstation point. However the found response time is better than reading 
all points individually as the total number of outstation points is twenty six. Twenty six 
reads at 50 milliseconds each, would result in a total response time of 1300 milliseconds, 
substantially longer than the reported 379 miIliseconds. 
Table 6.S. Performance statistics for the simple read task. 
Sim-.J!le Read 
A verage Response time 49 mi1liseconds 
Transmitted Read Reguests 41494 
Transmitted Write Reguests 0 
Transmitted Selects 0 
Transmitted 02erates 0 
Number ofres2onse time outs 58 
Challenges Sent 30 
Challenged Received 30 
Table 6.9. Performance statistics for the simple write task. 
Simple write 
Average time to receive a response 399 milliseconds 
Transmitted Read Requests 0 
Transmitted Write Requests 7691 
Transmitted Selects 0 
Transmitted Q~erates 0 
Number of response time outs 51 
Challenges Sent 30 
Challenged Received 7658 
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Table 6.10. Performance statistics for the static data poll task. 
Static Data Poll 
A vera~e time to complete one poll 379 milliseconds 
Transmitted Read Requests 597 
Transmitted Write Requests 0 
Transmitted Selects 0 
Transmitted Operates 0 
Number ofreSQonse time outs 48 
Challenges Sent 29 
Challeng_ed Received 30 
Table 6.11. Performance statistics for the closed loop control task. 
Closed loop control 
A verage time to complete one loop 499 milliseconds 
Transmitted Read Requests 6589 
Transmitted Write Requests 6589 
Transmitted Selects 0 
Transmitted Operates 0 
Number of response time outs 68 
Challenges Sent 30 
Challenged Received 6581 
Table 6.12. Performance statistics for the complex operation task. 
Complex operation 
Response time to comQIete the entire o~eration 2506 milliseconds 
Transmitted Read Requests 1267 
Transmitted Write Requests 0 
Transmitted Selects 3801 
Transmitted Operates 3762 
Number of response time outs 75 
Challenges Sent 30 
Challenged Received 7532 
Table 6.13. Summary of response times for each performance task. 
Task Response time in milliseconds 
Simple Read (read one analog input point) 49 
Simple Write (write one analog output point) 399 
Static Data Poll (read all RTU points) 379 
Closed Loop (read 1 point write 1 point) 499 
Complex Operation (read 1 point, select / operate 3 points) 2506 
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6.7 Security Testing 
The second component of prototype testing focused on security. The goal of the 
hardened RTU is to increase security for RTUs. Both the reduced Linux kernel and the 
RTU role based access control layer were developed for the hardened RTU to enhance 
security. The reduced Linux kernel was intended to reduce security threats resulting from 
vulnerabilities in COTS operating systems by reducing the size of the TCB and the 
number of lines of code compiled in the kernel. Evaluation of this approach was 
discussed in the development of the prototype in section 6.3. It was shown there that the 
kernel was significantly reduced in size and it was argued that an inference could be 
made that an equivalent reduction in vulnerabilities was achieved. Further evaluation of 
testing of this mechanism was achieved using the standard IT penetration testing tools: 
NMAP, NESSUS, and fuzzball. These tools were used against the prototype RTU while 
it was connected to the level control system and providing an interface to a human 
controller operating a console based control application. 
The RTU role based access control layer was intended primarily to mitigate 
insider threat attacks, and to a lesser degree place limits on other software components. 
Security testing of this hardened RTU prototype component was conducted by carrying 
out simulated insider attacks against the hardened RTU prototype while it was operating 
and connected to the level control system and providing SCADA to a human operator 
operating the level control system from a console based SCADA application. Sections 
6.7.1 through 6.7.4 describe the security tests conducted, the results and any related 
discussion. 
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6.7.1 NMAP Scan 
Two nmap scans were done, a TCP scan and a UDP scan. The output of the two 
scans is shown in figure 6.7. The nmap scan identified ftp and telent ports as open. The 
prototype does not have a serial console interface, therefore these services were needed 
on the prototype to allow development access during testing. However a custom script 
was tied to Internet daemon inetd to activate these services. That script reads the value of 
binary input eleven. If the input is one then telent or ftp is started by the script. If the 
value of binary input eleven (which is tied to physical switch in the development 
platform), is zero then ftp or telnet are not started. So while nmap identified these as 
open, actually using the services was reserved for development aspects, not deployment, 
and is controlled by a physical switch. 
6.7.2. Nessus scan 
Following the nmap scan a nessus vulnerability scan was directed at the hardened 
RTU. The result of this scan correlates with the nmap scan. The complete nessus report 
is listed in appendix D. Nessus identified ftp and telnet as open, but protected with 
tcpwrapper. As mentioned in section 6.7.3, telnet and ftp were disabled using a custom 
script to allow a hardware switch to enable them if needed. This setup allows inetd to 
answer requests for which it is configured, and this is the reason Nessus identified them 
as protected by tcpwrapper. Nessus also correctly identified the prototype as running the 
Linux 2.4 kernel. 
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Starting Nmap 4.11 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2007-10-30 
10:43 EDT 
Interesting ports on private049249.private.louisville.edu 
(10.165.49.249) : 
Not shown: 3165 closed ports 
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 
21/tcp open tcpwrapped 
23/tcp open tcpwrapped 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.4.XI2.5.X 
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20 
Uptime 2.900 days (since Sat Oct 27 13:32:48 2007) 
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1515.371 seconds 
(a) nmap -sT -sV -0 xxx.xxx.49.249 
Starting Nmap 4.11 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2007-10-30 
13:08 EDT 
Interesting ports on private049249.private.louisville.edu 
(10.165.49.249) : 
Not shown: 510 closed ports 
PORT STATE SERVICE 
20000/udp openlfiltered unknown 
Nmap finished: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 511.571 seconds 
(b) nmap -sU -p 1-500, 19995-20005 xxx.xxx.49.249 
Figure 6.7 Output from the nmap scans of the prototype hardened RTU. 
Nessus also identified the hardened RTU as vulnerable to the 'nestea' attack, 
CVE: CAN-1999-0257, and claimed it was possible to make the server crash using this 
attack. The 'nestea' attack is a type of Denial of Service (DoS) similar to a teardrop 
attack. The 'nestea' attack is an off by one IP header bug. Recovery from the attack 
usually consists of rebooting the server. However, for RTUs, without a functioning 
network interface, rebooting may not be a practical solution. According to Nessus, the 
hardened RTU could be crashed using this remote DoS exploit. Exploit code that carries 
out a nestea attack was downloaded from the web, and compiled on the attack machine. 
The command 
nestea xxx.xxx.67.47 xxx.xxx.49.249 -n 1000 
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was executed from the attack machine to launch 1000 'nestea' attacks against the 
hardened RTU prototype. The hardened RTU prototype remained running and continued 
to provide level control readings, and allowed the operator to make changes to the valve 
position. It was then concluded that the hardened RTU was in fact not vulnerable to the 
'nestea' attack. Nessus did not identify any other vulnerabilities, though it did point out 
that packets with the syn flag set were not dropped. 
6. 7.3 Fuzzball 
As a final general security test, the open source fuzzier fuzzball was used. The 
hardened RTU prototype exposes on the DNP3 network service, but parts of the TCP/IP 
stack are exercised as well. Fuzzball was used to send packets to the hardened RTU 
prototype with non standard IP and TCP settings. These packets can activate flaws in the 
TCP/IP stack that might not otherwise be activated by more normal packets. Fuzzball 
was run against the prototype while it was operating and providing status and control to a 
human operator. During and following the fuzzball test the prototype hardened RTU 
continued to function normally. 
6.7.4. Insider attacks 
A primary focus of the RTU's novel security, the new RTU role based access 
control model, was to enable fine grained access control while still mitigating potential 
insider attacks. Therefore a major component of the security testing focused on 
simulating a variety of insider based attacks and confirming that the RTU role based 
access control system and enforcement algorithm did indeed provide protection. For this 
testing component, it was important users be associated with a location. The mapping 
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between location and DNP3 address was given in section 6.2.1. The following insider 
based attacks were carried out against the prototype hardened R TU. 
Insider attack scenario one: The user ALICE, from the control room writes the 
value 30 to analog ANALOGOUTPUT_l. ANALOGOUTPUT _1 is a dead band value 
that indicated the percent change in the column level required to cause the RTU to 
generate an unsolicited response. Increasing this value would mean that a greater change 
in the column level was required before the RTU would issue an unsolicited response. 
Since ALICE is assigned to the OPERA TOR role and permission to WRITE 
ANALOGOUTPUT _1 is not assigned to the role OPERA TOR, ALICE is prevented from 
carrying out this attack by the role assignment relation. The prototype correctly blocked 
this action. 
Insider attack scenario two: The user ALICE SELECTS and then OPERATES 
BINARYOUPUT_l on from an unknown host. This will increase the openness of the 
valve allowing water into the column at a greater rate. Operators are only allowed to 
control the valve position from the control room. ALICE is granted permission to 
operate BINARYOUPUT_l by her membership in the OPERA TOR role, but is 
prevented from activating the permission by a the permission activation constraint 
<OPERATOR, WRITE BINARYOUTPUT_l, {UNKNOWN}>. 
successfully blocked this operation. 
The prototype 
Insider attack scenario three: EVAN sends SELECT and OPEATE 
BINARYOUTPUT_O on, SELECT and OPERATE BINARYOUTPUT_l on, and 
SELECT and OPERATE BINARYOUTPUT_2 on. This will fully open the valve that 
controls the flow of water into the column. Vendors, who are essentially external 
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engineers, need access to the RTU from time to time, but are not permitted to control 
physical processes. EVEN as a member of the VENDOR role is not granted permission 
to write values to BINARYOUPUT_O, BINARYOUTPUT_I, and BINARYOUTPUT_2. 
The prototype successfully blocked this operation. 
Insider attack scenario four: EVAN sends READ ANALOGINPUT _5, READ 
BINARYINPUT_5, READ BINARYINPUT_6, READ BINARYINPUT_7 at 8:00 UTe. 
ANALOGINPUT_5, BINARYINPUT_5, BINARYINPUT_6, and BINARYINPUT_7 
are some type of status value. Vendors are allowed to read these values, and the 
necessary permissions are available to the user EVAN through the assignment to the 
VENDOR role. However EVAN's work schedule is known and established to be from 
10:00 - 22:00 UTC. Therefore EVAN is prevented from activating his VENDOR role 
assignment by the RAC <5, VENDOR, {00:00-10:00,22:00-23:59}>, and therefore 
cannot access the permissions assigned to VENDOR. The prototype successfully 
blocked this operation. 
Insider attack scenario five: The hardened R TU prototype state was first set to 
OPERATE_SECURE. The secure operating mode might be triggered by external 
intrusion detection system (roS) event or a local event. After the RTU state had 
changed, BOB writes the value five to ANALOGOUTPUT _1. ANALOGOUT _1 is an 
engineering dead band value that configured when the RTU sends unsolicited responses 
concerning the column level. BOB has been granted this permission through the 
ENGINEERING role. However, the PAC <ENGINEER, WRITE 
ANALOGOUTPUT_J, {OPERATE_SECURE}> prevents the permission from being 
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activated through the ENGINEERING role when the RTU is in secure operating mode. 
The prototype successfully blocked this operation. 
Table 6.14. Insider attack scenarios 
Attack Conditions Attack stopped because 
Scenario 1 ALICE E USERS «write, ANALOGOUTPUT_l>,OPERATOR 
roles(ALICE) = OPERA TOR > \l RA 
location(ALICE) = CONTROL_ROOM 
op = write 
point = ANALOGOUTPUT 1 
Scenario 2 ALICE E USERS 3 (cr,cp,cs) E PAq OPERATOR = cr A (write 
Roles(ALICE) = OPERATOR BINARYOUTPUT_l)= cp A UNKNOWN E 
Location(ALICE) = UNKNOWN cs 
op = write 
point = BINARYOUTPUT 1 
Scenario 3 EVAN E USERS «write, BINARYOUTPUT_l>,VENDOR >\l 
roles(EVAN) = VENDOR RA, «write, BINARYOUTPUT_2>,VENDOR 
op = write > \l RA, «write, 
point = BINARYOUTPUT_I, BINARYOUTPUT_3>,VENDOR>\l RA, 
BINARYOUTPUTj, 
BINARYOUTPUT 3 
Scenario 4 EVAN E USERS 3 (cu,cr,cs) E RAq EVAN = cu A VENDOR = 
roles(EVAN) = VENDOR 
time _ oL day=08:00 
cp A 08:00 E cs 
op = read 




Scenario 5 system_stateO = OPERATE SECURE 3 (cr,cp,cs) E PAq ENGINEER ,= cr A (write 
BOB E USERS; op = write; point = ANALOGOUTPUT_l)= cp A 
ANALOGOUTPUT I OPERATE SECURE Ecs 
Another key security testing result was affirmation that for COTS systems, high 
assurance middleware layer security can be difficult to achieve. In implementing the 
prototype RTU, interprocess communication was used to achieve cooperation among 
R TU components and form the basis for the middleware layer security component, not an 
unusual or uncommon approach. A serious problem with this approach, at least in the 
Linux IPe functionality, is the lack of identification of the calling process. Ideally the 
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security layer would perfonn authentication, but the anonymity of IPC in the Linux 
kernel make that difficult and in the prototype, authentication was achieve using the 
security enhanced DNP3 protocol. A means of transferring authentication from one 
entity to another is needed. This could be achieved by third party authentication server 
process, which could then serve as the authentication authority for all processes. 
However, this functionality is difficult to provide in Linux because there is no simple, 
high-assurance, way for the receiver of a message to know the true identity of a sender. 
This is one area where microkemels show their benefits, as their IPC is not anonymous; 
this is explored and explained in more detail in chapter seven. 
6.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the development, implementation, and testing of a 
security hardened RTU prototype. The prototype was developed using the open mIPM 
from SIXNET, an actual RTU platform that support OEMs. The hardened RTU 
prototype included a custom compiled reduced Linux kernel, security enhanced SCADA 
communications running over UDP, and the RTU role based access control developed in 
chapter four. A test environment was created for the RTU using a level control system 
made available by the Department of Chemical Engineering at the University of 
Louisville. Performance and security testing of the security hardened RTU was then 
performed. Performance testing included simulating various tasks involved in 
monitoring or operating the level control system using the prototype hardened RTU. All 
but one task was completed by the prototype RTU in less than 500 milliseconds. Security 
testing including: basic scanning using nmap and nessus, launching the 'nestea' remote 
exploit (identified by nessus) against the RTU, and simulating five insider attacks. The 
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hardened RTU continued to operate during and after the scans and the remote exploit 
attack, and the insider attacks were successfully blocked by the RTU role based access 
control security middleware. The attacks carried out for this testing were limited to 
trying to change only one or a handful of points, due in part to the limited complexity of 
the test bed. While more complex attacks that try to change many RTU points are 
possible, the current test bed is not sufficient to fully test such attacks. However, 
vulnerability to such tasks would more likely result from a misconfiguration issue than 
from a failure of the model to provide sufficient protection. 
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CHAPTER VII 
MICROKERNELS FOR HARDENED RTUS 
Chapter six discussed a hardened RTU prototype using a reduced Linux kernel 
and the RTU role based access control scheme described in chapter four. Chapter five 
presented two approaches for minimal kernel RTUs, the reduced COTS kernel approach 
used in the prototype development in chapter six, and microkernels. The reduced COTS 
kernel approach was used in the initial prototype development to allow quicker 
development of a functioning prototype and use of the RTU role based access control 
security middleware. This chapter further investigates the use of a microkernel in 
developing a hardened RTU. 
As discussed in chapter two, the microkernel idea originated with Brian Hansen's 
Nucleus [88] and gained popularity with MACH [92]. Initial poor IPC performance and 
the assertion that the poor performance was inherent to micro kernels led to this approach 
falling out of favor for many years. However, thanks mostly to Leidke [87; 116], there 
has been resurgence in microkernel research and development as well as increased 
interest in their commercial use. The MILS architecture [99; 1 00] is a developing 
standard for high-assurance systems, and is based on a type of microkernel called a 
separation kernel. While a MILS system, suggested as potential platform for security 
hardened RTU in chapter five, was not available for evaluation at time of this 
dissertation, there were some microkernels available for investigation. The following 
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microkemels were considered as possible candidates for use in a security hardened RTU: 
QNX, VxWorks, Mach, Minix, and L4. 
Two criteria were considered in determining a potential microkemel 
implementation for investigation. The first criterion was that the microkemel be open 
source. There are several reasons for the open source requirement. First, as discussed in 
chapter two, SCADA vendors and operators are strongly motivated to contain costs. 
Open source systems alleviate the licensing cost associated proprietary operating 
systems. Of equal value is the availability of source code. Since SCADA devices can 
potentially have a long life time (fifteen to twenty years) the availability of source code 
assures that the product can be supported throughout its lifetime. An open source 
microkemel also assures vendors or product developers that the source code will be 
available throughout a project, and avoids the potential problems that can occur when 
commercial systems are acquired by another company or become unavailable due to 
bankruptcy. Finally, an open source microkemel allows continued development of this 
project and the possibility of sharing results with industry practitioners. The second 
criterion for consideration was that the microkemel provide partitioning, in both space 
and time, and support some type ofRT scheduler. This is needed to allow the isolation of 
RTU components described in chapter five, and allow the RTU to achieve real-time 
requirements. 
Of the identified potential microkemels, QNXI and VxWorks were eliminated 
because they are not open source. Mach was eliminated because it is a first generation 
I QNX has very recently released part of their system under an open source licencing agreement. However, 
there was not time to sufficiently investigate this recent addition to the open source microkemel 
community. QNX is a real-time operating system the focus of which has therefore been performance and 
not security. 
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microkernel known to have poor performance characteristics, and a large code base. 
Minix was eliminated because it lacks a real-time scheduler and supports only IA32 
processors. This leaves the L4 microkernel as the choice for further investigation. 
Fortunately there are several open source L4 implementations available that could be 
used in a security hardened RTU. A hardware platform and L4 implementation were 
selected for prototype development and evaluation. The hardware platform and L4 
implementation were obtained and the final section of this chapter presents the results of 
some initial experimental work to investigate using OKL4 microkernel as the basis for a 
security hardened RTU, and to determine the IPe overhead inflicted on the hardened 
RTU. 
7.1 The L4 Microkernel 
The L4 microkernel, originally developed by Liedtke, adheres to Liedtke's 
microkernel design criteria of allowing only those features into the kernel, which cannot 
be exported out of the kernel. L4 is not an operating system, but is rather a minimal base 
on which a complete operating system can be built. The most fundamental task of an 
operating system, and therefore of a microkernel, is to provide abstractions for sharing 
resources securely. Towards this end, and in maintaining minimality with respect to the 
kernel, L4 provides only a few basic abstractions and mechanisms. 
Address spaces 
Data, other than hardware registers, which are accessible to a thread are contained 
in the threads address space. Address spaces are L4's basis for protection .. An address 
space in L4 is a partial mapping from virtual memory to physical memory. Threads can 
share data by mapping parts of their address space to other address spaces. The mapping 
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can be revoked by the mapper at any time. In addition to mapping, a thread can grant 
parts of address space to another address space. In this case the grantor gives up control 
of the data and can no longer access that part of the virtual address space. The grantee 
receives full control of that data and may subsequently map or grant it to other address 
spaces. Through the use of mapping and granting described above, L4 address spaces 
can be recursively constructed. The concept of a task is basically synonymous with 
address space, where a task is a set of threads that share an address space. 
Threads 
Threads are the basic unit of execution in L4. Every thread is "attached" to an 
address space, which it may share with other threads. A thread has a unique identifier 
(UIO) and a register set that includes an instruction pointer and a stack pointer. Threads 
communicate with each other through interprocess communication (IPC) primitives 
provided by L4. Threads can also communicate with each other using shared memory. 
Threads within an address space can access shared memory, and a thread can also map 
memory into other thread's address space and share memory that way. 
The heart of L4 is the message-passing interprocess communication (IPC) that it 
supports. L4 IPe is synchronous and unbuffered. L4 IPe can be used to pass data by 
value or by reference (using mapping or granting). Since IPe is synchronous L4 IPe can 
also be used for thread synchronization. L4 supports the following basic IPe primitives: 
• receive - wait for a message from a specific thread 
• reply_wait - send a reply message to a client thread, and wait for the next request 
• send - send a message to a thread 
• wait - wait for a message from any thread 
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UID 
A UID is a unique identifier for threads in an L4 system. A thread's UID is 
composed of the task number of the thread's address space and the thread's local thread 
number within that task. The UID is used by kernel IPC calls. 
An L4 system is then composed of address spaces populated by threads executing 
code in their address space. Figure 7.1 depicts an L4 based system. Individual threads, 
indicated by a thread UID, operate on data stored within their address space. The L4 
kernel assures that threads are not able to execute instructions in other address spaces or 
access data in other address spaces. However, in L4 memory is not managed by the 
kernel. Instead, L4 supports what are called external pagers, which are user level threads 
that manage memory. An initial task, referred to in L4 as SigmaO, is privileged in that it 
is run first by the kernel, and claims all the physical memory of the system. SigmaO can 
then map or grant that memory to other tasks. Other tasks can then map or grant that 
memory to a succession of other tasks, allowing for the recursive construction of address 
spaces. PagefauIts in L4 are translated by the L4 kernel into an IPC message to a tasks 
pager. Initially SigmaO would be the pager for all tasks, but through the construction of 
recursive address spaces, there can then be multiple pagers in a given system. 
Threads are scheduled by L4 according to three parameters: time: slice length, 
thread priority, and maximum controlled priority. Each L4 thread has a time slice value 
that indicates the amount of time for which that thread will be scheduled, and is stored as 
part of the threads control block. Different threads can have different time slice values. 
When a running thread uses up its allotted time slice the scheduler selects and starts the 
next run-able thread. The L4 kernel supports 256 different priority levels, 0 - 255, with 
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255 having the highest priority. L4's scheduler has a, possibly empty, queue for each 
priority level. All the queues together form the ready queue, and a thread's priority level 
indicates to which queue the thread is assigned. A thread's priority can be changed, and 
will affect the queue to which it is assigned. The maximum controlled priority is a task 
level value that prevents the threads within a task from being assigned a priority higher 
than the maximum controlled priority for that task. This limitation is also applied to 
newly created threads as well. 
Privileged 
Mode 
Task A Task B ) 
Thread 1 .. ' Thread j Thread 1 ... Thread n 
OS API 
SigmaO 
L4 based OS Root-T.", J 





Figure 7.1. Structure of an L4 based as system. 
With respect to the security objectives for the hardened RTU, specifically the 
space and time partitioning, L4 provides both space and time partitioning. L4's address 
space abstraction provides a mechanism to achieve space partitioning. In addition L4 
scheduling, through time slices and priorities, supports real-time scheduling. Along with 
time and space partitioning the microkernel must support a way for isolated components 
to cooperate. L4 supports thread cooperation through a well defined and supposedly fast 
IPe system call interface mentioned previously. These attributes together make L4 an 
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excellent choice as the platform for a security hardened microkemel based RTU. They 
allow the primary goals identified in chapter five: strong isolation of RTU components 
and controlled interaction along a well defined interface. 
7.1.1 L4 implementations 
There have been a number of L4 implementations over the years. 10chen 
Liedtke's initial implementation of L4 called L4/x86 was written for x86 machines, and 
is no longer supported. It served as the basis for performance evaluations that 
demonstrated L4 could achieve reasonable IPC performance needed to build a system 
with overall acceptable performance. However that implementation is no longer 
supported or developed. Since then several groups have developed their own L4 
implementations and the L4 API has evolved. The early L4 API is referred to as version 
2 (V2) and the more recent API is referred to as version 4 (V4). Three L4 
implementations were considered as potential candidates for investigation: Pistachio, 
Fiasco, and OKL4. A brief description of each is given in the foIlowing paragraphs. 
Pistachio [117]: Pistachio is the most recent microkemel developed by the 
System Architecture Group at the University of Karlsruhe. Pistachio implements the L4 
version 4 API and is written in C++. Pistachio includes SigmaO and Sigmal which 
server as pagers for the entire L4 system. Pistachio is fully 32 and 64 bit clean and 
provide support for multiprocessors. Pistachio supports Alpha, AMD64, ARM, IA32, 
IA64, MIPS and PowerPC processors. Pistachio is actively maintained and is licensed 
under a BSD license. 
Fiasco [118]: Fiasco was developed at Technical University Dresden (TUD). 
Fiasco is licensed under GPL, and is freely redistributable. Fiasco implements the L4v2 
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ABI which was the original L4 specification defined by Liedtke. Fiasco is part of the 
TUD DROPS operating system. Fiasco is implemented in C++ and is currently 
supported on i486 and later Intel architectures, ARM processors SA-II 00 and XScale 
PXA 25x. Fiasco is still under active development. 
OKL4 [119]: OKL4 descends from a Pistachio-embedded system which was 
developed by National Information and Communication Technology Australia (NICTA). 
OKL4 is now developed and maintained by OK-labs [120]. The kernel supports the L4 
version 2 API and is written in C++. The OKL4 release supports ARM, x86, and MIPS 
processors, and is targeted toward embedded systems. OKL4 is released under the BSD 
license. There is also a commercial licensing available, and OKL4 has actually been used 
in a least one commercial device, the OpenMoko phone [121]. 
Each of these implementations was downloaded and the basic system built using 
the provided build system. Pistachio uses the Scans build system, Fiasco uses GNU 
Make, and OKL4 uses its own python based system that is provided in the download and 
is completely self-contained. This initial build was used to assure that the 
implementation was reasonably stable for carrying out additional evaluation. Each of 
these systems supports at least one kind of simulation. Fiasco has a user mode fiasco, 
FiascoUX, that enable the kernel and other components to be loaded and run as a 
standard Linux process, in much the same way that user mode Linux (UML) works. 
Pistachio uses Qemu and OkL4 uses Skyeye or Qemu to emulate hardware. The standard 
build of each of the systems was successfully loaded and executed in the appropriate 
simulator. However, though the availability of simulators makes it possible to develop 
and test prototype implementation code, for the hardened RTU, performance on real 
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hardware is a key issue of this evaluation. Therefore, before making a final decision on 
an L4 implementation a hardware platform was selected. The selection criteria and 
section process are described in the following section. 
7.2 Development Platforms 
There are many available development platforms from which to choose. The list 
below describes the basic requirements that the development platform needed to meet: 
I. Small embeddable computer with sufficient resources to store and load the 
microkernel and eventually support network communications, and analog and 
digital 10, 
2. Ability to attach external digital and/or analog 10 circuitry, 
3. Support potential future commercialization activities, 
4. Full console access to a flexible boot loader, preferably Uboot, 
5. Supported by a GNU tool chain, 
6. Use a processor supported by at least one of the L4 implementations listed in 
section 7.1.1. 
7.2.1 Pla(form Analysis 
This section presents a brief overview of the development platforms considered. 
SIXNET mIPM 
The SIXNET mIPM, used for prototype development in chapter six, was 
considered as potential and desirable development platform. To load the microkemel, 
root-task, and any other tasks requires a flexible boot loader. The mIPM uses Uboot, but 
a command line interface to the boot loader is not accessible. The mIPM Uboot 
bootloader is configured to boot a Linux kernel, located in a specific location within the 
flash file system, and with a specific name. Without this ability the microkemel can't be 
loaded into the system, and therefore this system could not be used for microkernel 
testing. 
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PC/I04 based systems 
PC/1 04 is a public specification for embedding the familiar PC architecture, 
starting with the i386, into a small form factor (3.6" x 3.8"). The specification details the 
location and type of connectors used so that components can be combined or inter 
changed. The advantage of the PCI1 04 platforms that were surveyed was that many were 
rugged and geared to industrial applications. However, most systems seemed to include a 
lot of unnecessary peripherals and with the exception of buying PCI1 04 data acquisition 
modules, provided little easy interfacing to 10 customization. The PC/I04 platforms 
considered were provided by Arcon, Win Systems, and Diamond Point International 
Electronics. 
Rabbit Semiconductor 
Rabbit makes a number of nice development kits, in a variety of ranges and type. 
There are some very nice platforms with 10 and Ethernet. However Rabbit uses its own 
proprietary microprocessor. While they provide a C compiler, Rabbit systems are not 
supported by a GNU tool chain. 
Gumstix 
Gurnstix provides a range of embeddable computers powered by an ARM XScale 
processor. The boards are low in power consumption, but provide good performance. 
They are small, 80mm x 20mm, and are very affordable. The gumstix boards expose 
about 80 TTL GPIO lines that can be used to interface to custom devices, such as analog 
and digital 10 for the RTU, and also include on board connectors that allow gurnstix 
accessories to be easily attached. Gumstix accessories include an Ethernet controller, 
serial UARTs, compact flash and WiFi. Gumstix uses the Buildroot environment, and 
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the on-board Uboot boot loader can load from built in flash, compact flash cards, a serial 
connection, or Ethernet connection. The boot loaders command interface is exposed, and 
the boot loader can even be recompiled and reloaded. The XScale PXA 255 processor is 
supported by the GNU tool chain, which is used by the build root environment. 
7.3 Microkernel Based Hardened RTU Platform 
Bec:ause of the advantages described above, the Gumstix platform was selected 
for microkernel evaluation. The Gumstix architecture is relatively affordable and 
includes native access to TTL GPIO lines that make it possible to add the additional 
components that will be required in the future for a fully functional RTU prototype. 
Though a fully functional mircrokernel based RTU is not developed at this point, it is 
planned that future work will progress in that direction. Gumstix also supports OEM and 
has been used for a number of commercial devices [122] providing a path for 
commercialization. Of the many Gumstix boards, the connex 400 was chosen. It is a 
middle of the road Gumstix board, and is competitively priced at $129. The connex 400 
is an XScalle PXA 255 processor running at 400 MHz. The XScale processor is a 32 bit 
processor and the connex 400 has 64 MB ram and 16MB of flash. In addition to the 
Gumstix motherboard, a Netstix and console ST boards were also purchased. Both of 
these boards were connected to the connex 400. The Netstix provides an Ethernet 
controller, which can be used by the boot loader to load images via tftp. The console ST 
board provides two UART serial interfaces, one of which serves as a console interface to 
the board. 
For the microkernel, the OKL4 implementation was selected as the L4 
implementation to use in the microkernel based RTU evaluation. OKL4 is the most 
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advanced of the implementations, and the implementation is targeted at both researchers 
and comffil~rcial activities. OKL4 is also geared towards embedded systems and RTUs 
can be considered a type of embedded system. OKL4 supports the XScale processor and 
the Gumstix platform. In addition to OKL4's L4 implementation, OKL4 includes 
Iguana. Iguana was developed by NICTA along with their L4 implementation Pistachio-
embedded. Iguana is not a complete operating system either, and is intended to work 
with the underlying L4 implementation to support the development of different L4 based 
operating systems. Iguana complements, rather than hides, the underlying L4 kernel. 
Iguana includes an IDL compiler that allows the definition of servers, which provide an 
interface for Iguana "applications." Access of servers is achieved through L4 IPC, with 
the IDL just marshalling and un-marshalling parameters. 
A Linux 2.6 kernel PC was used as a development platform. The Gumstix 
development unit was connected to the host development platform using a serial 
connection and the terminal emulator Kermit. The normal boot processes was interrupted 
when the Gumstix was powered on, and reconfigured to use tftp to retrieve images from 
the development host. The OKL4 source code was downloaded and extracted. OKL4 
uses a precompiled toolchain, available from NICTA. This tool chain was obtained from 
[123], and installed on the development system. A test image was then built using the 
command 
Tools/build.py machine=gumstix project=iguana test libs=all 
The resulting elf image, image. boot, was loaded in the gumstix's memory and 
executed using the bootelf command. All tests completed successfully, indicating that 
the microkernel and iguana were operating correctly on the platform. The next section 
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describes the development of some RTU software components and IPe performance 
evaluation of those software components. 
7.3 Points Server Development and IPC performance. 
With the test platform constructed, the next part of the evaluation was to begin 
developing RTU components for the test platform. The overall goal of using the L4 
microkernel in a hardened RTU is to allow RTU components to be isolated and enable a 
protection architecture to determine access control. Core RTU components will therefore 
be implemented as "servers", running as user processes (not in privileged mode). RTU 
user applications will then call on these services using L4 IPe which passes through a 
security layer. Figure 7.2 provides a high level view of this architecture. 
This architecture creates a hardened platform in several ways. Only the 
microkernel runs in privileges mode, so the TeB of the RTU is small. RTU services are 
protected by a non-bypassable security layer. Finally, leveraging the microkernel 
flexibility, the network drivers and protocol stack used by the application, which in a 
monolithic kernel must run in the kernel, are mapped into the application address space, 
where they can at most damage the application instead of the entire kernel. 
The L4 IPe provides the path along which the R TU component servers, the 
security layer and actual R TU programs exchange information and cooperate. A key 
factor in the RTU's performance will then be the IPe overhead. In particular, the IPe 
performance of a call from an RTU application to a RTU server. As was discussed in 
chapter two, IPe is a central component of microkernel based systems that has in the past 
led to poor system performance. As a central component of an L4 hardened RTU, IPe 
overhead needs to be low in order to guarantee acceptable RTU performance. An initial 
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evaluation ofIPC overhead was carried out by implementing one of the servers shown in 
figure 7.2, a limited RTU security layer,. and a simple test application program. 







RTU Security Layer 







OKL4 micro kernel 
Xscale PXA 255 (Gumstix) 
Iguana 
Server 
Figure 7.2. Derived OKL4 based RTU architecture. 
7.3.1 fPC overhead test setup 
To evaluate the IPC performance a server was implemented using Iguana's IDL. 
The server was called points, since it was intended to represent one of the analog or 
digital 10 servers. The server provided an interface to read and write a single analog 
input, analog input one. Obtaining actual values was not done at this time; instead the 
analog input value was just stored as a persistent variable. Eventually 10 threads that are 
apart of the analog or digital 10 server will update input and output values. The interest 
at this point was just to measure the IPC overhead. 
A security layer and test application were written as an iguana program. The 
security layer has access to all the underlying RTU servers. The security layer creates the 
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address space for the RTU applications, and maps into them any needed resources. RTU 
applications threads are then started and the security then layer listens for IPC requests 
from the RTU application thread for the low level services provided by the servers. 
In the example case, it listens for a request to read analog input one. If the request 
is allowed,. then the operation is performed and the result passed back to the user level 
thread that made the call. From an IPC perspective this entails several IPC operations as 
shown in figure 7.3. InitiaIly the RTU security layer thread and the RTU service call 
IPC _Wait, (1) and (2), which is a blocking IPC that waits for an incoming IPC message. 
IPC activity is initiated by the application thread's IPC_Send to the RTU security layer 
thread (3). When the send succeeds, the RTU application thread caIls IPC _Receive to 
wait for the response IPC (4). The RTU security layer then issues an IPC_send to the 
appropriate RTU server thread (5). The RTU Security layer then has to calliPC _Receive 
to wait for a response from the server (6). The server responds with an IPC _Send back to 
the RTU Security layer (7). Finally the RTU security layer calls IPC_Send to the send 
the response back to the RTU application thread that initiated the IPC sequence (8). 
A code fragment from the test application is shown in figure 7.4. A test loop 
iterates 300 times. Each loop iteration, records the start time and finish time of a loop 
instance using the timer current time () call, which is available in Iguana. 
Iguana's time tick is one microsecond, and the timer_current _ time () returns the 
current tick count. Subtracting the final time from the start time gives the number of 
microseconds that elapsed between (3) and (7). To make sure that IPC operations were 
indeed reaching the point server and being correctly returned, different values were 
written to and read from the point server. Observing the results of these read and writes 
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RTU Security Layer 
Thread 
(1 ) I P C_Wa itO 
IPC Send 
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(2) I PC_Wait 
IPC Send 
IPC Send 
Figure 7.3. IPe calls in an RTU application request for RTU services. 
#define READ ANALOG INPUT 1 Ox01 
- - -
for (i = 0; i < 300; i++) 
{ 




tag = L4_Send(thread_14tid(listener)); 
assert (L4_IpcSucceeded(tag) ); 
L4_MsgClear(&msq); 
tag = L4_Receive(thread 14tid(listener)); 
ftime = timer_current_time(); 
val = L4_Label(tag); 
prlntf ("RTU test app read __ analog input _1 call took %" PRIu64 " 
milliseconds, or %" PRIu64 
" microseconds\n", ((ftime - stime) /1000ULL), (ftime - stime) ); 
Figure 7.4. RTU test application code fragment. 
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7.3.2 [PC overhead results 
The elapsed time reported by the code fragment in figure 7.4 also includes the 
overhead of the timer_current _time () call. A separate test program was used 
where the intermittent L4_IPC calls were removed, leaving just the two calls to 
timer _ current _ time ( ). This was used to obtain a measure of the timer overhead, 
which was determined to be 59.63 microsecond. This was rounded down to 59 
microseconds when calculating the actual IPC overhead, so that any error is kept in the 
IPC overhead. 
The above program fragment was executed when the test application was loaded 
and run on the RTU development test platform. The print statements generate console 
output, which is output to the development systems screen by Kermit. The test program 
was run a total of four times. The first value reported each time was several milliseconds, 
but the remaining sample times were closely grouped around 123 microseconds. This 
first recorded elapsed time was high because the kernel some one time initialization to do 
for each thread IPC. Once this is done, it does not have to be done again. Therefore the 
first recorded time interval was excluded from further calculations. From the remaining 
times, a total of 500 samples were selected. The mean value was 123.19 microseconds 
with a standard deviation of .78 and a 95% confidence interval of .002. 
Recall that this value still includes the 59 microseconds of the calls to timer 
overhead. After subtracting this out of the previous result, the actual IPC overhead is for 
the timer overhead the actual IPC overhead was 64.19 microseconds, for the entire 
sequence depicted in figure 7.3. Assuming that overhead is evenly distributed, then a 
single IPC call, which would include a send-to and a receive-from, has an overhead of 
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approximately 32 microseconds, with a single IPC operation taking about 15 
microseconds. These times are indeed much better than the 100 microseconds reported 
for MACH IPC calls. 
Table 7.1. IPC overhead for hardened RTU protected calls. 
Description Value 
A verage Reported elapsed time 123.19 microseconds 
Standard Deviation .784908 
95% confidence interval .002 
Timer overhead 59 microseconds 
Actual Average overhead of IPe overhead 64.19 microseconds 
for hardened R TU protected operation call 
7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the results of further investigation of microkernels and 
their use in developing a hardened R TU. The L4 kernel was selected as a suitable 
microkernel for RTU development. The address space and thread abstractions provided 
by L4 make possible the functional and process separation that were identified in chapter 
five as key objectives in the MILS separation kernel approach. Another advantage of L4 
is that it supports real time scheduling. There are several possible L4 implementations. 
OKL4 was identified as the best L4 implementation for hardened RTU development 
since it is open source, and supporting both research endeavors and commercial 
endeavors. The gumstix XScale PXA 255 platform was identified as a good candidate 
for L4 based hardened RTU development. Gumstix supports OEM activities and is 
already in use in some commercial activities. Gumstix's architecture is open and 
accessible, and is supported by an open source build system including GNU tool chain. 
The microkernel based RTU will include a security layer that protects low-level 
RTU services implemented as L4 or Iguana servers. Hardened RTU application will use 
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L4 IPC to access these servers, through IPC to the security layer. Some initial 
development on an ARM XScale platform, loaded with the OKL4 kernel, was done to 
determine what the IPC overhead would be for the hardened RTU. Platform evaluation 
found the IPC overhead to be 64.19 microseconds. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
SCADA and DCS are used in a wide variety of utility and industrial operations. 
Complete isolation of these control networks is no longer a possible or plausible means of 
providing cyber security for these systems. Instead, security must be built into SCADA 
systems. However, control systems differ from traditional IT systems in a number of 
ways. One of those differences is the importance of securing perimeter devices, such as 
RTUs, in control networks. This dissertation has developed a new role based access 
control model for RTUs, and investigated two approaches for using minimal kernels, all 
of which can be used to create a security hardened R TU. This chapter presents the 
overall conclusions from this dissertation research and possible directions for future 
research. 
8.1 Conclusions 
A major focus of current SCADA security efforts has been authentication. This 
research has argued that RTUs need to provide access control as well. The insider threat 
and increased commercial R TU software components, such as web servers, are two 
important threats that RTU access control can help reduce. This dissertation has 
presented a new role based access control model designed specifically for RTUs and 
process control. The model includes assignment constraints based on RTU operation 
type which limit the RTU operations that a specific role can be assigned. The model also 
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includes activation constraints that allow a security administrator to specify conditions 
when specific roles or permissions cannot be used. Constraints are activated by context 
information, including process control specific state information as well as the process 
control relevant information of location and time. 
The RTU access control model helps to mitigate the insider threat by allowing 
those who must have access to the RTU, to be limited to only those RTU operations that 
their duties require. Contractors and business partners, or new employees can easily be 
given reduced privileges. Organizing RTU permissions around roles also makes it much 
easier to manage the assignment and revocation of permissions to users, and decrease the 
probability of a misconfiguration or forgotten privilege. The assignment constraints, 
based on R TU operation type of control, status, and configuration allow a security 
administrator to establish separation of duty policies that the model then makes sure are 
not violated, further reducing the chance of a misconfiguration or inappropriate 
assignment of permissions. Context based constraints, such as "Bill cannot activate his 
engineering role on weekends, or at night", allow fined grained control of permissions 
organized around logical contexts. 
Additional RTU hardening can be achieved through development of a minimal 
kernel RTU and this dissertation has investigated two possible approaches. The first 
approach is to reduce a commercial OS kernel to only those components needed by the 
RTU, eliminating known and unknown vulnerabilities and significantly reducing the size 
of the kernel. The second approach proposes using a microkernel that supports 
partitioning as the basis for an RTU specific operating system which isolates network 
related RTU software, from critical RTU operation software such as local control and 
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analog and digital input and output. This isolation provides an additional, and nearly 
impenetrable layer of separation between software that can be attacked and critical RTU 
software. Allowed channels of communication are achieved and enforced using kernel 
IPC. The use of IPC allows security critical RTU code to be protected, and makes 
circumvention of security less likely. 
A prototype hardened RTU was constructed using the reduced COTS kernel 
approach and implementing the newly developed RTU role based access control model. 
The over 50% reduction in the size of the commercial kernel confirms that significant 
amounts of code in commercial kernels can be eliminated. This eliminated code can 
contain both known and unknown vulnerabilities, increasing the RTU's security. The 
prototype was connected to real SCADA hardware in the Chemical Engineering 
Department's Process Control Laboratory. Functional testing of users, roles and 
constraints confirmed that users were able to carryout assigned tasks with the limited set 
of permissions provided by the security hardened RTU. Security tests, ranging from 
scanning and network based attacks to simulated insider stacks were all positive, 
demonstrating the RTUs increased resistance to cyber based attacks. Analysis of the 
communication times found the prototype RTU response time to be within 500 
milliseconds, acceptable for many SCADA and DCS application areas. This indicates 
that the RTU access controls and reduced kernel did not negatively impact performance. 
Potential commercialization of this prototype is possible after additional testing and 
refinement. 
Investigation of a partitioning microkernel for an RTU identified the L4 
microkernel as a potential candidate since L4 provides partitioning and real time 
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scheduling. To evaluate L4, the OKL4 implementation was used on an embedded ARM 
XScale processor. Using a Gumstix development platform, the microkemel approach 
was demonstrated by creating simulated critical RTU operations that were isolated from 
network facing software using L4 address spaces. The approach makes extensive use of 
IPC and could be negatively impacted by high IPC overhead. Experimental analysis 
found the IPC overhead for protected RTUs operations to be slightly less than 65 
microseconds, sufficiently small to warrant continued investigation of an OKL4/ARM 
based hardened R TU. 
8.2 Future Research Directions 
The RTU role based access control model chose to use negative constraints. The 
decision was made to strike a balance between allowing, through role assignment, and 
denying, through constraints. A different approach, one that focuses entirely on 
instantaneous enabling of permissions could be explored. In such an approach, RTU 
permission assignment would be completely event driven. Such an approach would 
result in an even better approximation of least privilege, allowing only those permissions 
needed at any moment to be granted to a subject. Just as important, the approach makes 
sure that the access control is continuous, allowing an attack to be prevented even if 
initial condition under which the attack occurred would have allowed it to succeed. 
A second direction of research related to the RTU access control policy is to 
translate the policy into constraint logic programming (CLP). The use of CLP is gaining 
interest in access control research due to the ability to apply AI reasoning research to the 
domain. A CLP based model should be equally expressive, and could encourage the 
development of policy tools. The development of tools to help SCADA operators 
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configure and reason about policies would be of great value. SCADA systems are 
complex systems, and as they grow in size and intricacy, it will be very difficult to 
develop and analyze policies. Development of tools for policy development and policy 
checking, especially CLP, is an area of exploration that might yield results that could 
directly benefit the SCADA community and possibly be translated to other commercial 
sectors. 
The ability to express constraints is one major advantage of role based access 
control models over the traditional access control matrix model. Another strength of role 
based access control that could be exploited by this model is role hierarchies. In role 
hierarchies, more privileges roles inherit the permissions of more junior roles, forming a 
lattice of roles. This allows roles to be layered and permissions to be grouped not only by 
role but by their dominance or subordination to other permissions. The application of 
role hierarchies to the RTU role based access control model could provide even more 
logical permission grouping and is worthy of further investigation, though it might entail 
the addition of more roles to the model. 
Another direction for future research is related to handling access denials. The 
current prototype returns a flag to the application that the access was denied. The 
application then has to handle the error. In DNP3 this could be done using the internal 
indicator status bytes to indicate the point is offline. A more elegant and potentially 
much more secure approach is to explore having the RTU provide something like poly-
instantiation of RTU points and services. By applying a type of poly-instantiation, a 
connected user or device would only see those points (eventually other R TU services as 
well) to which they had access. It would be as if users with different roles or 
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authorization were connected to different RTUs. This would discourage attackers by 
making less privilege scans of the system show little of interest. Poly-instantiation could 
also assist in assuring availability by helping clearly define how the RTU should be 
partitioned to maximize the ease of implementing the RTU poly-instantiation. 
The potential security benefits of microkernel based systems are just now 
beginning to be seriously considered. The key challenge in furthering this agenda is 
developing systems that provide specific security architectures. While an L4 based RTU 
has a smaller TCB, and can isolate components, the need for component interaction 
mandates more elaborate security support. For the hardened RTU based microkernel, the 
next area of exploration is to demonstrate that the RTU role based access control model 
can be implemented on L4, and that it can be done so with in a more secure way than on 
a COTS system. A static policy can easily be implemented by the security middleware 
layer, but what will eventually be desirable is for objects to protect themselves using the 
security server. This kind of protection allows program developers to include security 
during the entire software development lifecycle. This is a goal for most software 
development activities, but is doubly critical for RTUs and other field devices, and the 
potential consequences of security violations can be dire. 
The harsh environment in which RTUs operate and the importance of availability 
provide motivation for a final future research direction. The measures presented in this 
dissertation focus on protection, and did not include any performance monitoring 
features. However, the incorporation of performance monitoring into the security harden 
RTU would enhance security, especially availability. With the performance monitoring, 
the RTU may be able to self report problems before they become big problems. 
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Performance features could give additional indication of a security violation, or may just 
indicate a physical problem. Possible performance monitoring features would be 
processor temperature, the number of packet reassembly failures, the longest and average 
time for a request to be received, the number of processes currently active and/or 
inactive. Performance monitoring comes at a cost, both for the extra cycles needed to 
calculate and store performance data, and the bandwidth needed to transmit the extra 
data. Further investigation is needed to determine the most appropriate performance 
measures, and how to assure that they do not themselves create vulnerabilities. 
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GLOSSARY 
Certificate Authority (CA) - Entity that creates and issues digital certificates used by 
other parties in a PKI. 
Commercial Off The Self (COTS) -- Described ready made products that are easily 
obtainable. Products include both hardware and software, and the use of open 
standards is an important component. An excellent example of COTS hardware 
would be standard Ethernet cards. Examples of COTS software products include 
operating systems like Windows, Linux, and MAC OS as well as server products 
such as liS or Apache, and user application like word processors or compilers. 
COTS components are typically inexpensive compared to the cost of custom 
developed products. 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) - A standard created and 
controlled by OMG that defines APls and communications protocols that allow 
heterogeneous software components to interoperate. 
Denial of Service (DoS) - Inhibition of a service or resource for an extended period of 
time. A type of attack which usually does not result in the loss of information or 
corruption of information, but which prevents valid users from accessing a service 
or resource 
Distributed Control System (DCS) - A distributed PCS where one or more sub-
controllers at different geographic location within the plant are monitored and 
controlled from a singe remote location. 
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) - A SCADA communication protocol for 
delivering the status offield equipment from RTUs to MTUs and control 
commands from MTUs to RTUs. The primary abstraction used in the DNP3 
protocol is that of points where a point indicated a specific value associated with a 
specific piece of field equipment. The protocol is broken into two components 
the client and the server. Typically RTUs implement the DNP3 server protocol 
and MTUs implement DNP3 client protocol. 
Field Equipment - In SCADA and process control systems field equipment refers to 
devices measure or operate physical system. Temperature sensors and value 
controllers are excellent examples offield equipment. Field equipment may have 
a communication interface, in which case it might be referred to as a lED. Other 
field equipment may have only analog and digital leads. 
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Fieldbus - The network that links sensors, actuators, and other devices to a PC or PLC 
based controller eliminating the need for point to point wiring of device to 
controller. 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) - A network protocol for exchanging files over a network. 
Firewall - A combination of hardware and software components that inhibit network 
traftic flows based on security policy. 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) - The hardware or software through which the an 
operator interacts with a controller. HMls range in complexity from a physical 
panel with buttons and lights to an industrial PC with color graphics running HMI 
software. 
Independent Application Development Kit (IADK) - A set of tools and libraries from 
SIXNET for custom software development for mIMP based RTUs. 
Intelligent Electronic Device (lED) - Any device that incorporates one or more 
processors capable of sending or receiving data or control to or from an external 
source. 
Inter Process Communication (IPC) - A set of techniques for exchanging data between 
two or more processes running on the same or different computers. 
Internet Protocol (IP) - An open network layer protocol used for communication data 
across packet-switched network. 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) - A set of protocol developed to support secure 
exchange of packets at the IP layer. Especially useful in implementing VPNs. 
Local Area Network (LAN) - A group of computers that share a common 
communicatins line and occupy a relatively small geographic area (such as a build 
or control room). A LAN can consist of a couple of computers to several 
thousand. Ethernet is by far the most common LAN network technology. 
Master Terminal Unit (MTU) - A SCADA component whose primary responsibility is 
to maintain a real-time data about the status of the system through regular polling 
of RTUs. MTUs are also responsible for sending operator control signal back to 
RTUs. Some MTUs provide a user interface and in other situations the user 
interface is provided by a separate machine usually referred to as a HMI. 
Modbus - A open standard SCADA protocol for RTU - MTU communication. 
Multiple Independent Layers of Security (MILS) - A high-assurance high-
performance computing architecture that can enforce strict security and separation 
policies on data and processes residing on a single microprocessor. 
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Partition Communication System (PCS) - Part of the MILS standard that is under 
development. Partitions are the unit of separation in MILS and the PCS is a 
middleware layer that enforces a security policy on communication between 
partitions on one or more processors. 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) - An access control entity that receives requests from the 
policy enforcement point in the form of (subject, object, operations) and returns 
either true or false indicating whether a given request is allowed by the policy. 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) - An access control entity that is logically located 
between subjects and systems resources, and enforces the systems access control 
policy. 
Process Control System (PCS) - A computer system that processes sensor inputs, 
executes control algorithms, and computes actuator outputs. In a PCS control 
decisions are made by the computer system based on control algorithms. 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) - A small industrial computer used in factories 
originally designed to replace relay logic of a process control system and has 
evolved into a controller having the functionality of a process controller. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - A cryptographic arrangement that provides for third 
party validation of user identities by tying public keys to a user identity. 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) - The international telephone system that 
uses copper wire to transmit analog data, usually voice communication. 
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) - Also known as remote telemetry unit. SCADA system 
component that acquires data from sensors, delivers control signals to field 
equipment, and communicates with the master station. 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) - An access control scheme in which the 
permission to carryout various operations are assigned to roles. A user of the 
system is then assigned to one or more roles and is allowed to carryout only those 
operations which are associated with the users roles. 
SCADA Cryptographic Module (SCM) - A hardware device that provides secure serial 
SCADA communication between MTUs and RTUs. The SCM has two ports a 
plaintext port and a ciphertext port. SCADA messages from either an RTU or 
MTU are received on the SCM's plaintext port and protected messages are sent 
out the cipher text port and vice versa. Secure communication requires a SCM at 
each end of the communications channel. 
Secure Shell (SSH) - A protocol that provides for the establishment of a secure channel 
between a local and remote computer using public-key cryptography and 
symmetric encryption. 
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Serial SCADA Protection Protocol (SSPP) - A cryptographic protocol developed by 
the AGA as part of its effort to secure SCADA systems. The protocol is designed 
for serial communications and the ability to support many SCADA protocols. 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition System (SCADA) - Provides the ability to 
monitor and control the operation of a distributed physical system, such as 
electrical power distribution, from a single remote location. In general control 
commands are delivered by the SCADA system but control decision are made by 
a human operator in response to alarms generated by the SCADA system. 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) - A transport layer protocol that provides 
applications with a reliable stream for in order data flow. 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) - The collection of hardware and software components 
that are involved in enforcing security for a given computing system. 
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) - Greenwich mean time. 
Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) - A network of computers that behave as if they 
were connected to the same physical network segment of a LAN. VLANs are 
configured through software. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) - A private communications network used by one or 
more organizations to communicate over a public network. 
War-dialer - a computer program that uses a modem connected to the computer to dial 
hundreds or thousands of phone numbers and identifies numbers to which a 
corresponding modem and computer are connected. 
Wide Area Network (WAN) - A computer network that spans a large geographical area, 
such as multiple states or cities. Computer connected to the WAN are often 
connected through public networks like the telephone system. 
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APPENDIX A 
REDUCED LINUX KERNEL CONFIGURATION FILE 
# 
# Automatically generated by make menuconfig: don't edit 
# 
# CONFIG UID16 is not set 









# Loadable module support 
# 
CONFIG_MODULES=y 
# CONFIG MODVERSIONS is not set 
CONFIG KMOD=y 
# 




# CONFIG 6xx is not set 
# CONFIG 4xx is not set 
# CONFIG POWER3 is not set 
-
# CONFIG POWER4 is not set 
CONFIG 8xx=y 
-
# CONFIG PPC STD MMU is not 
- - -
CONFIG SERIAL_CONSOLE=y 
# CONFIG RPXLITE is not set 
# CONFIG RPXCLASSIC is not 
# CONFIG BSEIP is not set 
# CONFIG FADS is not set 
CONFIG_SXNI855T=y 
# CONFIG_TQM823L is not set 
# CONFIG_TQM850L is not set 
# CONFIG_TQM855L is not set 
# CONFIG_TQM860L is not set 
# CONFIG FPS850L is not set 
# CONFIG_TQM860 is not set 
set 
set 
# CONFIG SPD823TS is not set 
# CONFIG IVMS8 is not set 
# CONFIG IVML24 is not set 
# CONFIG SM850 is not set 
-
# CONFIG MBX is not set 
# CONFIG WINCEPT is not set 
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# CONFIG ALL PPC is not set 
# CONFIG SMP is not set 
CONFIG_MATH EMULATION=y 
# 
# General setup 
# 
# CONFIG HIGHMEM is not set 
# CONFIG ISA is not set 
# CONFIG EISA is not set 
# CONFIG SBUS is not set 
# CONFIG MCA is not set 
# CONFIG_PCI_QSPAN is not set 









# CONFIG BINFMT MISC is not set 
# CONFIG HOT PLUG is not set 
# CONFIG PCMCIA is not set 
# 
# Parallel port support 
# 
# CONFIG PARPORT is not set 
CONFIG_PPC_RTC=y 
CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL=y 
CONFIG CMDLINE="console=ttySO,9600 console=ttyO root=/dev/sda2" 
# 
# Memory Technology Devices (MTD) 
# 
CONFIG_MTD=y 
# CONFIG MTD DEBUG is not set 
CONFIG_MTD_PARTITIONS=y 
# CONFIG MTD CONCAT is not set 
# CONFIG MTD REDBOOT PARTS is not set 
# CONFIG MTD CMDLINE PARTS is not set 
CONFIG_MTD_CHAR=y 
CONFIG_MTD_BLOCK=y 
# CONFIG FTL is not set 
# CONFIG NFTL is not set 
# 





# CONFIG MTD CFI ADV OPTIONS is not set 
- - - -
CONFIG_MTD_CFI_INTELEXT=y 
CONFIG MTD CFI_AMDSTD=y 
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# CONFIG MTD CFI STAA is not set 
# CONFIG MTD RAM is not set 
# CONFIG MTD ROM is not set 
# CONFIG MTD ABSENT is not set 
# CONFIG MTD OBSOLETE CHIPS is not set 
# CONFIG MTD AMDSTD is not set 
# CONFIG MTD SHARP is not set 
# CONFIG MTD JEDEC is not set 
# 
# Mapping drivers for chip access 
# 
# CONFIG MTD PHYSMAP is not set 
CONFIG_MTD_SXNI855T=y 
# CONFIG_MTD_TQM8XXL is not set 
# CONFIG MTD RPXLITE is not set 
# CONFIG MTD MBX860 is not set 
# CONFIG MTD DBOX2 is not set 
# CONFIG MTD CFI FLAGADM is not set 
# CONFIG MTD REDWOOD is not set 
# CONFIG MTD PCI is not set 
# CONFIG MTD PCMCIA is not set 
# 
# Self-contained MTD device drivers 
# 
# CONFIG MTD PMC551 is not set 
CONFIG_MTD_SLRAM=y 
# CONFIG MTD MTDRAM is not set 
# CONFIG MTD BLKMTD is not set 
# CONFIG MTD DOCIOOO is not set 
# CONFIG MTD DOC2000 is not set 
# CONFIG MTD DOC2001 is not set 
# CONFIG MTD DOCPROBE is not set 
# 
# NAND Flash Device Drivers 
# 
CONFIG MTD_NAND=y 
CONFIG MTD NAND VERIFY_WRITE=y 
CONFI G_MT D_NAND_SXN I =y 
CONFIG MTD_NAND IDS=y 
# 
# Plug and Play configuration 
# 
# CONFIG PNP is not set 
# CONFIG ISAPNP is not set 
# 
# Block devices 
# 
# CONFIG BLK DEV FD is not set 
# CONFIG BLK DEV XD is not set 
# CONFIG PARIDE is not set 
# CONFIG_BLK_CPQ_DA is not set 
# CONFIG BLK_CPQ CISS DA is not set 
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# CONFIG BLK DEV DAC960 is not set 
# CONFIG BLK DEV LOOP is not set 
~ ~ ~ 
# CONFIG BLK DEV NBD is not set 
~ ~ ~ 
CONFIG~BLK~DEV~RAM=y 
CONFIG BLK DEV RAM SIZE=4096 
CONFIG BLK~DEV INITRD=y 
# 
# Multi-device support (RAID and LVM) 
# 
# CONFIG MD is not set 
# CONFIG BLK DEV MD is not set 
# CONFIG MD LINEAR is not set 
# CONFIG MD RAIDO is not set 
# CONFIG MD RAIDl is not set 
# CONFIG MD RAID5 is not set 
# CONFIG MD MULTIPATH is not set 
# CONFIG BLK DEV LVM is not set 
# 
# Networking options 
# 
# CONFIG PACKET is not set 
# CONFIG NETLINK DEV is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG NETFILTER is not set 
# CONFIG FILTER is not set 
CONFIG~UNIX=y 
CONFIG~INET=y 
# CONFIG IP MULTICAST is not set 
# CONFIG IP ADVANCED ROUTER is not set 
# CONFIG IP PNP is not set 
# CONFIG NET IPIP is not set 
# CONFIG NET IPGRE is not set 
# CONFIG ARPD is not set 
# CONFIG~INET~ECN is not set 
# CONFIG SYN COOKIES is not set 
# CONFIG IPV6 is not set 
# CONFIG KHTTPD is not set 
# CONFIG ATM is not set 
# CONFIG~VLAN 8021Q is not set 
# CONFIG IPX is not set 
# CONFIG ATALK is not set 
# CONFIG DECNET is not set 
# CONFIG BRIDGE is not set 
# CONFIG X25 is not set 
# CONFIG LAPB is not set 
# CONFIG LLC is not set 
# CONFIG NET DIVERT is not set 
# CONFIG ECONET is not set 
# CONFIG WAN ROUTER is not set 
# CONFIG NET FASTROUTE is not set 
# CONFIG NET HW FLOWCONTROL is not set 
# 
# QoS and/or fair queueing 
# 
# CONFIG NET SCHED is not set 
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# 
# ATA/IDE/MFM/RLL support 
# 
CONFIG IDE is not set # 
# 
# 
CON FIG BLK DEV IDE MODES is ~ot set 
~ ~ --
CONFIG BLK DEV HD is not set 
# 
# SCSI support 
# 
# CONFIG SCSI is not set 
# 




# ARCnet devices 
# 
# CONFIG ARCNET is not set 
# CONFIG DUMMY is not set 
# CONFIG BONDING is not set 
# CONFIG EQUALIZER is not set 
# CONFIG TUN is not set 
# CONFIG ETHERTAP is not set 
# 
# Ethernet (10 or 100Mbit) 
# 
CONFIG_NET ETHERNET=y 
# CONFIG MACE is not set 
# CONFIG BMAC is not set 
# CONFIG GMAC is not set 
# CONFIG SUNLANCE is not set 
# CONFIG SUNBMAC is not set 
# CONFIG_SUNQE is not set 
# CONFIG SUNGEM is not set 
# CONFIG NET VENDOR 3COM is not set 
# CONFIG LANCE is not set 
# CONFIG NET VENDOR SMC is not set 
- - -
# CONFIG NET VENDOR RACAL is not set 
# CONFIG NET ISA is not set 
# CONFIG NET PCI is not set 
# CONFIG NET POCKET is not set 
# 
# Ethernet (1000 Mbit) 
# 
# CONFIG ACENIC is not set 
# CONFIG DL2K is not set 
# CONFIG MYRI SBUS is not set 
# CONFIG NS83820 is not set 
# CONFIG HAMACHI is not set 
# CONFIG YELLOWFIN is not set 
# CONFIG SK98LIN is not set 
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# CONFIG FOOl is not set 
# CONFIG HIPPI is not set 
# CONFIG PLIP is not set 
CONFIG PPP=m 
CONFIG~PPP~MULTILINK=y 
# CONFIG PPP FILTER is not set 
CONFIG PPP ASYNC=m 
CONFIG PPP SYNC TTY=m 
CONFIG PPP DEFLATE=m 
CONFIG PPP BSDCOMP=m 
CONFIG PPPOE=m 
# CONFIG SLIP is not set 
# 
# Wireless LAN (non-hamradio) 
# 
# CONFIG NET RADIO is not set 
# 
# Token Ring devices 
# 
# CONFIG TR is not set 
# CONFIG NET FC is not set 
# CONFIG RCPCI is not set 
# CONFIG SHAPER is not set 
# 
# Wan interfaces 
# 
# CONFIG WAN is not set 
# 
# Amateur Radio support 
# 
# CONFIG HAMRADIO is not set 
# 
# IrDA (infrared) support 
# 
# CONFIG IRDA is not set 
# 
# ISDN subsystem 
# 
# CONFIG ISDN is not set 
# 
# Old CD-ROM drivers (not SCSI, not IDE) 
# 
# CONFIG CD NO IDESCSI is not set 
# 
# Console drivers 
# 
# 
# Frame-buffer support 
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# 
# CONFIG FB is not set 
# 








CONFIG INPUT is not set 
CONFIG INPUT KEYBDEV is not set 
CONFIG INPUT MOUSEDEV is not set 
- -
CONFIG INPUT JOYDEV is not set 
CONFIG INPUT EVDEV is not set 
# Macintosh device drivers 
# 
# 
# Character devices 
# 
# CONFIG VT is not set 
CONFIG_SERIAL=y 
CONFIG_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y 
# CONFIG SERIAL EXTENDED is not set 
- -
# CONFIG SERIAL NONSTANDARD is not set 
CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS=y 
CONFIG UNIX98 PTY COUNT=32 
# 
# I2C support 
# 
CONFIG_I2C=y 
# CONFIG I2C ALGOBIT is not set 
# CONFIG I2C ALGOPCF is not set 
CONFIG_I2C_SIMPLE_BIT=y 
# CONFIG I2C ALG08XX is not set 
# CONFIG I2C CHARDEV is not set 




# CONFIG BUSMOUSE is not set 




# CONFIG INPUT GAME PORT is not set 
# CONFIG QIC02 TAPE is not set 
# 
# Watchdog Cards 
# 
# CON FIG WATCHDOG is not set 
# CONFIG INTEL RNG is not set 
# CONFIG NVRAM is not set 
# CONFIG RTC is not set 
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CONFIG~DS1306~RTC=y 
# CONFIG DTLK is not set 
# CONFIG R3964 is not set 
# CONFIG APPLICOM is not set 
# 
# Ftape, the floppy tape device driver 
# 
# CONFIG FTAPE is not set 
# CONFIG AGP is not set 
# CONFIG DRM is not set 
# 
# Multimedia devices 
# 
# CONFIG VIDEO DEV is not set 
# 






CONFIG~QUOTA is not set 
CONFIG AUTOFS FS is not set 
CONFIG AUTOFS4 FS is not set 
~ ~ 
CONFIG REI SERFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG REI SERFS CHECK is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG REI SERFS PROC INFO is not set 
# CONFIG ADFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG ADFS FS RW is not set 
# CONFIG AFFS FS is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG HFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG BFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG EXT3 FS is not set 
# CONFIG JBD is not set 
# CONFIG JBD DEBUG is not set 
# CONFIG FAT FS is not set 
# CONFIG MSDOS FS is not set 
# CONFIG UMSDOS FS is not set 
# CONFIG VFAT FS is not set 
# CONFIG EFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG JFFS FS is not set 
~ ~ 
CONFIG~JFFS2~FS=y 
CONFIG JFFS2 FS DEBUG=O 
CONFIG JFFS2 FS~NAND=y 
~ 
# CONFIG CRAMFS is not set 
# CONFIG TMPFS is not set 
# CONFIG RAMFS is not set 
# CONFIG IS09660 FS is not 
# CONFIG JOLIET is not set 
# CONFIG ZISOFS is not set 
set 
# CONFIG MINIX FS is not set 
# CONFIG VXFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG NTFS FS is not set 
# CON FIG NTFS RW is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG HPFS FS is not set 
CONFIG~PROC~FS=y 
# CONFIG DEVFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG DEVFS MOUNT is not set 
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# CONFIG DEVFS DEBUG is not se~ 
~ ~ 
CONFIG~DEVPTS~FS=y 
# CONFIG~QNX4FS~FS is not set 
# CONFIG~QNX4FS~RW is not set 
# CONFIG ROMFS FS is not set 
~ ~ 
CONFIG~EXT2~FS=y 
# CONFIG SYSV FS is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG UDF FS is not set 
# CONFIG UDF RW is not set 
# CONFIG UFS FS is not set 
# CONFIG UFS FS WRITE is not set 
# 
# Network File Systems 
# 
# CONFIG CODA FS is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG INTERMEZZO FS is not set 
CONFIG~NFS~FS=y 
CONFIG~NFS~V3=y 







# CONFIG 5MB NLS DEFAULT is not set 
# CONFIG NCP FS is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS PACKET SIGNING is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS IOCTL LOCKING is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS STRONG is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS NFS NS is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS OS2 NS is not set 
# CONFIG NCPFS SMALLDOS is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG NCPFS NLS is not set 
~ ~ 
# CONFIG NCPFS EXTRAS is not set 
# CONFIG ZISOFS FS is not set 
# 
# Partition Types 
# 





# Native Language Support 
# 
CONFIG NLS DEFAULT="iso8859-1" 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 437 is not 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 737 is not 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 775 is not 
~ ~ ~ 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 850 is not 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 852 is not 
# CONFIG NLS CODEPAGE 855 is not 

























CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 861 is not set 
- - -
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 862 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 863 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 864 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 865 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 866 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 869 is not set 
- - -
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 936 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 950 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 932 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 949 is not set 
- - -
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 874 is not set 
CONF1G NLS 1S08859 8 is not set 
- - -
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 1250 is not set 
CONF1G NLS CODEPAGE 1251 is not set 
CONF1G NLS 1S08859 l=m 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 2 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 3 is not set 
- - -
# CONFIG NLS 1S08859 4 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 5 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 6 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 7 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 9 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 13 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 14 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS 1S08859 15 is not set 
# CONF1G NLS K018 R is not set 
# CONF1G NLS K018 U is not set 




# CONF1G SOUND is not set 
# 
# MPC8xx CPM Options 
# 
# CONFIG SCC ENET is not set 
CONF1G_FEC_ENET=y 
CONF1G_USE_MD10=y 
# CONF1G FEC AMD79C874 is not set 
# CONF1G FEC LXT970 is not set 
CONF1G_FEC_LXT971=y 






CONF1G UART MAX1DL SMCl=1 
CONF1G SMCI UART RX BDNUM=2 
CONF1G SMCI UART RX BDS1ZE=8 
CONF1G SMCI UART TX BDNUM=2 
CONF1G SMCI UART TX BDS1ZE=8 




eONFIG PORT CTSl NONE=y 
# CONFIG UART CTS CONTROL SeCl is not set 
CONFIG PORT RTSl NONE=y 
# CONFIG PORT RTSl B is not set 
# CONFIG_PORT_RTS1_c is not set 
CONFIG PORT COl NONE=y 
# CONFIG UART CD CONTROL SCCl is not set 
-" --
CONFIG PORT OTRl NONE=y 
# CONFIG PORT OTRl A is not set 
# CONFIG-PORT-OTRI-B is not set 
# eONFIG-PORT OTRl C is not set 
# CONFIG PORT OTRl 0 is not set 
CONFIG UART MAXIOL SCC1=4 
CONFIG SCCl UART RX BONUM=2 
CONFIG SCCl UART RX BOSIZE=8 
CONFIG SCCl UART TX BONUM=2 
CONFIG SCCl UART TX BOSIZE=8 
# CONFIG SCC2 UART is not set 
# CONFIG SCC3 UART is not set 
# CONFIG SCC4 UART is not set 
CONFIG_8xx_COPYBACK=y 
# CONFIG 8xx CPU6 is not set 
# eONFIG UCOOE PATCR is not set 
# 
# USB support 
# 
CONFIG USB is not set 
CONFIG USB URCI is not set 
CONFIG USB URCI ALT is not set 
CONFIG USB OHCI is not set 
eONFIG USB AUDIO is not set 
CONFIG USB BLUE TOOTH is not set 





























eONFIG USB STORAGE DEBUG is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB STORAGE OATAFAB is not set 
CONFIG USB STORAGE FREECOM is not set 
CONFIG USB STORAGE IS0200 is not set 
CONFIG USB STORAGE OPCM is not set 
CONFIG USB STORAGE HP8200e is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB STORAGE SOOR09 is not set 
CONFIG USB STORAGE JUMPSHOT is not set 
CONFIG USB ACM is not set 
CONFIG USB PRINTER is not set 
CONFIG USB OC2XX is not set 
CONFIG USB MOC800 is not set 
CONFIG USB SCANNER is not set 
CONFIG USB MICROTEK is not set 
CONFIG USB HPUSBSCSI is not set 
CONFIG USB PEGASUS is not set 
CONFIG USB KAWETH is not set 
CONFIG USB CATC is not set 
CONFIG USB COCETHER is not set 
CONFIG USB USBNET is not set 
CONFIG USB USS720 is not set 
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CONFIG USB SERIAL is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL GENERIC is not set 
- -
CONFIG USB SERIAL BELKIN is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL WHITEHEAT is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL DIGI ACCElEPORT is not set 
- - - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL EMPEG is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL FTDI SIO is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL VISOR is not set 
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_IPAQ is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL IR is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL EDGEPORT is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN PDA is not set 
- - - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA28 is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA28X is not set 
- - - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA28XA is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA28XB is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN US.A19 is not set 
- - - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA18X is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA19W is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KEYSPAN USA49W is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL MCT U232 is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL KLSI is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL PL2303 is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL CYBERJACK is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB SERIAL XIRCOM is not set 
CONFIG USB SERIAL OMNINET is not set 
- - -
CONFIG USB RI0500 is not set 
Bluetooth support 
CONFIG BLUEZ is not set 
Kernel hacking 
CONFIG MAGIC SYSRQ is not set 
CONFIG KGDB is not set 
CONFIG XMON is not set 
# Library routines 
# 
CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE=y 




DNP3 is a SCADA protocol designed to allow SCADA devices to communicate 
and transfer data and control commands from one point to another. It supports both serial 
and TCP/IP communications with IP communications generally being achieved by 
tunneling the serial version inside TCP or UDP packets. In DNP3 the term outstation 
refers to devices or computers that are in the field and the term master refers to 
computers in the control center. The terms slave is also used to refer to an outstation. 
DNP3 is a non-proprietary protocol and a full specification is available from 
www.dnp.org for a nominal fee. 
Every DNP3 device has a database of different data types; each organized as an 
array of values. Data items are identified by their data type and index, called a point 
index, as shown in figure B.l. The MTU, or master, uses the data values to display the 
state or condition of the physical system to which one or more outstations or RTUs are 
connected. The objective of the master is to keep its database updated and accomplishes 
this by sending requests (polling) to outstations. Outstations then provide the master with 
the value of data item or items that were requested. (Outstations may also send 
unsolicited data to masters in the form of an unsolicited response). 
The DNP3 protocol is organized into layers that are similar to the standard OSI 
model. The top layer, or user layer, maps DNP3 data objects to local data or a local 
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database. On master stations the user layer initiates requests to outstations for data and 
on outstations the user layer retrieves data from the outstation database in response to a 
master's request. The requested operations, the item or items on which the request is 
made, and any data need to complete the request are specified in the application layer 
message. The transport layer breaks up long application layer messages into smaller 
packets for the link layer and reassembles them on the other side. And the link layer 
makes the physical connection reliable. For the purpose of this disertation only the 
application layer is of concern since the developed security enhancements are applied at 
the application layer. 
DNP3 application layer messages have three main components: an application 
header, a function code, and one or more ONP3 objects each of which consists of an 
object header followed by one or more object values. Figure B.2 shows the general 
structure of the ONP3 application layer fragments; masters send request fragments and 
outstations send response fragments. The application control octet contains application 
layer sequence number and some status flags. The function code indicates the operations 
being performed, and the object header identifies the data point or points (range of 
indexes) on which the operation is to be carried out. The lIN in the application response 
is used to communicate the internal status of the RTU or outstation to the master. 
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Security in DNP3 is limited to transmission errors which are detected by the link 
layer using CRC checksums. As is common in many SCADA protocols the identity of 
the sender is not authenticated nor is the integrity of the message verified. More 
importantly, like other SCADA protocols DNP3 has embraced TCP/IP and the use of 
TCP and UDP are now apart of the DNP3 specification. The lack of security features in 
194 
DNP3 makes SCADA and DCS devices vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks 
discussed in chapter two. 
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APPENDIXC 
NESSUS SCAN REPORT 
Nessus Scan Report 
SUMMARY 
- Number of hosts which were alive during the test 1 
- Number of security holes found: 1 
- Number of security warnings found : 2 
- Number of security notes found : 5 
TESTED HOSTS 
10.165.49.249 (Security holes found) 
DETAILS 
+ 10.165.49.249 
List of open ports 
o ftp (21/tcp) (Security notes found) 
o telnet (23/tcp) (Security notes found) 
o general/tcp (Security warnings found) 
o general/udp (Security hole found) 
o general/icmp (Security warnings found) 
Information found on port ftp (21/tcp) 
The service closed the connection after 0 seconds without sending 
any data 
It might be protected by some TCP wrapper 
. Information found on port telnet (23/tcp) 
The service closed the connection after 0 seconds without sending 
any data 
It might be protected by some TCP wrapper 
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· Warning found on port general/tcp 
The remote host does not discard TCP SYN packets which 
have the FIN flag set. 
Depending on the kind of firewall you are using, an 





Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch 
Risk factor : Medium 
BID : 7487 
Information found on port general/tcp 
The remote host is running one of these operating systems 
Linux Kernel 2.4 
NetGear Router 
Information found on port general/tcp 
10.165.49.249 resolves as private049249.private.louisville.edu. 
Vulnerability found on port genera1/udp : 
It was possible 
to make the remote server crash 
using the 'nestea' attack. 
An attacker may use this flaw to 
shut down this server, thus 
preventing your network from 
working properly 
Solution : contact your operating 
system vendor for a patch. 
Risk factor : High 
CVE CAN-1999-0257 
BID : 7219 
Information found on port general/udp 





. Warning found on port general/icmp 
The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This allows 
an 
attacker 
to know the date which is set on your machine. 





filter out the ICMP timestamp requests (13), and the 
timestamp replies (14). 
Risk factor : Low 
CVE : CAN-1999-0524 
This file was generated by the Nessus Security Scanner 
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APPENDIXD 
SIXNET mIPM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
Section 5 Technical Specifications 
Technical 
Specifications 
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